{"title":"How Can We Know What We Think We Know about Cyber Operations?","authors":"Eugenio Lilli","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Academic research on cyber operations is characterized by an exceptional paucity of work on sources and methods of information gathering and analysis. This lack of attention can arguably hinder the future development of this increasingly important area of research and weaken its potential impact on policymaking and the wider society. This article sets to redress this undesirable situation by addressing a number of critical questions: What obstacles make collecting information on cyber operations especially hard? What are the main sources of information available to the scholar of cyber international relations? Why should we rely critically on these sources? This article's second main contribution is to advance the adoption of a research technique for the study of cyber operations based on a combination of Triangulation and Problematization called TP technique. The article also provides three detailed examples of how this research technique can be used in practice to investigate specific scenarios concerning real-world cyber operations. The article ends with a discussion of the limitations of the proposed technique while also reaffirming the benefits deriving from its application to the study of cyber operations.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86166216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Solar Geoengineering: The View from Just War/Securitization Theories","authors":"Rita Floyd","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad012","url":null,"abstract":"As the world continues to fail to reduce and control global surface temperatures, the use of solar radiation management (SRM) technology by one actor or by a small coalition of actors is becoming increasingly likely. Yet, most of the social scientific literature on solar geoengineering does not tend to systematically engage with this possibility; scholars focus either on global governance or on banning SRM usage and research altogether. On the margins of this debate, a handful of researchers have sought to bring insights from the just war tradition to the issue of unilateral and minilateral SRM usage. This article is concerned with the contribution just war/securitization theories can make to our understanding of the debate surrounding climate engineering. It scrutinizes and deepens existing attempts by just war scholars to examine the moral permissibility of unilateral and minilateral SRM usage, including from the perspective of Just Securitization Theory.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80036475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The US Intelligence Community, Global Security, and AI: From Secret Intelligence to Smart Spying","authors":"Christopher R. Moran, J. Burton, G. Christou","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines the ways in which the US intelligence community is leveraging the power of artificial intelligence (AI) for national security purposes. Drawing on declassified intelligence records, it contends that this community has been fascinated by AI for decades. This is important to acknowledge because this historical context has shaped contemporary projects and thinking within the community. It has given the United States a first-mover advantage, establishing precedents that other global actors need to comply with, negotiate or resist. The article advances three arguments. One, the community has long recognized that it needs to collaborate with the tech sector on AI. However, these relationships bring certain challenges since the sector is a curious compound of ideologies and interests. Two, while the community was initially attracted to the data processing advantages of AI to help human analysts to overcome “data smog,” today it has broadened its focus to consider how AI can improve all stages of the intelligence cycle. Three, while many voices feverishly herald the transformative potential of AI in the global security environment, we argue instead that US agencies will not be able to exploit the full potential of AI, and thus talk of an intelligence revolution is premature. This is because of national and international rules on data collection and retention but also because of cultural tensions within the global AI ecosystem. The discussion will appeal to scholars and practitioners interested in the impact of emerging technologies on national security processes and decision-making and, more broadly, global security.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91319599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Promoting Peace and Impunity? Amnesty Laws after War in El Salvador and beyond","authors":"Nadine Ansorg, Sabine Kurtenbach","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Amnesty laws are a widespread practice in the transition from war to peace. They often aim at the transformation of violent conflict by making promises about exemptions from liability for war crimes. Critics argue that amnesties are in violation of international law and reproduce impunity in post-war societies, whereas supporters of amnesty laws focus on their peace-promoting features. Previous research has extensively looked into the second aspect, and found that amnesty laws can open the door to negotiations and a short-term termination of civil war. The question of impunity, however, has not been answered extensively. Applying a Historical Institutionalist framework, we assess the impact of the adoption of amnesty laws on societal impunity, defined as any person or group being exempt from punishment or free from the injurious consequences of an action. Case-study evidence from El Salvador shows that amnesty laws are reproducing existing power relations and thus inhibit profound reforms. With the help of amnesty laws, an institutional environment will be created that acts in the favor of involved parties for years, if not decades. We subsequently test these qualitative findings with a newly created dataset on post-war justice sector governance and reform across forty different post-war countries worldwide from 1990 to 2016, and with societal, police, and military impunity as dependent variables. Statistical evidence shows that amnesty laws significantly correlate with higher levels of impunity in a country. A peace agreement, or democracy at the end of war, reduces the risk of impunity even with amnesty laws present.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75817525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coups and the End of Mass-Killing Episodes","authors":"Gary Uzonyi, Matthew S Wells","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Why do mass-killing episodes end? Most attention is paid to international tools for ending atrocities. Instead, we consider how domestic politics alter the duration of killing by focusing on how divisions within the regime may lead to coups during the violence. Coups help shift regime preferences and undermine capacity to continue killings. We find support for this argument by statistically analyzing the relationship between coups and the end of each mass-killing episode from 1946 to 2013. We explore each mechanism quantitatively, and buttress these results with a series of examples illustrating the mechanisms at work.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79580422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thorsten Bonacker, H. Carl, A. Langenohl, A. Marciniak
