{"title":"Sellars’s Core Critique of C. I. Lewis: Against the Equation of Aboutness with Givenness","authors":"Griffin Klemick","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0114","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many have taken Sellars’s critique of empiricism in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) to be aimed at his teacher C. I. Lewis. But if so, why do the famous arguments of its opening sections carry so little force against Lewis’s views? Understandably, some respond by denying that Lewis’s epistemology is among the positions targeted by Sellars. But this is incorrect. Indeed, Sellars had earlier offered more trenchant (if already familiar) critiques of Lewis’s epistemology. What is original about EPM is that it criticizes empiricist positions like Lewis’s not because of their foundationalism, but because of their psychologism about meaning. Since psychologism turns out to be unacceptable by Lewis’s own lights, EPM has a compelling (if implicit) critique of Lewis to offer after all, one that strikes at the heart of his philosophical system.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47735990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epicurean Feelings (pathē) as Criteria","authors":"J. M. Robitzsch","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0079","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper is dedicated to feelings (pathē) as criteria of truth and criteria of choice and avoidance in Epicureanism. The first section reviews two features of the other two Epicurean criteria of truth, perceptions and preconceptions: their non-rational and evident character. The second section extends the account to feelings, showing how, on the basis of their non-rational and evident character, feelings can be used to gain insights. The third section of the paper finally turns to feelings as criteria of choice and avoidance. It examines some neglected textual evidence that shows that perceptions and feelings are closely connected to each other, that is, that Epicurean feelings are defined as perceptions and observances of themselves, shedding some new light on the joint role of feelings and perceptions in choices and avoidances.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"0 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41410674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Posidonius’ Two Systems: Animals and Emotions in Middle Stoicism","authors":"Benjamin Harriman","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0084","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper attempts to reconstruct the views of the Stoic Posidonius on the emotions, especially as presented by Galen’s On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. This is a well-studied area, and many views have been developed over the last few decades. It is also significant that the reliability of Galen’s account is openly at issue. Yet it is not clear that the interpretative possibilities have been fully demarcated. Here I develop Galen’s claim that Posidonius accepted a persistent, non-rational aspect of the soul that he connects with the merely animal part of humans. The aim is to begin from this testimony in answering two questions: (1) How might the possession of a non-rational element of the soul operate alongside the hêgemonikon (leading-part of the soul) as a source of impulse for Posidonius. (2) How does this persistent animal aspect conform to the Stoic ontological classification found in their scala naturae? I shall argue in response to these that (a) Posidonius distinguished the merely cognitive aspects of the soul from those that are rational, and (b) that the hêgemonikon itself is not to be identified with what is rational. Accepting a persistent non-rational source of emotional impulses allows Posidonius a richer framework for explaining human affective responses and behaviours. I also briefly address Galen’s motivation for the account he offers. It is in view of Posidonius’ approach to Plato’s Timaeus that Galen’s discussion finds its most plausible interpretation.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42821215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Stability of Knowledge","authors":"Joseph Bjelde","doi":"10.1515/agph-2020-0145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2020-0145","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Socrates’ official answer to Meno’s question about the value of knowledge, near the end of Plato’s Meno, is that knowledge is stable. I argue that both the answer and the question have been widely misunderstood. The question has been taken to be why knowing at a time is better than true belief at that time, and Socrates’ answer has been taken to point to the greater persistence of knowledge over time. I argue instead that, given the broader context of the question and answer in the Meno, together with what Plato has to say about stability elsewhere, Meno’s question is better understood as a more difficult question – and Socrates’ answer as a good solution to it. This also involves arguing that Socrates’ analogy to the statues of Daedalus is not intended as the simple illustration of Socrates’ official answer for which commentators have taken it.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43279251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Importance of Kant’s Schematism for Schelling’s Project of a Philosophy of Nature","authors":"L. F. Garcia","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0127","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Counteracting a widespread interpretation of Schelling’s project of a philosophy of nature as anti-Kantian, this paper claims that Kant’s doctrine of the schematism plays a central role in the emergence and development of Schelling’s project. My argument will be structured in the following way. First, I will discuss Schelling’s reception of the schematism in his Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature of 1797, especially as regards his association of it with Kant’s dynamical conception of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Relying on this reconstruction, I will argue, secondly, that Schelling brings together a central issue of the Critique of Pure Reason (the objectivity of pure concepts) and the overall problem of the Metaphysical Foundations (the transition from pure philosophy to empirical sciences) by addressing the issue of a schematism specifically related to outer sense. Thirdly, I maintain that this issue is at the core of the overall argument developed in the Ideas, where it appears in the form of a schematism of “materiality as such”. Finally, I suggest that the notion of a schematism of materiality as such offers a useful key to understanding the unfolding of Schelling’s project between 1797 and 1800.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49304133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reydams-Schils, Gretchen, Calcidius on Plato’s Timaeus – Greek Philosophy, Latin Reception and Christian Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020, ix + 243 pp.","authors":"B. Bakhouche","doi":"10.1515/agph-2022-2003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2022-2003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"590 - 592"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43580395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Specht, Rainer (ed.), Christian Wolff: Disquisitio philosophica de loquela. Philosophische Untersuchung über die Sprache. Lateinisch-Deutsch. Übersetzung und Kommentar. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 2019. xliii + 388 pp. (Philosophische Bibliothek 727).","authors":"L. Kreimendahl","doi":"10.1515/agph-2022-2005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2022-2005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"592 - 595"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44232063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ludwig, Bernd, Aufklärung über die Sittlichkeit. Zu Kants Grundlegung einer Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann Rote Reihe 2020, 226 pp.","authors":"K. Ameriks","doi":"10.1515/agph-2022-2004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2022-2004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"786 - 790"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49164411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on Animal Cognition and Immortality","authors":"P. Adamson, B. Somma","doi":"10.1515/agph-2021-0171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0171","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper is devoted to a fascinating passage in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), in which he argues that non-human animals have rational souls. It is found in his Mulaḫḫaṣ fī l-manṭiq wa-l-ḥikma (Epitome on Philosophy and Logic). Following a discussion of the afterlife, Faḫr al-Dīn suggests that animals should, like humans, be capable of grasping universals, and that they are aware of their own identity over time. Furthermore, animal behavior shows that they are capable of rational planning and problem-solving. We contextualize these arguments with reference to Faḫr al-Dīn’s other philosophical works, and also compare the considerations he raises to ideas found in modern-day animal ethics, drawing here especially on the work of Mark Rowlands. The paper concludes with a translation of the passage.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46679492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}