Argumentation最新文献_第10页

“Agreement Builds and Disagreement Destroys:” How Polish Undergraduates and Graduates Understand Interpersonal Arguing “协议建立，分歧摧毁：”波兰本科生和毕业生如何理解人际争论

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-04-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09570-w

Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska, Dale Hample

{"title":"“Agreement Builds and Disagreement Destroys:” How Polish Undergraduates and Graduates Understand Interpersonal Arguing","authors":"Kamila Dębowska-Kozłowska, Dale Hample","doi":"10.1007/s10503-022-09570-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-022-09570-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This is a descriptive study (<i>N</i> = 243) of how Polish undergraduates and graduates perceive face to face arguing. We had some reasons to suppose that they would not be especially aggressive. The Polish culture has a number of proverbs warning against combative arguing, with “agreement builds and disagreement destroys” being illustrative. In addition, up until 1989 public dissent and open disagreements were suppressed by the government, and older generations often found it prudent to avoid arguing. We compared Polish results with previously reported data from the U.S. and Ukraine. We did, in fact, find that Polish orientations were less aggressive and more other-oriented than the two comparison nations. We also discovered Poland was more wary of engaging in interpersonal conflicts. Distinct sex differences appeared when we compared Polish men and women, with men being more forceful. Correlational patterns, especially concerning argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness, were largely consistent with those originally found in the U.S. Power distance continues to have important connections with the standard argument orientation measures, but its patterns of correlation are not entirely consistent across the relatively small number of nations where the variable has been studied.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 3","pages":"365 - 392"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50479941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Questions, Presuppositions and Fallacies 问题、预设和谬误

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-03-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09566-6

Andrei Moldovan

引用次数: 1

Argumentation in Suboptimal Settings 次优环境下的论证

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-03-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09571-9

Diego Castro

{"title":"Argumentation in Suboptimal Settings","authors":"Diego Castro","doi":"10.1007/s10503-022-09571-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-022-09571-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>When parties attempt to persuade their opponents of the tenability of a certain standpoint using reasons, they will often find that the circumstances of the dialogue hinder their chances of resolution. Power imbalances, cognitive biases, lack of time or hidden interests are some of the circumstances they need to face. I will label these circumstances as <i>suboptimal settings for argumentation</i>. According to the pragma-dialectical tradition, higher-order conditions for critical discussion are unfulfilled in these cases (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs, & Jackson, 1993). The main question of this paper is the following: what is the normative standard that parties in a discussion need to follow to arrive at a resolution within such circumstances? I will defend a middle-ground solution between two extreme ones.</p><p>The first extreme position, the <i>anything-goes policy</i>, claims that, given that the conditions for a reasonable exchange of reasons are not satisfied, the dialogue stands outside the domain of reason, so anything goes for the parties. The second extreme position, the <i>business as usual policy</i>, claims that, since critical discussion is a normative model, the same rules should apply in suboptimal settings. Finally, the <i>supernormal policy</i> that I defend claims that we need a more general and comprehensive norm that I refer to as a <i>supernorm</i> to evaluate these cases.</p><p>The supernormal policy divides argumentation into two stages: preparation and resolution. In the preparation stage, the parties attempt to restore or compensate for the suboptimality of the setting, while in the resolution stage, they attempt to resolve their disagreement. I contend that the moves of the preparation stage should be evaluated by using the supernorm instead of by the rules for critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). At this point, the paper considers theoretical insights from Gilbert (1995, 1997, 2002) and Jacobs (2000, 2006) to understand what this entails.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 3","pages":"393 - 414"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-022-09571-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50520429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Demanding a halt to metadiscussions 要求停止元讨论

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-03-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09569-3

