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Arguments from Fairness and Extensive Interpretation in Greek Judicial Rhetoric 希腊司法修辞中的公平论证和广义解释
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.22329/il.v44i1.8291
Miklós Könczöl
{"title":"Arguments from Fairness and Extensive Interpretation in Greek Judicial Rhetoric","authors":"Miklós Könczöl","doi":"10.22329/il.v44i1.8291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v44i1.8291","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments from fairness as described in Aristotle’s Rhetoric are usually taken to aim at mitigating the strictness of the law or, in terms of procedure, to favour the defendant. This paper considers a more inclusive interpretation, that is, that arguments from fairness can work both ways. In the example given in the Rhetoric, arguments from fairness are directed at a restrictive interpretation of the text. That may not be necessary however. Likewise, fairness may speak for the claimant. Two examples may support this conclusion: a judicial speech by Hyperides, and the doctrine of issues appearing in Hellenistic school rhetoric.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140239924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generative AI and Argument Creativity 生成式人工智能与论证创造力
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.22329/il.v44i1.8258
Louise Vigeant
{"title":"Generative AI and Argument Creativity","authors":"Louise Vigeant","doi":"10.22329/il.v44i1.8258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v44i1.8258","url":null,"abstract":"Generative AI appears to threaten argument creativity. Because of its capacity to generate coherent texts, individuals are likely to integrate its ideas, and not their own, into arguments, thereby reducing their creative contribution. This article argues that this view is mistaken—it rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of creativity. Within arguments, creative and critical thinking cannot be separated. Because creativity is enmeshed with skills such as analysis and evaluation, the use of generative AI in the construction of arguments, especially in the role as universal audience, has the potential to heighten, not diminish argument creativity.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140239651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Distinctiveness Problem of Analogical Arguments 类比论证的独特性问题
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.22329/il.v44i1.8183
Yanlin Liao
{"title":"The Distinctiveness Problem of Analogical Arguments","authors":"Yanlin Liao","doi":"10.22329/il.v44i1.8183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v44i1.8183","url":null,"abstract":"The orthodox view holds that analogical arguments are a distinctive type of argument, while the eliminative view and its enhanced variant proposed in this paper contend that analogical arguments can be reducible to non-analogical arguments by eliminating the similarities proposition. This paper shows that the existing defense for the orthodox view fails to tackle the challenge posed by the eliminative view and its enhanced variant. The new defense for the distinctiveness of analogical arguments argues that an analogical argument is composed of both a conductive and principle-based argument. Consequently, analogical arguments remain irreducible, as the similarities proposition is not eliminated.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140239332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Makes an Argument Strong? 怎样才能使论证有力？
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-03-15 DOI: 10.22329/il.v44i1.8222
Blake D. Scott
{"title":"What Makes an Argument Strong?","authors":"Blake D. Scott","doi":"10.22329/il.v44i1.8222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v44i1.8222","url":null,"abstract":"It is widely believed that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of argumentation is vulnerable to the charge of relativism. This paper provides a more charitable interpretation of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s normative views, one that properly considers the historical trajectory of their work and a wider range of texts than existing interpretations. It is argued that their views are better characterized as a form of “contrastivism about arguments” than any kind relativism. This more accurate depiction contributes to ongoing efforts to revive interest in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work as well as build bridges with trends in contemporary argumentation theory.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140241436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cet obscure object du désir (philosophique) 朦胧的欲望对象（哲学）
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-01-21 DOI: 10.22329/il.v43i4.8311
Pau Olmos
{"title":"Cet obscure object du désir (philosophique)","authors":"Pau Olmos","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i4.8311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.8311","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is a response to H. Siegel’s “Arguing with Arguments” from a rhetorical perspective on argumentation. First I address Siegel’s concept of ‘argument in its abstract propositional sense’ and attempt to show that it is not at all an obvious object that should unquestionably be the privileged focus of argumentation theory. I then defend C. W. Tindale’s rhetorical perspective on argumentation against some of Siegel’s misreadings and also some of his legitimate disagreements regarding the relations between persuasion and rational justification and the way we should understand the source of argumentative normativity.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139609829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Une réaction à la critique depuis les marges épistémologiques 对来自认识论边缘的批评做出反应
