Argumentation最新文献

{"title":"Secundum Quid and the Pragmatics of Arguments. The Challenges of the Dialectical Tradition","authors":"Fabrizio Macagno","doi":"10.1007/s10503-022-09568-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-022-09568-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The phrase <i>secundum quid et simpliciter</i> is the Latin expression translating and labelling the sophism described by Aristotle as connected with the use of some particular expression “absolutely or in a certain respect and not in its proper sense.” This paper presents an overview of the analysis of this fallacy in the history of dialectics, reconstructing the different explanations provided in the Aristotelian texts, the Latin and medieval dialectical tradition, and the modern logical approaches. The <i>secundum quid</i> emerges as a strategy that is based on the pragmatic dimension of arguments, and in particular the complex passage from an utterance (what is said) to its logical form (a proposition in an argument). The medieval and modern logical theories attempted to explain from different philosophical perspectives how the pragmatically enriched semantic representation can be achieved, justified, and most importantly manipulated. The different analyses of this fallacy bring to light various dimensions of the pragmatics of arguments, and the complex interdependence between context, meaning, and inferences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 3","pages":"317 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50453210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internal Deliberation Defending Climate-Harmful Behavior","authors":"Maria Wolrath Söderberg,&nbsp;Nina Wormbs","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09562-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09562-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Most people in countries with the highest climate impact per capita are well aware of the climate crisis and do not deny the science. They worry about climate and have climate engaged attitudes. Still, their greenhouse-gas emissions are often high. How can we understand acting contrary to our knowledge? A simple answer is that we do not want to give up on benefits or compromise our quality of life. However, it is painful to live with discrepancies between knowledge and action. To be able to avoid taking the consequences of our knowledge, we deal with the gap by motivating to ourselves that the action is still acceptable. In this article, we use topical analysis to examine such processes of motivation by looking at the internal deliberation of 399 climate engaged people’s accounts of their reasoning when acting against their own knowledge. We found that these topical processes can be described in at least four different ways which we call rationalization, legitimization, justification and imploration. By focusing on topoi we can make visible how individual forms of reasoning interact with culturally developed values, habits and assumptions in creating enthymemes. We believe that these insights can contribute to understanding the conditions for climate transition communication.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"203 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09562-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50448706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Charles Arthur Willard (1945–2021): In Memoriam","authors":"Barbara J. O’Keefe,&nbsp;Daniel J. O’Keefe","doi":"10.1007/s10503-022-09567-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-022-09567-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 1","pages":"151 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50438598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why We Need Skepticism in Argument: Skeptical Engagement as a Requirement for Epistemic Justice","authors":"Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09565-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09565-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Argumentative Adversariality debate is over the question of whether argument must be adversarial. A particular locus of this debate is on skeptical challenges in critical dialogue. The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) in argument is a practical manifestation of argumentative adversariality. Views about the on-the-ground value of the DSS vary. On one hand, in “The Social &amp; Political Limitations of Philosophy” (2012), Phyllis Rooney argues that the DSS leads to epistemic injustice. On the other, Allan Hazlett in his recent piece “Critical Injustice” (2020) argues for the virtues of the skeptical stance in terms of epistemic justice. Both Rooney and Hazlett are concerned with the role skeptical engagement plays in argument, but they assign opposite values to it. In this essay, I review Rooney and Hazlett’s examples and (i) show that the epistemic dysfunction in the two scholar’s going cases is one and the same, and (ii) argue that the cause of both is a lack of proper skeptical engagement. <i>Skeptical engagement is a requirement for epistemic justice.</i> Together (i) and (ii) constitute an initial defense of the Adversarialist position against objections regarding the social epistemic risk of the skeptical stance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"269 - 285"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50470895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bothsiderism","authors":"Scott F. Aikin,&nbsp;John P. Casey","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper offers an account of a fallacy we will call <i>bothsiderism</i>, which is to mistake disagreement on an issue for evidence that either a compromise on, suspension of judgment regarding, or continued discussion of the issue is in order. Our view is that this is a fallacy of a unique and heretofore untheorized type, a fallacy of meta-argumentation. The paper develops as follows. After a brief introduction, we examine a recent bothsiderist case in American politics. We use this as a pivot point to survey the theoretical literature on the fallacy. The most prominent theory is that bothsiderism is a case of dialogue-shifting. This view fails, we maintain, to explain how bothsiderism might be persuasive. We argue, rather, bothsiderism is a kind of meta-argumentative fallacy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"249 - 268"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09563-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39938536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Arguments and Reason-Giving","authors":"Matthew W. McKeon","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09561-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09561-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Arguments figure prominently in our practices of reason-giving. For example, we use them to advance reasons for their conclusions in order to justify believing something, to explain why we believe something, and to persuade others to believe something. Intuitively, using arguments in these ways requires a certain degree of self-reflection. In this paper, I ask: what cognitive requirements are there for using an argument to advance reasons for its conclusion? Towards a partial response, the paper’s central thesis is that in order to so use an argument one must believe the associated inference claim to the effect that the premises collectively are