{"title":"Republican Freedom and Committees of Safety: Notes on Historicization in Critical Security Studies","authors":"Thorsten Bonacker, H. Carl, A. Langenohl, A. Marciniak","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper discusses the historical case of committees of safety and their role in three republican revolutions in early modern western political history in order to conceptually contribute to the historicization of critical security studies. These committees were significant in amalgamating republican understandings of public freedom with demands for security from tyrannical oppression, thus highlighting the constitutive role of security considerations in the formation of republican polities and republican political constituencies. Yet, they also pointed to the seemingly self-defeating effects of those committees’ practices in situations perceived as revolutionary, which regularly involved clandestine, self-legitimating, and oppressive force against “enemies of the revolution” and potential internal opposition alike, and hence undermined normative notions of republican freedom. The paper introduces an analytical triad, consisting of definition of security situation, interpretative frame, and security repertoire, which allows analyzing historical situations of securitization in full complexity while at the same time allowing inter-comparability and the modeling of dynamic invocations of security by interdependent actors. Applied to the historical narrative, two interrelated conceptual consequences for a historicization of critical security studies are derived. First, prominent strands in critical security studies will profit from studying securitization as a politically constitutive, as opposed to a merely transformative, act, precisely as securitization crystallizes in historically specific, politically constitutive organizational forms, such as committees of safety. Second, the paper complicates accounts concerning the security/freedom nexus inherited from conceptual history, analyzing the entanglement of republicanism with security reasoning from the perspective of historically situated practices.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77051450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Do States Repatriate Refugees? Evidence from the Middle East","authors":"Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, G. Tsourapas","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac031","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Which conditions affect whether a state will choose to repatriate forcibly displaced populations residing within its borders? One of the most pressing issues related to the protracted Syrian refugee situation concerns the future of over 5 million Syrians who sought shelter in neighboring states. With host countries pursuing disparate strategies on Syrians’ return, the existing literature has yet to provide a framework that is able to account for variation on host states’ policies toward refugee repatriation. In this paper, we expand upon the concept of the refugee rentier state to theorize inductively upon the conditions shaping states’ policymaking on repatriation. We draw upon multi-sited fieldwork across the three major refugee host states in the Eastern Mediterranean (Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey) to establish that a refugee rentier state's strategy is driven by domestic political economy costs related to the hosting of refugee populations as well as its geostrategic interests vis-à-vis these refugees’ country of origin. Using a comparative case study approach, we note how a state is more likely to pursue a blackmailing strategy based on threats if it faces high domestic political economy costs and adopts an interventionist policy vis-à-vis the sending state, as in the case of Turkey. Otherwise, it is more likely to pursue a backscratching strategy based on bargains, as in the case of Lebanon and Jordan. We conclude with a discussion on how this framework sheds light on refugee host states’ repatriation policies on a global scale.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78575863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: System Structure, Unjust War, and State Excusability","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87887852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"System Structure, Unjust War, and State Excusability","authors":"David Rubin","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article seeks to bridge the interdisciplinary gap between just war theory (JWT) and international relations (IR) by introducing into the former discipline key theoretical and empirical insights from the latter discipline. Specifically, the article argues that traditional JWT is deficient as a normative account of war because it constitutes what Kenneth Waltz calls a “unit-level” theory, operating at the level of the individual state and evaluating the morality of a given war solely by reference to a list of state-level factors (e.g., just cause, proportionality, etc.). In this manner, JWT fails to take account of the systemic, or structural, correlates of international armed conflict. In particular, it fails to incorporate insights from the leading mainstream IR theories of neorealism, institutionalism, and constructivism in regard to how the international distribution of material capabilities, institutions, and ideas codetermines the nature and likelihood of war. To remedy these inadequacies of JWT, a “multilevel” approach to the morality of war is put forward according to which unit-level factors are required to be weighted by systemic factors. Pursuant to this approach, if a state has initiated or participated in a war that is assessed as unjust through the unit-level lens of traditional JWT, the state itself can still sometimes be partially excused for that war once systemic factors have been considered.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73461299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Winning Team of Losers: The Logic of Jihadist Coalitions in Civil Wars","authors":"Aisha Ahmad, O. Diallo","doi":"10.1093/jogss/ogac029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 For small groups fighting in multi-actor civil wars, joining a larger coalition is often a way to survive. Yet, it is not only rebel or pro-government non-state armed groups that form alliances; in many cases, jihadists have been surprisingly successful in building winning coalitions in civil wars. This is puzzling because jihadists attract fierce international opposition and are therefore very risky teams to join. Jihadists are also typically excluded from the political process, which means that they are unlikely to enjoy the spoils of a peace agreement. Why then would any local groups choose to join jihadist coalitions, rather than other rebel or pro-government coalitions in a conflict theatre? In this paper, we argue that ideology fails to explain this choice; rather, we contend that competition among rebel and pro-government coalitions inevitably produces winners and losers. Under these conditions, jihadists serve as an attractive spoiler coalition, drawing support from groups that see no chance of benefitting from an existing or future peace agreement. By offering these ‘losers’ a wider network and reference group, jihadists can expand their coalition base and territorial reach. By courting support from marginalized groups across ethnic and tribal lines, jihadists can create a winning coalition out of a diverse mix of losers.","PeriodicalId":44399,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Global Security Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73124065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}