Argumentation最新文献_第4页

Teaching the Fallacies 教授谬论

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09604-x

J. Anthony Blair

引用次数: 0

Argumentum Ex Divinatione: Divination and Civic Argument in the Ancient World 占卜论：古代世界的占卜与公民之争

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-03-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09612-x

Shawn D. Ramsey

引用次数: 0

Fallacies and Their Place in the Foundations of Science 谬论及其在科学基础中的地位

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09609-6

John Woods

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引用次数: 0

Reconceiving Argument Schemes as Descriptive and Practically Normative 重新认识论证方案的描述性和实用规范性

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09608-7

Brian N. Larson, David Seth Morrison

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引用次数: 0

Do Arguments for Global Warming Commit a Fallacy of Composition? 关于全球变暖的争论是否构成了一种谬误？

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-03-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09596-8

Maurice A. Finocchiaro

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引用次数: 0

Epistemic Norms for Public Political Arguments 公共政治论证的认识规范

IF 1 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-23 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09590-6

Christoph Lumer

引用次数: 0

Exploring TED Speakers’ Narrative Positioning from a Strategic Maneuvering Perspective: A Single Case Study from Winch’s (2014) TED Talk 从战略策略的角度探讨TED演讲人的叙事定位——以温奇（2014）TED演讲为例

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09597-7

Nahla Nadeem

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引用次数: 0

The Pragma-Dialectical Approach to the Fallacies Revisited 真理辩证法对谬误的再认识

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09605-w

Frans H. van Eemeren, Bart Garssen

引用次数: 1

High Costs and Low Benefits: Analysis and Evaluation of the “I’m Not Stupid” Argument 高成本低效益：“我不笨”论的分析与评价

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-022-09592-4

Henrike Jansen

{"title":"High Costs and Low Benefits: Analysis and Evaluation of the “I’m Not Stupid” Argument","authors":"Henrike Jansen","doi":"10.1007/s10503-022-09592-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-022-09592-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article presents an analysis and evaluation of what I call the “I’m not stupid” argument. This argument has ancient roots, which lie in Aristotle’s famous description of the weak man’s and strong man’s arguments. An “I’m not stupid” argument is typically used in a context of accusation and defense, by a defendant who argues that they did not commit the act of which they have been accused. The analysis of this type of argument takes the shape of an argumentative pattern, which displays a full-fledged representation of its argumentation structure. It is based on a collection of ten contemporary instances of the “I’m not stupid” argument. Although ten instances constitute a small collection, the wide variation in the argumentative elements that they express explicitly or leave implicit made it possible to identify five new key premises in comparison with previous analyses of the weak man’s and strong man’s arguments (Walton, Tindale and Gordon 2014 in <i>Argumentation</i> 28:85–119, 2014; Walton 2019 in <i>Argumentation</i> 33:45–74, 2019). These new premises show that the crucial point of an evaluation of this argument is the arguer's supposedly rational character in making a gain-loss calculation. They also show that we need empirical data to strengthen our analyses of argument schemes and argumentation structures.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 4","pages":"529 - 551"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10503-022-09592-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50477574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

On Halting Meta-argument with Para-Argument 用Para变元中止元变元

IF 1.2 2区文学

Argumentation Pub Date : 2023-02-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10503-023-09602-z

Scott Aikin, John Casey

{"title":"On Halting Meta-argument with Para-Argument","authors":"Scott Aikin, John Casey","doi":"10.1007/s10503-023-09602-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10503-023-09602-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recourse to meta-argument is an important feature of successful argument exchanges; it is where norms are made explicit or clarified, corrections are offered, and inferences are evaluated, among much else. Sadly, it is often an avenue for abuse, as the very virtues of meta-argument are turned against it. The question as to how to manage such abuses is a vexing one. Erik Krabbe proposed that one be levied a fine in cases of inappropriate meta-argumentative bids (2003). In a recent publication (2022) Beth Innocenti expands on this notion of a penalty, arguing that some meta-arguments should be halted with “shouting, cussing, sarcasm, name-calling.” In this essay, we review Innocenti’s case that these confrontations and haltings improve the argumentative circumstances. We provide three reasons that this promise is not well-founded. First, that such confrontations have a significant audience problem, in that they are more likely to be interpreted as destroying the argumentative context than improving it. Second, that Innocenti’s procedural justification, that those who lose meta-discussions should pay a penalty, is not satisfied if the meta-discussion is halted. And third, there is a boundary problem for the cases, since it seems there is no principled reason to restrict halting meta-arguments just to these cases (especially if there is no meta-discussion on the matter to make the bounds explicit). Though expressions of anger can be appropriate in argument, we argue, it cannot take the place of argument.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"37 3","pages":"323 - 340"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50474476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0