Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series最新文献_第7页

Violencia, Procesos De Paz E Inversión Industrial En Colombia (Violence, Peace Processes and Investment in Colombia) 哥伦比亚的暴力、和平进程和工业投资

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2017-04-06 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2974017

Juan-Pablo Medina B., Alvaro-Jose Pinzon G., H. Zuleta

{"title":"Violencia, Procesos De Paz E Inversión Industrial En Colombia (Violence, Peace Processes and Investment in Colombia)","authors":"Juan-Pablo Medina B., Alvaro-Jose Pinzon G., H. Zuleta","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2974017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2974017","url":null,"abstract":"El acuerdo de paz entre el gobierno de Colombia y el grupo guerrillero de las FARC alcanzado en noviembre de 2016 ha despertado interes academico desde diferentes areas del conocimiento. Desde la economia, en particular, surgen preguntas acerca de los posibles efectos del acuerdo de paz sobre la productividad, la asignacion de factores y el crecimiento economico. Con el objeto de contribuir a la identificacion de los efectos economicos de los procesos de paz y de la violencia, en este documento se investiga el efecto de los procesos del Caguan (1999-2002), Santa Fe de Ralito (2003-2006) y de los actos violentos sobre la inversion privada en Colombia. Con este proposito, se analiza la inversion anual bruta en activos fijos de las firmas manufactureras de todo el pais en un periodo de tiempo caracterizado por el recrudecimiento del conflicto armado, por un posterior descenso en los niveles de violencia y por dos negociaciones de paz. Los resultados sugieren que: (i) la presencia de las FARC tiene un efecto negativo en la inversion manufacturera, (ii) la presencia de las AUC genera un aumento de la inversion, (iii) las tacticas ofensivas de las FARC generan caidas significativas en la inversion de la industria, (iv) ataques a la propiedad privada llevadas a cabo por las AUC producen reducciones en la inversion y v) ninguno de los dos procesos de paz genero un efecto significativo en la toma de decisiones de inversion.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124981481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Entender Y Combatir El Crimen: Modelo De Comportamiento Criminal Basado En La Provisión De Información (Understanding and Fighting Crime: Model for Criminal Behavior Based on Information Provision) 理解和打击犯罪:基于信息提供的犯罪行为模式(理解和打击犯罪:基于信息提供的犯罪行为模式)

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2017-03-08 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2931169

Nicolás Rodríguez, A. Zambrano

{"title":"Entender Y Combatir El Crimen: Modelo De Comportamiento Criminal Basado En La Provisión De Información (Understanding and Fighting Crime: Model for Criminal Behavior Based on Information Provision)","authors":"Nicolás Rodríguez, A. Zambrano","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2931169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2931169","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: Las ciudades de Colombia mantienen indices altos de delito a pesar del aumento del gasto en defensa y seguridad. Este trabajo propone y analiza la provision de informacion como una estrategia de bajo costo que puede ser efectiva para la disuasion del crimen. Para mostrar su efectividad, desarrollamos un juego dinamico con informacion imperfecta entre Autoridad y Criminal. En este juego la Autoridad debe decidir si asignar o no un policia a un area determinada y si enviar o no una senal. Por su lado, el Criminal solo observa la senal y debe decidir si comete el crimen o no. Si decide cometerlo sera atrapado unicamente si un policia esta presente. Uno de los equilibrios muestra que el uso adecuado de la senal puede desincentivar el crimen a traves de una mayor percepcion de captura sin incurrir en altos costos como el incremento del pie de fuerza. \u0000English Abstract: Despite authorities’ increase in defense and security expenditure, cities in Colombia maintain high delinquency rates. This document proposes and analyzes the provision of information as a low cost strategy that could be effective in crime reduction. To show its effectiveness, we develop a dynamic game with imperfect information between an Authority and a potential Criminal. The Authority decides whether to assign a policeman or not and whether to send a signal or not. The Criminal only observes the signal and must decide whether to commit the crime or not. If he decides to commit the crime, he will be arrested only if there is a policeman. One of the equilibria shows that the adequate use of the signal can deter crime through a greater perception of capture without having to incur in high costs such as increasing the police manpower. We also relate equilibria to different stages of development.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127918632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Pension Incentives and Formal-Sector Labor Supply: Evidence from Colombia 养老金激励与正规部门劳动力供给:来自哥伦比亚的证据

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2017-02-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2922105

