El Gasto Fiscal De La Guerra Contra Los Portadores Y Traficantes De Drogas Ilícitas: Una Aproximación Para Colombia (Public Expenditures on the War against Illicit Drugs Traffic and Possession: An Approximation for Colombia)
{"title":"El Gasto Fiscal De La Guerra Contra Los Portadores Y Traficantes De Drogas Ilícitas: Una Aproximación Para Colombia (Public Expenditures on the War against Illicit Drugs Traffic and Possession: An Approximation for Colombia)","authors":"Isabel Gutiérrez, Santiago Tobón","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2921464","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: Colombia concentra grandes esfuerzos fiscales a la persecucion del delito de porte, fabricacion y trafico de estupefacientes. Estos costos no son siempre visibles, en tanto corresponden al costo de oportunidad de una gran cantidad de funcionarios que intervienen en el ciclo criminal. En este articulo estimamos el costo esperado por una captura motivada por este delito, y a partir de ello calculamos los costos anuales del esfuerzo fiscal. Discutimos si este gasto se justifica por la persecucion al trafico internacional de drogas ilicitas, al crimen asociado al micro-trafico y mercados locales, o a un esfuerzo para disuadir consumidores. Concluimos que ninguna de estas motivaciones justifica este esfuerzo fiscal, y que mas bien parece relacionarse con incompatibilidad de incentivos en la policia.English Abstract: Colombia focuses relevant resources to pursue the crime of possession, manufacture and trafficking of narcotic drugs. These costs are not always visible as they are mainly related to the opportunity cost of a number of bureaucrats involved in the legal process. We estimate the expected cost of an arrest resulting from this crime and, from this figure, we estimate the average annual social costs. We discuss if these expenditures are justified either by the war against international drug trafficking, crime related to local markets and consumption, or an effort to deter drug users. We conclude that none of this justify the annual expenditures resulting from arrests and that these arrests may be motivated by an incentive compatibility problem in the police.","PeriodicalId":446687,"journal":{"name":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Universidad de los Andes Department of Economics Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2921464","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Spanish Abstract: Colombia concentra grandes esfuerzos fiscales a la persecucion del delito de porte, fabricacion y trafico de estupefacientes. Estos costos no son siempre visibles, en tanto corresponden al costo de oportunidad de una gran cantidad de funcionarios que intervienen en el ciclo criminal. En este articulo estimamos el costo esperado por una captura motivada por este delito, y a partir de ello calculamos los costos anuales del esfuerzo fiscal. Discutimos si este gasto se justifica por la persecucion al trafico internacional de drogas ilicitas, al crimen asociado al micro-trafico y mercados locales, o a un esfuerzo para disuadir consumidores. Concluimos que ninguna de estas motivaciones justifica este esfuerzo fiscal, y que mas bien parece relacionarse con incompatibilidad de incentivos en la policia.English Abstract: Colombia focuses relevant resources to pursue the crime of possession, manufacture and trafficking of narcotic drugs. These costs are not always visible as they are mainly related to the opportunity cost of a number of bureaucrats involved in the legal process. We estimate the expected cost of an arrest resulting from this crime and, from this figure, we estimate the average annual social costs. We discuss if these expenditures are justified either by the war against international drug trafficking, crime related to local markets and consumption, or an effort to deter drug users. We conclude that none of this justify the annual expenditures resulting from arrests and that these arrests may be motivated by an incentive compatibility problem in the police.