ArgumentationPub Date : 2024-02-08DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09623-8
Michał Araszkiewicz, Marcin Koszowy
{"title":"The Structure of Arguments from Deontic Authority and How to Successfully Attack Them","authors":"Michał Araszkiewicz, Marcin Koszowy","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09623-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09623-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Despite increasing interest in studying arguments from deontic authority of the general form “(1) <span>(delta)</span> is a deontic authority in institution <span>(varOmega)</span>; (2) according to <span>(delta)</span>, I should do <span>(alpha)</span>, <i>C</i>: therefore, (3) I should do <span>(alpha)</span>”, the state of the art models are not capable of grasping their complexity. The existing sets of critical questions assigned to this argumentation scheme seem to conflate two problems: whether a person is subject to an authority of an institution in the first place and whether the command issued within the context of a particular institution is eventually binding. For this reason, we introduce (1) a set of Basic Critical Questions to scrutinize the former issue, and (2) a set of more detailed questions related to specific features, also referred to as “parameters”, of institutional environments (Intra-Institutional Critical Questions). We identify major elements of institutional environments in which authoritative utterances are made and the crucial parameters of arguments from deontic authority. The selected evidence from the decisions of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court helps us show how these parameters may be used to reconstruct subtypes of this argument scheme, with their associated sets of critical questions. In specific institutional contexts, such detailed schemes are capable of grasping the complexity of appeals to deontic authority and thus should be used rather than general schemes. The reconstruction of argumentation schemes with critical questions shows how particular arguments may successfully be attacked.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 2","pages":"171 - 198"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09623-8.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139761521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ArgumentationPub Date : 2024-02-07DOI: 10.1007/s10503-024-09630-3
Eugen Octav Popa, Alexandru I. Cârlan
{"title":"Evidentiary Convincing and Evidentiary Fallacies","authors":"Eugen Octav Popa, Alexandru I. Cârlan","doi":"10.1007/s10503-024-09630-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-024-09630-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A convincing argument can change a discussant’s commitment regarding the acceptability of a claim, but the same effect can be achieved by examining evidence. Observing objects or events that count as evidence for or against the acceptability of a statement can change one’s commitment regarding that statement. If we speak of fallacies in the realm of convincing through argumentation, can we speak of fallacies in the realm of convincing through evidence? In this paper, we defend an affirmative answer. We introduce and discuss the conceptual implications of <i>evidentiary fallacies</i> as fallacies committed when evidence is fabricated or suppressed during an attempt to resolve disagreement using proof. We then apply the notion of evidentiary fallacy to two real-life examples of mis-executed evidentiary procedures. We conclude that the notion of evidentiary fallacy can contribute to a more comprehensive fallacy theory and can foster new and broadly applicable critical skills.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 3","pages":"349 - 367"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-024-09630-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139761427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ArgumentationPub Date : 2024-01-19DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09627-4
Guido Melchior
{"title":"Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation","authors":"Guido Melchior","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09627-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09627-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S doubts that a source <i>O</i> is reliable and believes that information <i>i</i> is delivered by <i>O</i>, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of <i>i</i>. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 2","pages":"225 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09627-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139517284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ArgumentationPub Date : 2024-01-18DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09626-5
Charles Rathkopf
{"title":"Some Benefits and Limitations of Modern Argument Map Representation","authors":"Charles Rathkopf","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09626-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09626-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Argument maps represent some arguments more effectively than others. The goal of this article is to account for that variability, so that those who wish to use argument maps can do so with more foresight. I begin by identifying four properties of argument maps that make them useful tools for evaluating arguments. Then, I discuss four types of argument that are difficult to map well: reductio ad absurdum arguments, charges of equivocation, logical analogies, and mathematical arguments. The difficulties presented by these four types appear unrelated to one another, but I show that, in each case, the difficulty can be traced back to the use of metalinguistic reasoning. The need to represent a transition between object language and metalanguage can undermine one or more of the benefits that argument map representation would otherwise confer.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 2","pages":"199 - 224"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09626-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139517329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ArgumentationPub Date : 2023-12-29DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09628-3