O. Becerra

{"title":"Pension Incentives and Formal-Sector Labor Supply: Evidence from Colombia","authors":"O. Becerra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2922105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2922105","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes how future pension benefits affect labor supply in economies that have an informal sector. From the perspective of the worker, a formal-sector job offers long-run gains, as it increases his likelihood of gaining pension benefits in the future. If workers take those gains into account when they search for formal-sector jobs, the pension system affects formal-sector labor supply. I estimate the causal link between pension incentives and formal-sector labor supply using a cohort-based reform undertaken in Colombia. I demonstrate that a change in future pension benefits generates a large shift between the formal-sector and informal-sector labor supply, and that this change does not affect labor force participation. The average effect of pension incentives on formal-sector labor supply is heterogeneous, and is consistent with the predictions of a theoretical model combining a pension system and informal job opportunities. The effect is concentrated among workers for whom the minimum qualifying conditions are binding, and among workers with higher expected pension wealth. The results presented here suggest that pension reforms have the potential to create large efficiency costs, an effect that should be taken into account when designing pension programs.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125105609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

When Ignorance Is Bliss: Theory and Experiment on Collective Learning 当无知是福:集体学习的理论与实验

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2017-02-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2922493

Boris Ginzburg, J. Guerra

引用次数: 3

El Rol De La Inversión En La Función De Producción De Habilidades Cognitivas: Evidencia De Colombia, Chile Y Perú (The Role of Investment in the Cognitive Ability Production Function: Evidence from Colombia, Chile, and Peru) 投资在认知能力生产功能中的作用:来自哥伦比亚、智利和秘鲁的证据(投资在认知能力生产功能中的作用:来自哥伦比亚、智利和秘鲁的证据)

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2017-02-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2921963

D. J. Martínez

{"title":"El Rol De La Inversión En La Función De Producción De Habilidades Cognitivas: Evidencia De Colombia, Chile Y Perú (The Role of Investment in the Cognitive Ability Production Function: Evidence from Colombia, Chile, and Peru)","authors":"D. J. Martínez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2921963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2921963","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: Se analiza el rol de las inversiones en tiempo y en bienes y servicios que hacen los padres en la acumulacion de habilidades cognitivas de sus hijos en Colombia, Chile y Peru. A diferencia de varios estudios relacionados, se corrige el sesgo por endogeneidad con una metodologia cuasi-estructural. Se corrige el error de medicion en los indicadores de inversion, y la endogeneidad causada por la presencia de caracteristicas no observables de los ninos. Se encuentra que las inversiones que los padres hacen en tiempo son mas efectivas que las que hacen en bienes y servicios. Ademas, las madres mas educadas invierten mas en sus hijos. Finalmente, se confirma la evidencia de auto-productividad que muestra la literatura relacionada. \u0000English Abstract: We analyze the role of parental investments on time and parental investments on goods and services on the accumulation of children’s cognitive skills in Colombia, Chile and Peru. Unlike various related studies, we control for endogeneity biases using a quasi-structural methodology. We can correct for measurement error in investments and endogeneity caused by unobserved child characteristics. We find that parental time investments are more effective in increasing cognitive abilities than investments on goods and services. Additionally, educated mothers invest more on their children. Finally, we confirm the self-productivity evidence found in related studies.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126721095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

El Gasto Fiscal De La Guerra Contra Los Portadores Y Traficantes De Drogas Ilícitas: Una Aproximación Para Colombia (Public Expenditures on the War against Illicit Drugs Traffic and Possession: An Approximation for Colombia) 打击非法毒品运输和贩运者战争的财政支出:哥伦比亚的近似值(打击非法毒品贩运和拥有战争的公共支出:哥伦比亚的近似值)

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2017-02-07 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2921464

