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Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

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Causation in Physics and in Physicalism 物理学和物理主义中的因果关系
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-01-11 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00503-y
Justin Tiehen
{"title":"Causation in Physics and in Physicalism","authors":"Justin Tiehen","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00503-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00503-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is widely thought that there is an important argument to be made that starts with premises taken from the science of physics and ends with the conclusion of physicalism. The standard view is that this argument takes the form of a causal argument for physicalism. Roughly, physics tells us that the physical realm is causally complete, and so minds (among other entities) must be physical if they are to interact with the world as we think they do. In what follows, I raise problems for this view. After an initial review of the causal argument, I begin my case by showing that the totality of physical truths do not deductively entail the causal completeness of the physical realm, using a double-prevention scenario and causation by omission to show that nonphysical causes of physical effects would not need to violate physical conservation laws. I then move on to raise problems for an inductive argument for causal completeness by drawing on the neo-Russellian view that there is no causation in fundamental physics, and so causation must itself be a realized or derived entity. I conclude by suggesting that the underlying problem is that the causal argument has fallen out of touch with the sophisticated understanding that philosophers have developed of the role of causation within physics.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42296261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fair Countable Lotteries and Reflection 公平可数彩票和反思
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-01-11 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00499-5
Casper Storm Hansen
{"title":"Fair Countable Lotteries and Reflection","authors":"Casper Storm Hansen","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00499-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00499-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The main conclusion is this conditional: If the principle of reflection is a valid constraint on rational credences, then it is not rational to have a uniform credence distribution on a countable outcome space. The argument is a variation on some arguments that are already in the literature, but with crucial differences. The conditional can be used for either a modus ponens or a modus tollens; some reasons for thinking that the former is most reasonable are given.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46455728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Remark on the Bank Cases 银行案例评析
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-12-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00501-0
Wolfgang Barz
{"title":"A Remark on the Bank Cases","authors":"Wolfgang Barz","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00501-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00501-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>Since their formulation by Keith DeRose (1992), the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition <i>p</i> does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against <i>p</i>. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00501-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45699057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Truth and Knowledge in F. P. Ramsey’s Essays: a Pragmatic Overview 拉姆齐散文中的真理与知识:语用学综述
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00502-z
Antonio Lizzadri
{"title":"Truth and Knowledge in F. P. Ramsey’s Essays: a Pragmatic Overview","authors":"Antonio Lizzadri","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00502-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00502-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper aims to renew the “deflationary” interpretation of Ramsey’s theory of truth, with respect to his declared “pragmatist tendency,” which was not completely developed due to his premature death. This aim is not only historical-philosophical, but also exquisitely theoretical, since the mediation of pragmatism allowed Ramsey to achieve an original synthesis among different philosophical instances. In order to show this, I pay attention to the debate between Ramsey and some spokespeople of the leading British philosophical traditions at the beginning of the twentieth century (especially Neo-idealism, Neo-empiricism, and Oxford Realism), through which it will stand out how Ramsey’s logical analysis of the truth predicate was embedded within a wider theoretical context, involving a pragmatic theory of knowledge and even a “general psychological theory.” Indeed, the truth of a belief will be defined in relation to mental factors, in so far as they involve a successful disposition to behave.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44732991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Sensitivity Unmotivated 灵敏度未被激活
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00500-1
Haicheng Zhao
{"title":"Sensitivity Unmotivated","authors":"Haicheng Zhao","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00500-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00500-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Sensitivity account of knowledge states that if one knows that <i>p</i> (via method M), then were <i>p</i> false, one would not believe that <i>p</i> via M. This account has been highly controversial. However, even its critics tend to agree that the account enjoys an important advantage of solving the Gettier problem—that is, it explains why Gettierized beliefs are not knowledge. In this paper, I argue that this purported advantage of sensitivity is merely illusory. The account cannot, in principle, solve the Gettier problem. Moreover, another formulation of sensitivity—which is fully in line with Nozick’s original account—is not unscathed either.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00500-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42207528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility 对比解释、意志努力与双重责任
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-11-03 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6
Neil Campbell, Jamal Kadkhodapour
{"title":"Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility","authors":"Neil Campbell,&nbsp;Jamal Kadkhodapour","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Neil Levy mounts two arguments against Robert Kane’s influential libertarian theory. According to the first, because Kanean self-forming actions are undetermined, there can be no contrastive explanation for why agents choose as they do rather than otherwise, in which case how they choose appears to be a matter of luck. According to the second, if one grants Kane the claim that agents are responsible for their undetermined choices in virtue of the fact that they made efforts of will to choose them, the fact that agents engage in dual efforts of will leads to an implausible doubling of the agent’s responsibility. We defend Kane from both objections. We argue against the first by clarifying the nature of contrastive explanation in the context of Kane’s theory and we argue against the second by showing that the kind of doubling of responsibility implied by an agent’s dual efforts of will is, in fact, innocuous.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50011666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility 对比解释、意志努力与双重责任
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-11-03 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6
N. Campbell, Jamal Kadkhodapour
{"title":"Contrastive Explanation, Efforts of Will, and Dual Responsibility","authors":"N. Campbell, Jamal Kadkhodapour","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00498-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"53136642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collective Epistemic Luck 集体认知运气
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-10-28 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x
Moisés Barba, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
{"title":"Collective Epistemic Luck","authors":"Moisés Barba,&nbsp;Fernando Broncano-Berrocal","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of <i>collective epistemic luck</i>. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking (suitably defined) forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides <i>a</i> reason (not a conclusive one) for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50052106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collective Epistemic Luck 集体认知运气
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-10-28 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x
Moisés Barba, F. Broncano-Berrocal
{"title":"Collective Epistemic Luck","authors":"Moisés Barba, F. Broncano-Berrocal","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"53136108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Virtues and Limitations of Randomized Experiments 随机实验的优点和局限性
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-10-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00497-7
Tudor M. Baetu
{"title":"The Virtues and Limitations of Randomized Experiments","authors":"Tudor M. Baetu","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00497-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00497-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>Despite the consensus promoted by the evidence-based medicine framework, many authors continue to express doubts about the superiority of randomized controlled trials. This paper evaluates four objections targeting the legitimacy, feasibility, and extrapolation problems linked to the experimental practice of random allocation. I argue that random allocation is a methodologically sound and feasible practice contributing to the internal validity of controlled experiments dealing with heterogeneous populations. I emphasize, however, that random allocation is solely designed to ensure the validity of causal inferences at the level of groups. By itself, random allocation cannot enhance test precision, doesn’t contribute to external validity, and limits the applicability of causal claims to individuals.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00497-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42991087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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