{"title":"On the Factivity Problem for Contextualism","authors":"Chih-Yun Yin","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00628-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00628-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A number of commentators have argued that epistemic contextualism faces the factivity problem, which is the problem that contextualism, together with some plausible epistemic principles, will lead to a contradiction. In this paper, I argue that on three variants of contextualism, two of the premises of the factivity problem are incompatible. Thus, the factivity problem is dissolved in the sense that contextualism does not lead to such a contradiction.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 4","pages":"715 - 729"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mereological Anti-Conservatism","authors":"Alexandre Declos, Vincent Grandjean","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00630-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00630-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we examine an overlooked answer to the Special Composition Question (SCQ), termed “Mereological Anti-Conservatism.” This view posits that extraordinary objects exist but that ordinary objects do not. For example, while tables and chairs do not exist, the mereological sums of these items do correspond to real objects. Although such a claim may initially seem absurd, we argue that (i) it is entirely derived from the claims and commitments of traditional rival theories—Nihilism, Universalism, and Conservatism; (ii) it resolves several issues that plague Conservatism, such as problems of vagueness, change and persistence, and the shortcomings of common sense; and (iii) it offers a more plausible perspective than Conservatism when considering the vast scale of possible worlds with differently segmented realities. Ultimately, we contend that if Anti-Conservatism is deemed implausible, then Conservatism must be as well, for structurally similar reasons.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 4","pages":"659 - 676"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00630-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Defense of Parfit’s Ontology","authors":"Evan Jack, Mustafa Khuramy","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00629-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00629-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Parfit (2011, 2017) denies that committing to the existence of reasons is ontologically costly. To motivate his denial, Mintz-Woo (2018) thinks Parfit forwards two arguments: the plural senses argument from elimination and the argument from empty ontology. Mintz-Woo believes he has “debunked” both arguments. In what follows, we do three things. First, we argue that his objections to the arguments fail or at best miss the point. Second, we argue that even if our independent responses fail, his responses meet an unfortunate dilemma. Lastly, we address his concerns about the relationship between Parfit’s ontology and truth.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 4","pages":"643 - 658"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00629-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reasoning with maps, a dynamic approach","authors":"Mariela Aguilera","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00625-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00625-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There has been considerable debate among scholars as to whether maps can play an inferential role. The debate has focused on whether maps possess the representational format required for logical transitions. This paper addresses a distinct challenge, namely whether maps can satisfy the taking condition, which has been proposed as a necessary condition for inference. In doing so, the focus of the discussion is slightly shifted by analyzing not only the representational structure of maps but also the rational transitions within them. Given that one of the main reasons for the use of maps is navigation, a dynamic notion of inference is proposed which takes into account practical reasoning. According to this view, logical theoretical inferences are just one type of many different kinds of inferential processes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"539 - 560"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145166524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Absurdity of Pannormism","authors":"Austin McGrath","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00626-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00626-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Some think normative properties like <i>being good</i> are <i>basic:</i> they cannot be explained in only non-normative terms. Moreover, some think these properties are instantiated—things are good. Others have argued the instantiation of basic normativity (with some plausible assumptions about grounding) implies <i>pannormism,</i> roughly the view that some atoms (and sub-atoms, and sub-sub…) and their behavior is also either good or bad. All the way down the levels of reality, normativity lurks. For example, if a seizure is bad, then the atomic behavior (and sub-atomic behavior, and so on) explaining it is also bad. These same philosophers believe pannormism could be taken as a <i>reductio</i> against basic normativity and normative realism. I’ll argue that with plausible additional premises, the argument for pannormism implies <i>all</i> atomic (and sub-atomic, and so on) behavior (and every atom, sub-atom, and so on) is normative. I’ll then explore whether this stronger pannormism, along with the weaker one, should be thought of as a <i>reductio</i>. My conclusion is that it isn’t clear what is absurd about pannormism, partly because the intuitions supporting the alleged <i>reductio</i> are surprisingly similar to those supporting basic normativity. This means believers in basic normativity and normative realism shouldn’t be as worried about their view implying pannormism as some suggest they should, and in fact, it might be <i>anti</i>pannormism that’s absurd.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 4","pages":"623 - 641"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The No-Content View of Contradictions","authors":"Krasimira Filcheva","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00624-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00624-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper challenges the widespread view that contradictions have semantic content. I argue that contradictory sentences in natural language, taken literally and occurring within assertoric contexts, lack content. I present an extended twofold argument, which rests on a set of considerations about the fundamental connection between meaning-constitutivity in natural language and the semantic status of contradictions. First, I argue that the contradictory negations of analytic statements cannot have semantic content as a necessary condition for the possibility of meaning-constitutive facts in natural language. Second, I argue that the special role of contradictions in the constitution of sameness and difference of content in natural language is incompatible with the view that non-analytic contradictions could have semantic content. These two arguments jointly imply that all contradictions in natural language lack content.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 4","pages":"695 - 714"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145469279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Plea for Commonality Thesis","authors":"S. Sreenish","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00623-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00623-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>John. R. Searle (2015) argues that the “Commonality thesis” (CT) is a respectable view in the philosophy of perception. According to CT, indistinguishable experiences (veridical perception and corresponding hallucination) can have the same phenomenology and the same intentional content. Searle thinks that to defend CT, one must accept the Common Kind Assumption (CKA). According to CKA, “whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur where one hallucinating.” Recently, CKA received enormous criticism. Therefore, maintaining CT in support of CKA is questionable. This paper aims at a dual purpose: first, to establish that CT is a respectable thesis and second, to defend CT without endorsing CKA.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"473 - 488"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145171843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Representational Solution to the Messenger-Shooting Objection","authors":"Błażej Skrzypulec","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00622-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00622-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Representational accounts of painful experiences, which characterize contents of pain in indicative terms, face a serious problem known as the Messenger-Shooting Objection. This problem arises from the fact that indicative representational accounts do not seem to be able to accommodate the observation that painful experiences rationalize actions aimed towards their own removal. I present a novel representational account of painful experiences which can solve the Messenger-Shooting Objection while still being an indicative representational theory. I argue that the proposed account is also coherent with the contemporary scientific paradigm concerning pains.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"561 - 580"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145165645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Morality and Aesthetics of Personal Beauty","authors":"David Friedell, Madeleine Ransom","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00621-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00621-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper argues that people commonly make moral and aesthetic errors regarding personal beauty. One moral error involves treating people as if their superficial physical beauty is a key source of their value. This practice immorally objectifies people by treating them as aesthetic objects, such as paintings or sunsets, rather than persons. Physical personal beauty is overrated. And even to the extent to which it may be appropriate to appreciate personal beauty, people still commonly make an aesthetic error by treating people as if their aesthetic value derives primarily from how their faces and bodies look. We thereby overlook much of their aesthetic value, including their aesthetic agency—which involves the aesthetic choices that shape people’s appearance and conduct, as well as their inner selves and character. Moreover, tending to a person’s fuller aesthetic value may mitigate harmful consequences of lookism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 2","pages":"195 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144073939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough","authors":"Bradford Saad","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00620-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00620-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A causal argument for physicalism is widely held to pose a problem for dualism. This view has an unobvious presupposition, namely that the causal closure of the physical has a special sort of ground. The requisite sort of ground must distinguish the causal argument for physicalism from many defective causal arguments. On behalf of physicalists, I develop an account of the ground for the causal closure of the physical, thereby putting the causal argument for physicalism back in the business of causally problematizing dualism. One consequence of my account is that physicalists can pose a causal problem for dualism using a much weaker closure premise than is generally assumed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"379 - 398"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12335395/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144823310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}