Isabel Gutiérrez, Santiago Tobón

{"title":"El Gasto Fiscal De La Guerra Contra Los Portadores Y Traficantes De Drogas Ilícitas: Una Aproximación Para Colombia (Public Expenditures on the War against Illicit Drugs Traffic and Possession: An Approximation for Colombia)","authors":"Isabel Gutiérrez, Santiago Tobón","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2921464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2921464","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: Colombia concentra grandes esfuerzos fiscales a la persecucion del delito de porte, fabricacion y trafico de estupefacientes. Estos costos no son siempre visibles, en tanto corresponden al costo de oportunidad de una gran cantidad de funcionarios que intervienen en el ciclo criminal. En este articulo estimamos el costo esperado por una captura motivada por este delito, y a partir de ello calculamos los costos anuales del esfuerzo fiscal. Discutimos si este gasto se justifica por la persecucion al trafico internacional de drogas ilicitas, al crimen asociado al micro-trafico y mercados locales, o a un esfuerzo para disuadir consumidores. Concluimos que ninguna de estas motivaciones justifica este esfuerzo fiscal, y que mas bien parece relacionarse con incompatibilidad de incentivos en la policia.English Abstract: Colombia focuses relevant resources to pursue the crime of possession, manufacture and trafficking of narcotic drugs. These costs are not always visible as they are mainly related to the opportunity cost of a number of bureaucrats involved in the legal process. We estimate the expected cost of an arrest resulting from this crime and, from this figure, we estimate the average annual social costs. We discuss if these expenditures are justified either by the war against international drug trafficking, crime related to local markets and consumption, or an effort to deter drug users. We conclude that none of this justify the annual expenditures resulting from arrests and that these arrests may be motivated by an incentive compatibility problem in the police.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125868862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Real Winner's Curse 真正赢家的诅咒

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2912915

L. Fergusson, Pablo Querubín, Nelson A. Ruiz, Juan F. Vargas

{"title":"The Real Winner's Curse","authors":"L. Fergusson, Pablo Querubín, Nelson A. Ruiz, Juan F. Vargas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2912915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2912915","url":null,"abstract":"We study the unintended consequences of political inclusion in a context of weak institutions. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we show that the narrow election of previously excluded left-wing parties to local executive office in Colombia results in an almost one-standard-deviation increase in violent attacks by right-wing paramilitaries, more than tripling the sample mean. We interpret this surge in violence as a de facto reaction of traditional political and economic elites, who seek to offset the increase in outsiders' de jure political power. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that other types of violence are unaffected, and that levels of violence are not influenced by the victory of right-wing parties in close elections. Moreover, we show that the surge in paramilitary violence is concentrated in the year of the next election, which gives left-wing parties a large incumbency disadvantage in Colombia. Our findings highlight the dangers of broadening political inclusion in the absence of efforts to strengthen other institutional dimensions. Open elections that are not complemented by checks and balances to prevent the disproportional accumulation of political power by some groups in society may have unintended negative consequences.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122652903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 40

Cuestión de salarios?: Efectos de las políticas salariales del sector público en la elección sectorial de profesionales calificados (A Question of Wages? : Effects of Public Sector Wage Policies on the Sector Choice of Highly Educated Professionals) 工资问题?公共部门工资政策对合格专业人员部门选择的影响(工资问题?公共部门工资政策对受过高等教育的专业人员选择部门的影响)

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2016-12-06 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2908677

Nicolás Acevedo

{"title":"Cuestión de salarios?: Efectos de las políticas salariales del sector público en la elección sectorial de profesionales calificados (A Question of Wages? : Effects of Public Sector Wage Policies on the Sector Choice of Highly Educated Professionals)","authors":"Nicolás Acevedo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2908677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2908677","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: El presente trabajo estima un modelo de eleccion sectorial de Roy, con el objetivo de evaluar la efectividad de un rango de politicas salariales contrafactuales en el sector publico en la atraccion de capital humano al sector publico colombiano. Utilizando datos administrativos de profesionales beneficiarios de creditos de Colfuturo, se halla que un aumento de salarios es mas efectivo en atraer a profesionales con postgrado que a profesionales sin postgrado. Con base en estos resultados, se presentan recomendaciones para el diseno de politicas de capital humano para el Estado colombiano. \u0000English Abstract: This paper estimates a Roy sector choice model in order to evaluate the effectiveness of a range of counterfactual public sector wage policies on the attraction of human capital to the Colombian public sector. Using administrative data of recipients of Colfuturo loans for graduate study abroad, I find that wage increases in the public sector are more effective in attracting individuals with graduate degrees than individuals before their graduate studies. These results inform recommendations for the design of human capital policies for the Colombian state.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115418959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Supplementary Health Insurance in the Colombian Managed Care System: Adverse or Advantageous Selection? 哥伦比亚管理医疗系统中的补充医疗保险:不利选择还是有利选择?

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2016-10-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2852467

D. Bardey, G. Buitrago

引用次数: 0

Habitantes De Calle, Seguridad Y Adicción: Opciones Jurídicas Con Sustento Médico (Street Dwellers, Security and Addiction: Legal Options with Medical Support) 街头居民、安全和成瘾:有医疗支持的法律选择

Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2016-10-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3046827

Alberto Gomez Zuleta, H. Zuleta, Pablo Zuleta

引用次数: 0