DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12228
Alberto Giubilini, Neil Levy
{"title":"What in the World Is Collective Responsibility?","authors":"Alberto Giubilini, Neil Levy","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12228","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12228","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper we analyse the notion of collective responsibility and the criteria for its application to different types of groups. We argue that most of the ways in which the notion of collective responsibility has been attributed to different types of groups actually refer to a form of responsibility that is not genuinely collective, but that boils down to some form of individual responsibility. We identify an intrinsically collective kind of responsibility and argue that it can be attributed to only one kind of group. We begin by setting two necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility, asking whether these two conditions are satisfied in the case of different types of groups that have been taken to be bearers of moral responsibility: organized groups, groups with internal bonds of solidarity, groups that program individuals to act in a certain way, random collections of individuals, and individuals engaging in joint actions. Contrary to what various authors have maintained, we argue that only in the case of individuals engaging in joint actions is attribution of a genuinely collective form of moral responsibility warranted, i.e. only groups engaging in joint action satisfy the two conditions for attribution of genuinely collective moral responsibility.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"191-217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12228","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37173132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12229
Gábor Bács
{"title":"Mental Fictionalism and Epiphenomenal Qualia","authors":"Gábor Bács","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12229","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12229","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the paper I discuss and defuse Miklós Márton and János Tőzsér's phenomenological objection to mental fictionalism. The phenomenological objection states that mental fictionalism is phenomenologically undermotivated, because mental fictionalism is motivated by doubt in the existence of the subject matter of folk psychology but there undoubtedly exist conscious experiences which are subject matters of folk psychology. While one could argue, in the spirit of realist fictionalism, that mental fictionalism is not necessarily motivated by doubt in the existence of the subject matter of folk psychology, I choose a more direct approach. I defuse the phenomenological objection on the grounds that its premises cannot both be true, because conscious experiences which indubitably exist and conscious experiences which are subject matter of folk psychology are <i>different</i> things. In other words, their argument is either not sound or is invalid, because it commits an equivocation. So I defend mental fictionalism, but I am no mental fictionalist myself. I defend mental fictionalism, because I am against the idea of phenomenologically undermotivated theory of mind as such. The general point I want to make is that no theory of mind is phenomenologically undermotivated, that the metaphysics of mind is not on a short phenomenological leash.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"297-308"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12229","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47252707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12221
Thomas Hodgson
{"title":"Meaning Underdetermines What Is Said, Therefore Utterances Express Many Propositions","authors":"Thomas Hodgson","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12221","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12221","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said. This has consequences for philosophical accounts of meaning, communication, and propositional attitude reports. I argue that the consequence we should endorse is that utterances typically express many propositions, that these are what speakers mean, and that the correct semantics for attitude reports will handle this fact while being relational and propositional.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"165-189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12221","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49065104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12233
Robert Michels
{"title":"David Wiggins, Continuants: Their Activity, Their Being and Their Identity. Twelve Essays, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 239 pp., $50.00 (£35.00) (hardback), ISBN: 9780198716624.","authors":"Robert Michels","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12233","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"325-328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42007482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12231
François Jaquet
{"title":"Marcus Arvan, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, xi + 271 pp., £88.39 (hardback), ISBN 978-1-137-54180-2, eBook ISBN 978-1-137-54181-9.","authors":"François Jaquet","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12231","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12231","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"315-320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12231","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48047017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12219
Peter Baumann
{"title":"What Will Be Best for Me? Big Decisions and the Problem of Inter-World Comparisons","authors":"Peter Baumann","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12219","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12219","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Big decisions in a person's life often affect the preferences and standards of a good life which that person's future self will develop after implementing her decision. This paper argues that in such cases the person might lack any reasons to choose one way rather than the other. Neither preference-based views nor happiness-based views of justified choice offer sufficient help here. The available options are not comparable in the relevant sense and there is no rational choice to make. Thus, ironically, in many of a person's most important decisions the idea of that person's good seems to have no application.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"253-273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12219","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44003216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-07-29DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12214
Abraham Rudnick
{"title":"James A. Marcum (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017, 407 pp., £140 (hardback), ISBN 978-1-4742-3300-2.","authors":"Abraham Rudnick","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12214","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12214","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 1","pages":"159-162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12214","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46197134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-07-29DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12216
Caj Sixten Strandberg
{"title":"Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons","authors":"Caj Sixten Strandberg","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12216","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12216","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire-independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 1","pages":"69-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12216","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42002806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}