DIALECTICAPub Date : 2019-01-22DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12235
Nick Zangwill
{"title":"Brutalist Non-naturalism and Hume's Principle","authors":"Nick Zangwill","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12235","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12235","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I argue that non-naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessities may be explained as flowing from the essence of moral properties. It is still true that non-naturalism embraces necessary connections between distinct things, thus offending against ‘Hume's Principle’ according to which there are no such connections. Therefore, the apparent appeal of Hume's principle needs addressing. Hume's Principle faces a tsunami of counterexamples, of both abstract and non-abstract kinds of things. Furthermore, Hume's Principle lacks any motivation and is highly revisionary of ordinary modal thought. Not only are supervenience objections to non-naturalism that draw on Hume's principle ineffective, but also the modal presuppositions of the supervenience argument are far stranger than anything in non-naturalism.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 3","pages":"365-383"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12235","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43165169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2019-01-22DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12237
Jens Gillessen
{"title":"Rationality, Virtue and Higher-Order Coherence","authors":"Jens Gillessen","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12237","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12237","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Since it is hard to see how subjective rationality could be normative, a humbler, purely evaluative account of rationality's importance has been suggested: rationality is a non-moral virtue, and rational action is good so far as it reveals that an agent ‘functions well’. This paper argues, however, that even this fallback position is threatened by ‘eccentric billionaire’ scenarios: sometimes, flouting purported coherence standards of rationality is maximally virtuous. In defense of the virtue account, I argue that a novel view of rational constraints is called for: rationality requires a certain form of higher-order coherence – as considerations about instrumental coherence can show.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 3","pages":"411-436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12237","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63162714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2019-01-22DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12243
Sybren Heyndels, Benjamin De Mesel
{"title":"On Shoemaker's Response-Dependent Theory of Responsibility","authors":"Sybren Heyndels, Benjamin De Mesel","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12243","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12243","url":null,"abstract":"<p>David Shoemaker has recently defended a response-dependent view of moral responsibility. We critically discuss some aspects of Shoemaker's view.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 3","pages":"445-451"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12243","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41873226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2019-01-22DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12234
Daniel E. Kalpokas
{"title":"Non-conceptualism and the Myth of the Given","authors":"Daniel E. Kalpokas","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12234","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12234","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Defenders of non-conceptualism have been accused of falling into the Myth of the Given. This is John McDowell's main objection to non-conceptualism. In this article I evaluate some well-known non-conceptualist responses to that objection. My analysis shows that non-conceptualists have not provided plausible explanations for the epistemic role of experience. As a consequence, McDowell's objection seems to be correct. The structure of the article is as follows: first, taking into account the debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists, I shed light on what the Myth of the Given is. Second, I critically examine Richard Heck's, Christopher Peacocke's and Robert Hanna's proposals on how experiences justify beliefs. I end the article by clarifying the scope of McDowell's criticism.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 3","pages":"331-363"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12234","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43779589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12222
Thomas Müller, Hans J. Briegel
{"title":"A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism","authors":"Thomas Müller, Hans J. Briegel","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12222","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12222","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim of this paper is to establish that free agency, which is a capacity of many animals including human beings, is compatible with indeterminism: an indeterministic world allows for the existence of free agency. The question of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism is less discussed than its mirror image, the question of the compatibility of free agency and determinism. It is, however, of great importance for our self-conception as free agents in our (arguably) indeterministic world. We begin by explicating the notions of indeterminism and free agency and by clarifying the interrelation of free agency and the human-specific notion of free will. We then situate our claim of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism precisely in the landscape of the current debate on freedom and determinism, exposing an unhappy asymmetry in that debate. Then we proceed to make our case by describing the mathematically precise, physically motivated model of projective simulation, which employs indeterminism as a central resource for agency modeling. We argue that an indeterministic process of deliberation modeled by the dynamics of projective simulation can exemplify free agency under indeterminism, thereby establishing our compatibility claim: Free agency can develop and thrive in an indeterministic world.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"219-252"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12222","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37173133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
DIALECTICAPub Date : 2018-08-24DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12227
Travis Timmerman
{"title":"Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad","authors":"Travis Timmerman","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12227","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12227","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his <i>Death and the Afterlife</i>, Samuel Scheffler provides a compelling argument that people <i>would</i> see less reason and be significantly less motivated to pursue most of their life's projects if they were to discover that there is no collective afterlife (i.e. future generations of humans continuing to exist after they die). Scheffler focuses on how people <i>would</i> react to learning there is no collective afterlife. In this paper, I focus on issues concerning how people <i>ought</i> to react to learning there is no collective afterlife. Answers to this question lead to surprising conclusions that challenge some of the normative claims Scheffler seems disposed to endorse. This paper has two central aims. First, I attempt to show that negative attitudes toward the lack of a collective afterlife are warranted for two reasons that have been heretofore overlooked. Interestingly, such reasons leave open the possibility that it can be appropriate to lament the lack of a collective afterlife even if it is not bad, all things considered, for anyone. Second, I argue that the lack of a collective afterlife need not be bad, all things considered, for most people. This is because there could be a sufficient number of meaningful projects available to people that would <i>compensate</i> for the loss of <i>pro tanto</i> value caused by the lack of a collective afterlife. These considerations lead to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the lack of a collective afterlife need not negatively affect the total value of anyone's life, yet it may still be appropriate to lament the fact that there is no collective afterlife.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 2","pages":"275-296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12227","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47778442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}