Jan Albert van Laar, Frank Zenker
{"title":"Norms and Practices of Public Argumentation","authors":"Jan Albert van Laar, Frank Zenker","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09628-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09628-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 1","pages":"1 - 5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139146765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ArgumentationPub Date : 2023-12-16DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09625-6
Fabrizio Macagno
{"title":"Presuppositional Fallacies","authors":"Fabrizio Macagno","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09625-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09625-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Presuppositions are at the same time a crucial and almost neglected dimension of arguments and fallacies. Arguments involve different types of presuppositions, which can be used for manipulative purposes in distinct ways. However, what are presuppositions? What is their dialectical function? Why and how can they be dangerous? This paper intends to address these questions by developing the pragmatic approaches to presupposition from a dialectical perspective. The use of presuppositions will be analyzed in terms of presumptive conclusions concerning the interlocutor’s acceptance of a proposition, which can be assessed as reasonable or unacceptable. Their dialectical function is described in terms of dark side commitments attributed to a collective \"voice\" representing what is commonly shared. For this reason, they count as attempts to include the presupposed contents into the hearer’s commitment store, which in some circumstances can reverse the burden of proof. The different manipulative strategies grounded on controversial presuppositions will be examined by showing the distinct roles that the latter play and the relationship between the degrees of presuppositional implicitness and the speaker’s burden of retraction.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 2","pages":"109 - 140"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09625-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138692822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ArgumentationPub Date : 2023-11-22DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09622-9
Mette Bengtsson, Lisa Villadsen
{"title":"It’s not (only) about Getting the Last Word: Rhetorical Norms of Public Argumentation and the Responsibility to Keep the Conversation Going","authors":"Mette Bengtsson, Lisa Villadsen","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09622-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09622-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The core function of argumentation in a democratic setting must be to constitute a modality for citizens to engage differences of opinion constructively – for the present but also in future exchanges. To enable this function requires acceptance of the basic conditions of public debate: that consensus is often an illusory goal which should be replaced by better mastery of living with dissent and compromise. Furthermore, it calls for an understanding of the complexity of real-life public debate which is an intermixture of claims of fact, definition, value, and policy, each of which calls for an awareness of the greater ‘debate environment’ of which particular deliberative exchanges are part. We introduce a rhetorical meta-norm as an evaluation criterion for public debate. In continuation of previous scholarship concerned with how to create room for differences of opinion and how to foster a sustainable debate culture, we work from a civically oriented conception of rhetoric. This conception is less instrumental and more concerned with the role of communication in public life and the maintenance of the democratic state. A rhetorical meta-norm of public argumentation is useful when evaluating public argumentation – not as the only norm, but integrated with specific norms from rhetoric, pragma-dialectics, and formal logic. We contextualise our claims through an example of authentic contemporary public argumentation: a debate over a biogas generator in rural Denmark.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 1","pages":"41 - 61"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09622-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ArgumentationPub Date : 2023-09-07DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09620-x
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Hietanen, Jonathan Baron
{"title":"Individual Differences in Argument Strength Discrimination","authors":"Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen, Mika Hietanen, Jonathan Baron","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09620-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09620-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Being able to discriminate poorly justified from well justified arguments is necessary for informed citizenship. However, it is not known whether the ability to recognize argument strength generalizes across different types of arguments, and what cognitive factors predict this ability or these abilities. Drawing on the theory of argument schemes, we examined arguments from consequence, analogy, symptoms, and authority in order to cover all major types of arguments. A study (<i>N</i> = 278) on the general population in Finland indicated that the ability to discriminate between strong and weak arguments did not differ between these schemes. Argument strength discrimination ability correlated positively with analytic thinking dispositions promoting both quality and quantity of thinking, slightly positively with education, and negatively with overconfidence. It was unrelated to an intuitive thinking style, and to self-rated mental effort.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"38 2","pages":"141 - 167"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-023-09620-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87061156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}