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Dodging the Perils of Dogmatism: A Response to Crispin Wright 躲避教条主义的危险:对克里斯平·赖特的回应
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12255
Tim Butzer
{"title":"Dodging the Perils of Dogmatism: A Response to Crispin Wright","authors":"Tim Butzer","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12255","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12255","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Dogmatism about perceptual warrant claims that if a subject has a perceptual experience as of p, then this can provide immediate and defeasible warrant to believe that p. Crispin Wright has put forward three original criticisms of this view. First, and most extensively, Wright argues that the dogmatist is committed to implausible answers to questions about when subjects are in a position to <i>claim</i> warrant to believe certain propositions. Second, he claims that the view is too permissive in assigning warrant in cases in which a subject has balanced evidence regarding the proper functioning of her perceptual system. Finally, he argues that the oft-included restriction of immediate and defeasible dogmatic warrant to <i>perceptually basic beliefs</i> results in a view that is unable to claim that beliefs about normal external world objects are warranted. I argue that none of these objections can be sustained and that dogmatism does not have the problematic consequences that Wright alleges.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"549-569"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12255","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47662061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Miloš Adžić and Kosta Došen, eds, Gödel's Basic Logic Course at Notre Dame, Belgrade: Logical Society Belgrade, Dosije, 2017, 302 pp., ISBN 978-8660472399. 米洛什Adžić和科斯塔Došen,编,Gödel的基本逻辑课程在巴黎圣母院,贝尔格莱德:逻辑学会贝尔格莱德,Dosije, 2017年,302页,ISBN 978-8660472399。
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12247
Johannes Stern
{"title":"Miloš Adžić and Kosta Došen, eds, Gödel's Basic Logic Course at Notre Dame, Belgrade: Logical Society Belgrade, Dosije, 2017, 302 pp., ISBN 978-8660472399.","authors":"Johannes Stern","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12247","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12247","url":null,"abstract":"This book is at treat. The logic community should thank Miloš Adžić and the late Kosta Došen for their huge effort in editing Gödel’s lecture notes of his 1939 Basic Logic Course at Notre Dame. Adžić and Došen have turned a number of handwritten notebooks that served as the basis of Gödel’s course into—even by modern standards—an elegant logic textbook, which is a pleasure to read. The edited lecture notes highlight once again what a clear and lucid thinker Gödel was. The book consists of an editorial introduction in which the editorial decisions and the notational conventions are explained, the edited text of Gödel’s logic course, and the source text in printed form. The source text provides a good idea of the amount of work that has gone into the editing process. Gödel’s notes are full of abbreviations, a number of passages are crossed out and every now and then there are interludes in which Gödel is concerned with seemingly unrelated issues—for example religious questions. The material covered by Gödel consists of a thorough discussion of propositional logic, an introduction to first-order logic and to basic notions of the calculus of classes. The lecture notes end with a short discussion of Russell’s paradox and the theory of types. In this review I shall start by briefly commenting on the editorial introduction and a number of Adžić and Došen’s editorial decisions. I then provide a brief summary and discussion of the content of Gödel’s Basic Logic Course. Before I start I would like to point the interested reader to the work of Adžić and Došen (2016) and Cassou-Nogues (2009). These works provide an outline of the content of the Gödel’s Notre Dame lectures and comment on their philosophical and historical significance.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"617-622"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12247","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47017773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Andrea Iacona, Logical Form: Between Logic and Natural Language, Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018, 133 pp., US$89.99 (hardback), ISBN 978-3319741536. Andrea Iacona,逻辑形式:介于逻辑和自然语言之间,瑞士Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018, 133页,89.99美元(精装本),ISBN 978-3319741536。
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12246
Geoff Georgi
{"title":"Andrea Iacona, Logical Form: Between Logic and Natural Language, Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018, 133 pp., US$89.99 (hardback), ISBN 978-3319741536.","authors":"Geoff Georgi","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12246","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12246","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"622-628"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12246","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63162723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Kinds of Tropes without Kinds 没有种类的比喻
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12256
Markku Keinänen, Jani Hakkarainen, Antti Keskinen
{"title":"Kinds of Tropes without Kinds","authors":"Markku Keinänen,&nbsp;Jani Hakkarainen,&nbsp;Antti Keskinen","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12256","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12256","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this article, we propose a new trope nominalist conception of determinate and determinable kinds of quantitative tropes. The conception is developed as follows. First, we formulate a new account of tropes falling under the same determinates and determinables in terms of internal relations of proportion and order. Our account is a considerable improvement on the current standard account because it does not rely on primitive internal relations of exact similarity or quantitative distance. The internal relations of proportion and order hold because the related tropes exist; no kinds of tropes need to be assumed here. Second, we argue that there are only pluralities of tropes in relations of proportion and order. The tropes mutually connected by the relations of proportion and order form a special type of plurality, tropes belonging to the same kind. Unlike the recent nominalist accounts, we do not identify kinds of tropes with any additional entities (e.g. sets) or abstractions from entities (e.g. pluralities of similar tropes).</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"571-596"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12256","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63162732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Anti-Nihilist Wager 反虚无主义者的赌注
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12254
Martin Peterson
