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Good and Bad Reasoning about COVID-19 关于新冠肺炎的好与坏推理
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-12-18 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i4.6310
L. Cummings
{"title":"Good and Bad Reasoning about COVID-19","authors":"L. Cummings","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i4.6310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i4.6310","url":null,"abstract":"The Covid-19 pandemic presents argumentation theorists with an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which people, agencies and governments respond to the emergence of a new virus. Reponses have revealed a range of judgements and decisions, not all of which are rationally warranted. This article will examine errors in reasoning, several of which have reduced the public’s compliance with important health measures. This article will also analyse rationally warranted reasoning about Covid-19 employed by public health agencies. In examining instances of good and bad reasoning during the Covid-19 pandemic, we can begin to construct a taxonomy of arguments that facilitated and hindered individual and collective responses during this public health emergency.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42357320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What is Wrong with Deductivism? 演绎主义错在哪里?
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-31 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6214
Lilian Bermejo Luque
{"title":"What is Wrong with Deductivism?","authors":"Lilian Bermejo Luque","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.6214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.6214","url":null,"abstract":"In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46668785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
CAT Scan: A Critical Review of the Critical-Thinking Assessment Test CAT扫描：批判性思维评估测试的批判性回顾
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6243
Kevin Possin
{"title":"CAT Scan: A Critical Review of the Critical-Thinking Assessment Test","authors":"Kevin Possin","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.6243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.6243","url":null,"abstract":"The CAT is entirely dedicated to assessing the critical-thinking skills involved in scientific reasoning and practical problem solving. While the test is found to have reasonable content validity, various issues with its prompts are discussed, along with significant issues with its scoring. The CAT’s recommended use as a “model” for curricular changes, called CAT Apps, is criticized as “teaching to the test.”","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48072168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Review of Narration as Argument, edited by Paula Olmos 《作为论点的叙述评论》，Paula Olmos编辑
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6309
Max Dosser
{"title":"Review of Narration as Argument, edited by Paula Olmos","authors":"Max Dosser","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.6309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.6309","url":null,"abstract":"This article reviews Paula Olmos’s Narration as Argument collection (Springer 2017).","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48744799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Justifying Particular Reasoning in a Legal Context 法律语境中的特殊推理
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.5994
Jingjing Wu
{"title":"Justifying Particular Reasoning in a Legal Context","authors":"Jingjing Wu","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.5994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.5994","url":null,"abstract":"Particular reasoning is arguably the most common type of legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick proposed that, in a legal context, justifiable particular reasoning has to be universalizable. This paper aims to: (1) investigate MacCormick’s thesis; (2) explain how a particular can ever be universal by drawing inspiration from Scott Brewer’s formula on reasoning by analogy; (3) further comprehend MacCormick’s thesis by considering some of the arguments advanced by its opponents; (4) use the ‘pilot-judgement procedure’ developed by the European Court of Human Rights as an example to illustrate the relevance of the universalizable particular thesis in today’s legal practices. Résumé: Le raisonnement particulier est sans doute le type de raisonnement juridique le plus courant. Neil MacCormick a proposé que, dans un contexte juridique, un raisonnement particulier justifiable doit être universalisable. Cet article vise à: (1) étudier la thèse de MacCormick; (2) expliquer comment un particulier peut jamais être universel en s'inspirant de la formule de Scott Brewer sur le raisonnement par analogie; (3) comprendre davantage la thèse de MacCormick en examinant certains des arguments avancés par ses opposants; (4) utiliser la «procédure de jugement pilote» développée par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme comme exemple pour illustrer la pertinence de la thèse du particulier universalisable dans les pratiques juridiques d’aujourd’hui.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"40 1","pages":"423-441"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45319755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
An Unlikely Source of (Absurd and Effective) Case Studies for Introductory Informal Logic 介绍性非正式逻辑的（荒谬而有效的）案例研究的一个不太可能的来源
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6294
Kamil Lemanek
{"title":"An Unlikely Source of (Absurd and Effective) Case Studies for Introductory Informal Logic","authors":"Kamil Lemanek","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.6294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.6294","url":null,"abstract":"This short work presents a popular fringe theory as a source of case studies for use in teaching informal logic in an introductory course. It puts forward ancient astronaut theory as the candidate source, together with a characterization of why it fits the bill. The televised material associated with that theory is well suited to being used as case studies given that they are easy to follow, contain a surprising number of arguments and fallacies, and keep students reliably engaged. The paper includes an overview of the forms of argumentation and fallacies that these cases may be used to teach, along with a sketch of how to best implement them in the classroom.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41464600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Other-Regarding Virtues and Their Place in Virtue Argumentation Theory 他者论美德及其在美德论辩理论中的地位
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6205
Felipe Oliveira de Sousa
{"title":"Other-Regarding Virtues and Their Place in Virtue Argumentation Theory","authors":"Felipe Oliveira de Sousa","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.6205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.6205","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned both with his own development as an arguer and with helping other arguers in that regard.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43412349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Source Related Argumentation Found in Science Websites 在科学网站上发现的与来源相关的论证
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.5984
R. Barnes, Zoë Neumann, Samuel Draznin-Nagy
{"title":"Source Related Argumentation Found in Science Websites","authors":"R. Barnes, Zoë Neumann, Samuel Draznin-Nagy","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.5984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.5984","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider the way that web documents seeking to persuade readers of certain science claims provide information about the sources of the arguments. Our quantitative analysis reveals that web documents in our sample include hundreds of examples in which the reader is provided information regarding the trustworthiness (or lack thereof) of sources. The web documents also contain a large number of examples in which the reader is provided with information about how many individuals hold a particular belief. We discuss ad hominem, ad verecundiam, and ad populum arguments, and the way that the examples found in our sample of documents are related to these argumentation schemes.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"40 1","pages":"443-473"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41789864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Rooting Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation in Jung, and Its Extension to Law 在荣格身上扎根吉尔伯特的多模态论证及其在法律上的延伸
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6002
M. Novak
{"title":"Rooting Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation in Jung, and Its Extension to Law","authors":"M. Novak","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.6002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.6002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses how an understanding of Jung's psychological types is important for the relevance of Gilbert's multi-modal argumentation theory. Moreover, it highlights how the types have been confirmed by contemporary neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Based on Gilbert's approach, I extend multi-modal argumentation to the area of legal argumentation. It seems that when we leave behind the traditional fortress of “logical” legal argumentation, we \"discover\" alternate modes (such as the intuitive, emotional, and sensory) that have always been present, concealed in the theoretically underestimated rhetorical skills of arguers.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45291484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus 深刻分歧的解决:不是简单的共识
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI: 10.22329/il.v40i30.6172
L. Henderson
{"title":"Resolution of Deep Disagreement: Not Simply Consensus","authors":"L. Henderson","doi":"10.22329/il.v40i30.6172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v40i30.6172","url":null,"abstract":"Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48548389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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