Rebel Resource Efficiency and the Escalation of Civil Conflict

Abstract

What explains the ebbs and flows of government–rebel battles during civil conflict? We posit that rebels, as actors dissatisfied with the status quo, challenge the government when they can sustain fighting and absorb losses on the battlefield. This is possible when the group's resource base is stable and unlikely to be undermined by market forces, government action, or external interveners. If, however, rebel portfolios are extraordinarily profitable, rebels will focus on profiting from their investments, making the escalation of armed conflict less likely. Using a measure that captures the efficiency of rebel resource portfolios and two illustrative cases, we find evidence for this curvilinear relationship: conflicts escalate as resource portfolio efficiency increases but de-escalate slightly when portfolios are very efficient. Thus, the decision to escalate a conflict is revealed to be a function of the entire bundle of resources controlled by rebels and the market value of those resources. By accounting for the entirety of rebel resource portfolios, this study refines the insurgent–resource nexus, leading to a better understanding of civil conflict dynamics.