{"title":"The Anti-Nihilist Wager","authors":"Martin Peterson","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12254","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12254","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Nihilists believe that nothing matters. This article discusses a pragmatic argument against nihilism proposed by Guy Kahane: If nothing matters it does not matter whether you believe that nothing matters, but if you falsely believe that nothing matters when some things actually do, then the consequences will be bad for you because you will fail to pay attention to things you should be paying attention to. If some things really do matter, then believing that some things matter will lead to a better outcome, because you will be paying attention to things you should be paying attention to. Therefore, it is rational to believe that some things matter even if the probability that this hypothesis is true is close to zero. I argue that this pragmatic argument against nihilism is unconvincing because it is vulnerable to the many-gods objection to traditional versions of Pascal's wager.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"597-602"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12254","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44409152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Giorgio Lando, Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction, London and New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, viii + 237 pp., US$120 (hardback), ISBN: 978-1472583666. 乔治·兰多,《Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction》,伦敦和纽约:布鲁姆斯伯里出版社,2017年,第8 + 237页,120美元(精装本),ISBN: 978-1472583666。
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12245
Massimiliano Carrara, Filippo Mancini
{"title":"Giorgio Lando, Mereology: A Philosophical Introduction, London and New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, viii + 237 pp., US$120 (hardback), ISBN: 978-1472583666.","authors":"Massimiliano Carrara,&nbsp;Filippo Mancini","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12245","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12245","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"628-633"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12245","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41376257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
You Cannot Steal Something that Doesn't Exist: Against Fictionalism about Fiction 你不能偷不存在的东西:反对小说的虚构主义
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12253
Fredrik Haraldsen
{"title":"You Cannot Steal Something that Doesn't Exist: Against Fictionalism about Fiction","authors":"Fredrik Haraldsen","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12253","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12253","url":null,"abstract":"<p><i>Realists</i> about fictional characters accept an ontological commitment to fictional characters, which enables them to provide straightforward explanations of data that are difficult to explain absent this commitment. <i>Fictionalists</i> about fictional characters purport to appropriate realists’ explanatory power without their ontological commitments by paraphrasing the realist's claims (‘according to the realist, …’). However, this approach faces a critical hurdle: To claim the explanatory benefits the fictionalist paraphrase cannot (radically) change the <i>content</i> of the realist theory. But realism's explanatory power comes, in part, from an associated theory of how the relevant claims should be interpreted, and that metatheory is itself ontologically committing. Fictionalists must accordingly offer alternative interpretations of the paraphrased claims, jettisoning any advantage they may claim over other anti-realist views.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 4","pages":"603-616"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12253","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42988074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Frames and the Ontology of Particular Objects 框架与特定对象本体论
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-01-22 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12236
David Hommen
{"title":"Frames and the Ontology of Particular Objects","authors":"David Hommen","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12236","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12236","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The theory of frames has recently been proposed as a universal format for knowledge representation in language, cognition and science. Frames represent categories as well as individual objects and events in terms of recursive attribute-value structures. In this paper, we would like to explore the potential ontological commitments of frame-based knowledge representations, with particular emphasis on the ontological status of the possessors of quality attributes in individual object frames. While not strictly incompatible with nominalistic, bundle- or substratum-theoretic approaches to the metaphysics of particular objects, it will be argued that representing objects in terms of attribute-value structures is more in accordance with a tradition that can be traced back to Aristotle's doctrine of physical substances. Attributes appear to describe primary potentialities of objects, which, in the Aristotelian view, are the unchangeable nature or essence, hence substance, of any separate object.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 3","pages":"385-409"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12236","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46582819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
On a Dilemma of Redistribution 论再分配的困境
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-01-22 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12244
Alexandru Marcoci
{"title":"On a Dilemma of Redistribution","authors":"Alexandru Marcoci","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12244","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12244","url":null,"abstract":"<p>McKenzie Alexander presents a dilemma for a social planner who wants to correct the unfair distribution of an indivisible good between two equally worthy individuals or groups: <i>either</i> she guarantees a fair outcome, <i>or</i> she follows a fair procedure (but not both). In this paper I show that this dilemma only holds if the social planner can redistribute the good in question at most once. To wit, the bias of the initial distribution always washes out when we allow for sufficiently many redistributions.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 3","pages":"453-460"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12244","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41381285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Concepts and Communication: A Reply to Onofri 概念与沟通:对奥诺弗里的回应
DIALECTICA Pub Date : 2019-01-22 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12242
Henry Clarke
{"title":"Concepts and Communication: A Reply to Onofri","authors":"Henry Clarke","doi":"10.1111/1746-8361.12242","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1746-8361.12242","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This note discusses Onofri's recent argument that no theory of concepts can jointly satisfy the <i>publicity constraint</i> and <i>Frege's constraint</i>, because these constraints are inconsistent. I show that this argument relies on the publicity constraint having an implication that it does not have.</p>","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"72 3","pages":"437-444"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/1746-8361.12242","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48289194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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