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-01-21 DOI: 10.22329/il.v43i4.8415
Bart Garssen
{"title":"Une réaction à la critique depuis les marges épistémologiques","authors":"Bart Garssen","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i4.8415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.8415","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a reaction is presented to Siegel’s claim that the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation ignores or neglects epistemological viewpoints that he finds vital to any normative theory of argumentation. The focus is on the most important problems in Siegel’s argument: 1) the ambiguity of the term ‘argument’ and the alleged negligence of this ambiguity in pragma-dialectics; 2) the critical rational perspective of the pragma-dialectical account; and 3) the alleged negligence of the “abstract propositional sense” of argument in pragma-dialectics.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139609804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Justifying the Epistemological Theory of Argumentation 论证认识论理论的正当性
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-01-21 DOI: 10.22329/il.v43i4.8473
C. Lumer
{"title":"Justifying the Epistemological Theory of Argumentation","authors":"C. Lumer","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i4.8473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.8473","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses Harvey Siegel’s general justification of the epistemological theory of argumentation in his seminal essay “Arguing with Arguments.\" On the one hand, the achievements of this essay are honoured—in particular, a thorough differentiation of the different meanings of ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation,’ the semantic justification of the fundamentality of arguments as sequences of propositions, and the detailed critiques of alternative theories of argumentation. On the other hand, suggestions for strengthening the theory are added to Siegel's expositions, which make different perspectives within the epistemological theory of argumentation recognisable.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139610296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Virtues Suffice for Argument Evaluation 美德足以评价论点
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-01-21 DOI: 10.22329/il.v43i4.8483
Andrew Aberdein
{"title":"Virtues Suffice for Argument Evaluation","authors":"Andrew Aberdein","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i4.8483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.8483","url":null,"abstract":"The virtues and vices of argument are now an established part of argumentation theory. They have helped direct attention to hitherto neglected aspects of how we argue. However, it remains controversial whether a virtue theory can contribute to some of the central questions of argumentation theory. Notably, Harvey Siegel disputes whether what he calls ‘arguments in the abstract propositional sense’ can be evaluated meaningfully within a virtue theory. This paper explores the prospects for grounding an account of argument evaluation in arguers’ virtues and vices by examination of a corresponding debate in virtue ethics: Can an ethics of virtue guide our actions? It is thereby argued that an affirmative answer is possible: virtues suffice for argument evaluation.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139609987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
À la mémoire de Michael Scriven 悼念迈克尔-斯克里文
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-01-21 DOI: 10.22329/il.v43i4.8437
Anthony Blair
{"title":"À la mémoire de Michael Scriven","authors":"Anthony Blair","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i4.8437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.8437","url":null,"abstract":"In Memoriam for Professor Michael Scriven","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139610452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Arguing with Arguments 与论点争论
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-01-21 DOI: 10.22329/il.v43i4.7667
Harvey Siegel
{"title":"Arguing with Arguments","authors":"Harvey Siegel","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i4.7667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.7667","url":null,"abstract":"‘Argument’ has multiple meanings and referents in contemporary argumentation theory. Theorists are well aware of this but often fail to acknowledge it in their theories. In what follows, I distinguish several senses of ‘argument’ and argue that some highly visible theories are largely correct about some senses of the term but not others. In doing so, I hope to show that apparent theoretical rivals are better seen as collaborators or partners, rather than rivals, in the multi-disciplinary effort to understand ‘argument,’ arguments, and argumentation in all their varieties. I argue as well for a pluralistic approach to argument evaluation and argumentative norms, since arguments and argumentation can be legitimately evaluated along several dimensions, but urge that epistemic norms enjoy conceptual priority.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139609817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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