Beth Innocenti

{"title":"Demanding a halt to metadiscussions","authors":"Beth Innocenti","doi":"10.1007/s10503-022-09569-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-022-09569-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How do social actors get addressees to stop retreating to metadiscussions that derail ground-level discussions, and why do they expect the strategies to work? The question is of both theoretical and practical interest, especially with regard to ground-level discussions of systemic sexism and racism derailed by qualifying “not all men” and “not all white people” perform the sexist or racist actions that are the topic of discussion. I use a normative pragmatic approach to analyze two exemplary messages designed to halt retreats to metadiscussions about using “not all men” and “not all white people” qualifiers in discussions of systemic sexism and racism. I find that social actors use strategies that may at first glance appear to be out of bounds in an ideal critical discussion—e.g., demanding, shouting, cussing, sarcasm, name-calling—to cultivate a context where using not-all qualifiers becomes increasingly costly. The strategies are designed to get addressees to recognize that using not-all qualifiers is not an epistemic correction of a hasty generalization or ethical intervention to halt promulgation of stereotypes about men and white people. Instead, the strategies display that using not-all qualifiers is a fallible sign of willful hermeneutical ignorance, willful ignorance, and an attempt to reassert a measure of social dominance. These findings affirm the need to investigate the various strategies and normative materials social actors actually bring to bear to regulate disagreement.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 3","pages":"345 - 364"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50513454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Secundum Quid and the Pragmatics of Arguments. The Challenges of the Dialectical Tradition 世俗测验与辩论的实用主义。辩证法传统的挑战

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-03-05 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09568-4

Fabrizio Macagno

引用次数: 3

Internal Deliberation Defending Climate-Harmful Behavior 内部商议保护气候有害行为

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-02-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-021-09562-2

Maria Wolrath Söderberg, Nina Wormbs

{"title":"Internal Deliberation Defending Climate-Harmful Behavior","authors":"Maria Wolrath Söderberg, Nina Wormbs","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09562-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09562-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Most people in countries with the highest climate impact per capita are well aware of the climate crisis and do not deny the science. They worry about climate and have climate engaged attitudes. Still, their greenhouse-gas emissions are often high. How can we understand acting contrary to our knowledge? A simple answer is that we do not want to give up on benefits or compromise our quality of life. However, it is painful to live with discrepancies between knowledge and action. To be able to avoid taking the consequences of our knowledge, we deal with the gap by motivating to ourselves that the action is still acceptable. In this article, we use topical analysis to examine such processes of motivation by looking at the internal deliberation of 399 climate engaged people’s accounts of their reasoning when acting against their own knowledge. We found that these topical processes can be described in at least four different ways which we call rationalization, legitimization, justification and imploration. By focusing on topoi we can make visible how individual forms of reasoning interact with culturally developed values, habits and assumptions in creating enthymemes. We believe that these insights can contribute to understanding the conditions for climate transition communication.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"203 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09562-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50448706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Charles Arthur Willard (1945–2021): In Memoriam 查尔斯·亚瑟·威拉德（1945–2021）：纪念

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-02-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09567-5

Barbara J. O’Keefe, Daniel J. O’Keefe

引用次数: 0

Why We Need Skepticism in Argument: Skeptical Engagement as a Requirement for Epistemic Justice 为什么我们在辩论中需要怀疑论：怀疑论参与是认识正义的要求

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-01-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-021-09565-z

Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht

{"title":"Why We Need Skepticism in Argument: Skeptical Engagement as a Requirement for Epistemic Justice","authors":"Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09565-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09565-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Argumentative Adversariality debate is over the question of whether argument must be adversarial. A particular locus of this debate is on skeptical challenges in critical dialogue. The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) in argument is a practical manifestation of argumentative adversariality. Views about the on-the-ground value of the DSS vary. On one hand, in “The Social & Political Limitations of Philosophy” (2012), Phyllis Rooney argues that the DSS leads to epistemic injustice. On the other, Allan Hazlett in his recent piece “Critical Injustice” (2020) argues for the virtues of the skeptical stance in terms of epistemic justice. Both Rooney and Hazlett are concerned with the role skeptical engagement plays in argument, but they assign opposite values to it. In this essay, I review Rooney and Hazlett’s examples and (i) show that the epistemic dysfunction in the two scholar’s going cases is one and the same, and (ii) argue that the cause of both is a lack of proper skeptical engagement. <i>Skeptical engagement is a requirement for epistemic justice.</i> Together (i) and (ii) constitute an initial defense of the Adversarialist position against objections regarding the social epistemic risk of the skeptical stance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"269 - 285"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50470895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Bothsiderism Bothsiderism。

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-01-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1

Scott F. Aikin, John P. Casey

引用次数: 5

Arguments and Reason-Giving 争论与理性陈述

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2022-01-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-021-09561-3

Matthew W. McKeon

引用次数: 1