Justifying Particular Reasoning in a Legal Context

IF 0.9 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-29 DOI:10.22329/il.v40i30.5994

Jingjing Wu

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Particular reasoning is arguably the most common type of legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick proposed that, in a legal context, justifiable particular reasoning has to be universalizable. This paper aims to: (1) investigate MacCormick’s thesis; (2) explain how a particular can ever be universal by drawing inspiration from Scott Brewer’s formula on reasoning by analogy; (3) further comprehend MacCormick’s thesis by considering some of the arguments advanced by its opponents; (4) use the ‘pilot-judgement procedure’ developed by the European Court of Human Rights as an example to illustrate the relevance of the universalizable particular thesis in today’s legal practices. Résumé: Le raisonnement particulier est sans doute le type de raisonnement juridique le plus courant. Neil MacCormick a proposé que, dans un contexte juridique, un raisonnement particulier justifiable doit être universalisable. Cet article vise à: (1) étudier la thèse de MacCormick; (2) expliquer comment un particulier peut jamais être universel en s'inspirant de la formule de Scott Brewer sur le raisonnement par analogie; (3) comprendre davantage la thèse de MacCormick en examinant certains des arguments avancés par ses opposants; (4) utiliser la «procédure de jugement pilote» développée par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme comme exemple pour illustrer la pertinence de la thèse du particulier universalisable dans les pratiques juridiques d’aujourd’hui.

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法律语境中的特殊推理

特别推理是最常见的法律推理类型。尼尔·麦克米克（Neil MacCormick）建议，在法律背景下，合理的具体理由必须是普遍的。本文旨在：（1）调查麦克米克的论文；（2）通过从斯科特·布鲁尔（Scott Brewer）的类比推理公式中汲取灵感，解释一个粒子如何具有普遍性；（3）通过考虑反对者提出的一些论点，进一步理解麦克米克的论文；（4）以欧洲人权法院制定的“试点审判程序”为例，说明可普遍化的具体论文在当今法律实践中的相关性。摘要：特殊推理可能是最常见的法律推理类型。尼尔·麦克米克（Neil MacCormick）提出，在法律背景下，特定的正当推理必须是普遍的。本文旨在：（1）研究麦克米克的论文；（2）根据斯科特·布鲁尔（Scott Brewer）关于类比推理的公式，解释一个特定的人是如何具有普遍性的；（3）通过研究反对者提出的一些论点，进一步理解麦克米克的论点；（4）以欧洲人权法院制定的“试点审判程序”为例，说明可普遍适用的个人论点在当今法律实践中的相关性。

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来源期刊

Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

12 weeks

期刊介绍： Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.