作为标准的伊壁鸠鲁情怀

IF 0.5 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE Pub Date : 2022-09-27 DOI:10.1515/agph-2021-0079

J. M. Robitzsch

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文主要探讨了作为伊壁鸠鲁主义真理标准和选择与回避标准的感受(路径)。第一部分回顾了伊壁鸠鲁的另外两个真理标准，即知觉和先入之见的两个特征:它们的非理性和明显的特征。第二部分将对情感的描述扩展到情感，展示了情感如何在其非理性和明显的特征的基础上获得洞察力。论文的第三部分最后转向情感作为选择和回避的标准。它检查了一些被忽视的文本证据，这些证据表明感知和感觉彼此紧密相连，也就是说，伊壁鸠鲁的感觉被定义为对自己的感知和遵守，这为在选择和回避中感受和感知的共同作用提供了一些新的启示。

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Epicurean Feelings (pathē) as Criteria

Abstract This paper is dedicated to feelings (pathē) as criteria of truth and criteria of choice and avoidance in Epicureanism. The first section reviews two features of the other two Epicurean criteria of truth, perceptions and preconceptions: their non-rational and evident character. The second section extends the account to feelings, showing how, on the basis of their non-rational and evident character, feelings can be used to gain insights. The third section of the paper finally turns to feelings as criteria of choice and avoidance. It examines some neglected textual evidence that shows that perceptions and feelings are closely connected to each other, that is, that Epicurean feelings are defined as perceptions and observances of themselves, shedding some new light on the joint role of feelings and perceptions in choices and avoidances.

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来源期刊

ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.00

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie [Archive for the History of Philosophy] is one of the world"s leading academic journals specializing in the history of philosophy. The Archiv publishes exceptional scholarship in all areas of western philosophy from antiquity through the twentieth century. The journal insists on the highest scholarly standards and values precise argumentation and lucid prose. Articles should reflect the current state of the best international research while advancing the field"s understanding of a historical author, school, problem, or concept. The journal has a broad international readership and a rich history.