ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE最新文献_第10页

Christian Wolff über motivierende Gründe und handlungsrelevante Irrtümer 克里斯蒂安·沃尔夫关于激励原因和与行动相关的错误

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-03-04 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2019-0073

Sonja Schierbaum

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引用次数: 2

The Human Vocation and the Question of the Earth: Karoline von Günderrode’s Philosophy of Nature 人类的职业与地球问题：Günderride的自然哲学

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-03-04 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2019-0028

D. Nassar

{"title":"The Human Vocation and the Question of the Earth: Karoline von Günderrode’s Philosophy of Nature","authors":"D. Nassar","doi":"10.1515/agph-2019-0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-0028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contra widespread readings of Karoline von Günderrode’s 1805 “Idea of the Earth (Idee der Erde)” as a creative adaptation of Schelling’s philosophy of nature, this article proposes that “Idea of the Earth” furnishes a moral account of the human relation to the natural world, one which does not map onto any of the more well-known romantic or idealist accounts of the human-nature relation. Specifically, I argue that “Idea of the Earth” responds to the great Enlightenment question concerning the human vocation, but from a distinctive romantic-idealist angle. I begin by demonstrating the influence of Fichte’s 1800 Vocation of Humanity on Günderrode’s thinking, which involves an investigation of both Fichte’s text and Günderrode’s critical response to it. I then turn to “Idea of the Earth” where I analyse Günderrode’s understanding of nature and the self in light of her critique of Fichte, and thereby distinguish her position from Fichte’s and from the position espoused by her fellow romantics and idealists. By reading “Idea of the Earth” alongside Fichte’s text and Günderrode’s remarks on it, this article sheds new light on both Günderrode’s understanding and defence of Naturphilosophie – against Fichte’s critique of it – and her distinctive contribution to romantic philosophies of nature.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"108 - 130"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2019-0028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47534059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Descartes’ Sum-Res-Cogitans-Argument in der Zweiten Meditation 笛卡儿的和-思-觉-论——《思想冥想》中的论证

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-02-19 DOI: 10.1515/AGPH-2018-0134

S. Dierig

引用次数: 0

Reciprocity and Political Justice in Nicomachean Ethics Book V 尼科马伦理学第五卷中的互惠与政治公正

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-02-10 DOI: 10.1515/AGPH-2019-0036

D. Jagannathan

{"title":"Reciprocity and Political Justice in Nicomachean Ethics Book V","authors":"D. Jagannathan","doi":"10.1515/AGPH-2019-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/AGPH-2019-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The profusion of senses of justice in NE V.1–7 has left many readers with a general impression of chaos, but also gives rise to pressing questions about Aristotle’s conception of justice. Specifically, (1) why does Aristotle claim that there are two parts to justice as equality, but go on to discuss three types of equality in the subsequent chapters? (2) What is the relationship between political justice and the distinction between general justice and particular justice? I argue in this essay that the notion of reciprocity, central to the first question, can also help us address the second. Specifically, I show that reciprocity is not a third species of particular justice, but rather a prior condition for political community and for political justice. Political justice is best understood as a redescription of particular justice that highlights how distributive and corrective justice maintain equality among citizens in an existing political community. In addition to explaining the unity of Aristotle’s thought in these chapters of NE V, I demonstrate a number of philosophical consequences for understanding Aristotle’s conception of justice.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"104 1","pages":"53 - 73"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/AGPH-2019-0036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43452393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Second Best City and its Laws in Plato’s Statesman 柏拉图《政治家》中第二好的城市及其法律

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-01-26 DOI: 10.1515/AGPH-2018-0055

A. Sørensen

引用次数: 0

Themistius on Concept Formation 提米修斯论概念形成

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-01-26 DOI: 10.1515/AGPH-2018-0051

Robert Roreitner

{"title":"Themistius on Concept Formation","authors":"Robert Roreitner","doi":"10.1515/AGPH-2018-0051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/AGPH-2018-0051","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper reconstructs the account of concept formation developed in the 4th Century A.D. by Themistius in the most ancient extant commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Themistius’ account can be contrasted with two widespread modern interpretations of Aristotle. Unlike psychological empiricists, Themistius ascribes an active role in concept formation to our innate capacity of understanding (νοῦς). Unlike intuitionists, he would not be satisfied by saying that νοῦς “intuits” or “spots” concepts. Rather, the question is what makes our νοῦς capable of “finding” and “recognizing” concepts in experience, and this can only be an understanding prior to all experience. Themistius seems to be responding here to Platonist arguments against Aristotle’s epistemology: postulating a “potential νοῦς” is not enough, for one can apply Meno’s dilemma to it and ask how it can recognize that it has found what it was looking for. But, contrary to the judgment of some modern scholars, Themistius never embraced the theory of recollection either (he rejects it decisively). He argued that both empiricism and Platonist innatism are wrong and developed a middle path marked by a strong interdependence between the perceptive and the rational capacity. This holds for all rational learning, and concept formation is its first stage: to form a concept means to learn something genuinely new, but also to recognize it as falling, e. g., under one of the ten categories. While being presented as a mere “paraphrasis” of Aristotle’s words, Themistius’ account is a well-advised and original response to the epistemological debates of his time.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"103 1","pages":"670 - 703"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/AGPH-2018-0051","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43482682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Force, Motion, and Leibniz’s Argument from Successiveness 力、运动与莱布尼茨的连续性论证

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-01-12 DOI: 10.1515/AGPH-2018-0088

Peter Myrdal

引用次数: 0

Aristotle on Attention 亚里士多德论注意力

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2021-01-12 DOI: 10.1515/AGPH-2018-0014

E. C. Fiecconi

引用次数: 5

Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding 康德与知性的概念前运用

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2020-12-16 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2017-0125

J. Indregard

引用次数: 0

The Gaze in the Mirror: Human Self and the Myth of Dionysus in Plotinus 镜中的凝视：人的自我与普罗提诺的酒神神话

IF 0.4 2区哲学

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2020-11-20 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2018-0046

Panayiota Vassilopoulou

{"title":"The Gaze in the Mirror: Human Self and the Myth of Dionysus in Plotinus","authors":"Panayiota Vassilopoulou","doi":"10.1515/agph-2018-0046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-0046","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract At the core of Plotinus’ exploration of human selfhood, lies a reference to the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus and his mirror, one of the toys the Titans used to seduce the young Dionysus (iv.3[27].12). In interpreting the myth within this context, the mirror has been invariably regarded by scholars as a symbol for matter, an external surface on which the soul is projected and becomes embodied as a human individual by dispersing in the material depths. This paper challenges this established view and advances a new interpretation of Plotinus’ allusion to the myth and its philosophical significance. It argues that the mirror is not a symbol for matter, but rather a symbol for the soul itself, for its power to transform itself and retain its identity in the process of becoming a human individual. The function of the mirror is thus both deceptive and protective. While the desire that the soul, deceived by the mirror, feels for its own image guides it to leave behind its original condition and unity, it is this same desire that keeps the soul within itself: protected by the Dionysian mirror, even the most dispersed soul cannot desire anything other than what it takes to be itself, hence rather than disappearing in the radical alterity of matter, soul reaffirms its identity as an individual human self.","PeriodicalId":44741,"journal":{"name":"ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"103 1","pages":"634 - 669"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/agph-2018-0046","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48366008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0