演绎主义错在哪里?

IF 0.9 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Informal Logic Pub Date : 2020-08-31 DOI:10.22329/il.v40i30.6214

Lilian Bermejo Luque

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在“演绎主义作为一种解释策略:对Groarke为重建演绎主义辩护的回答”中，David Godden(2005)区分了演绎主义的两个概念。一方面，演绎主义是一种解释性的论点，认为所有自然语言的论证都必须被解释为演绎的。另一方面，作为一个评价性的论点，演绎主义的观点是，要得出结论，必须从前提出发，或者换句话说，一个好的推论意味着要演绎。本文的主要目的是证明评价演绎主义是错误的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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What is Wrong with Deductivism?

In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong.

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来源期刊

Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

12 weeks

期刊介绍： Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.