reasons that support the conclusion. I then argue against making it a further cognitive requirement that one be aware of one’s justification for believing such an inference claim. This thesis provides a rationale for the typical informal-logic textbook characterization of argument and motivates a constraint on adequate accounts of what are referred to as inference claims in the informal logic and argumentation literatures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"229 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09561-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50465402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From Theory of Rhetoric to the Practice of Language Use: The Case of Appeals to Ethos Elements","authors":"Marcin Koszowy,&nbsp;Katarzyna Budzynska,&nbsp;Martín Pereira-Fariña,&nbsp;Rory Duthie","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09564-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09564-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In their book <i>Commitment in Dialogue</i>, Walton and Krabbe claim that formal dialogue systems for conversational argumentation are “not very realistic and not easy to apply”. This difficulty may make argumentation theory less well adapted to be employed to describe or analyse actual argumentation practice. On the other hand, the empirical study of real-life arguments may miss or ignore insights of more than the two millennia of the development of philosophy of language, rhetoric, and argumentation theory. In this paper, we propose a novel methodology for adapting such theories to serve as applicable tools in the study of argumentation phenomena. Our approach is both <i>theoretically-informed</i> and <i>empirically-grounded</i> in large-scale corpus analysis. The area of interest are appeals to ethos, the character of the speaker, building upon Aristotle’s rhetoric. Ethotic techniques are used to influence the hearers through the communication, where speakers might establish, but also emphasise, weaken or undermine their own or others’ credibility and trustworthiness. Specifically, we apply our method to Aristotelian theory of ethos elements which identifies <i>practical wisdom</i>, <i>moral virtue</i> and <i>goodwill</i> as components of speakers’ character, which can be supported or attacked. The challenges we identified in this case and the solutions we proposed allow us to formulate general guidelines of how to exploit rich theoretical frameworks to the analysis of the practice of language use.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 1","pages":"123 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09564-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50444765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Cultural Embeddedness of Arguments Raised as a Part of the Bulgarian Debate About the Ratification of the Istanbul Convention","authors":"Hristo Valchev","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09560-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09560-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper presents an analysis of the cultural embeddedness of arguments, raised as a part of the Bulgarian debate about the ratification of the Istanbul convention. The method I employed was the localization procedure of Generalized Argumentation theory. Through a qualitative analysis of empirical argumentation data, I identified arguments in favour of or against the ratification of the Istanbul convention. Information about the cultural background against which these arguments were raised, i.e. about Bulgarian culture, was gathered from the part of the ninth wave of the European Social Survey that used the Portrait Value Questionnaire—an instrument for measuring human values, based on Schwartz’s theory of human values. By establishing a certain relationship between the arguments and the cultural background information, I came to the conclusion that the debate between the proponents and the opponents of the ratification represented a conflict between the basic values of universalism and tradition, and more particularly, between the lower-order values of equality and respect for tradition.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"177 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50497461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When Evaluative Adjectives Prevent Contradiction in a Debate","authors":"Thierry Herman,&nbsp;Diane Liberatore","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09558-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09558-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper argues that some words are so highly charged with meaning by a community that they may prevent a discussion during which each participant is on an equal footing. These words are indeed either unanimously accepted or rejected. The presence of these adjectival groups pushes the antagonist to find rhetorical strategies to circumvent them. The main idea we want to develop is that some propositions are not easily debatable in context because of some specific value-bearing words (VBWs), and one of the goals of this paper is to build a methodological tool for finding and classifying these VBWs (with a focus on evaluative adjectives). Our study echoes the importance of “cultural keywords” (as reported by Wierzbicka, Understanding cultures through their key words: English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese, 1997) in argument (as reported by Rigotti &amp; Rocci, Argumentation in practice, 2005), but is rather based on a German approach developed by (as reported by Dieckmann, Sprache in der Politik: Einführung in die Pragmatik und Semantik der politischen, 1975), (as reported by Strauss and Zifonun, Der politische Wortschatz, 1986), and (as reported by Girnth, Sprache und Sprachverwendung in der Politik: Eine Einführung in die linguistische Analyse öffentlich-politischer Kommunikation, 2015) about “Miranda” and “Anti-Miranda” words that is expanded and refined here. In particular, our study tries to understand why some statements, fueled by appreciative (Tseronis, 2014) or evaluative adjectives, have such rhetorical effects on a pragmatic level in the particular context of a vote on the Swiss popular initiative called “for more affordable housing”. This context is fruitful since two parties offer reasons for two opposing policy claims: namely, to accept or to reject an initiative. When one party uses arguments containing such universally unassailable adjectival groups to defend a “yes” vote (in our example, pleading for more affordable housing rents), the opposing party cannot use a symmetrical antonym while pleading for the “no” vote. The methodological tool that is proposed here could shed light on the use of certain rhetorical and referential strategies in conflicting policy proposition contexts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"155 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-021-09558-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50497462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Raymond S. Nickerson, Argumentation, The Art of Persuasion","authors":"J. Anthony Blair","doi":"10.1007/s10503-021-09559-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-021-09559-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"36 2","pages":"305 - 316"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50493630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}