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Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

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Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge 更正：认识论的运气与知识
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00514-3
Michael J. Shaffer
{"title":"Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge","authors":"Michael J. Shaffer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00514-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00514-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"37 1","pages":"7 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43985635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relationism and the Problem of Order 关系论与秩序问题
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-03-11 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00513-4
Michele Paolini Paoletti
{"title":"Relationism and the Problem of Order","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00513-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00513-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>Relationism holds that objects entirely depend on relations or that they must be eliminated in favour of the latter. In this article, I raise a problem for relationism. I argue that relationism cannot account for the order in which non-symmetrical relations apply to their relata. In Section 1, I introduce some concepts in the ontology of relations and define relationism. In Section 2, I present the Problem of Order for non-symmetrical relations, after distinguishing it from the Problem of Differential Application. I also examine four main existing strategies to solve it. In Section 3, I develop my argument. The first step consists in arguing that—among those strategies—relationism can only accept directionalism. The second step consists in arguing that directionalism is affected by a serious problem: the Problem of Converses. I also show that relationists who embrace directionalism cannot solve this problem. In Section 4, I introduce and rebut several strategies on behalf of relationists to cope with my argument. In Section 5, I briefly draw some conclusions.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 2","pages":"245 - 273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48051177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Contingentist Actualists Should Endorse the Barcan Formula 为什么偶合现实主义者应该支持巴肯公式
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-03-10 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00508-1
Nicholas Rimell
{"title":"Why Contingentist Actualists Should Endorse the Barcan Formula","authors":"Nicholas Rimell","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00508-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00508-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>On its usual interpretation, the Barcan Formula—◊∃<b>xB</b> → ∃<b>x</b>◊<b>B</b>—says that, if there could have been something that is such and such a way, then there is something that could have been that way. It is traditionally held that contingentist actualists should—indeed, must—reject the Barcan Formula. I argue that contingentist actualists should—indeed, must—endorse the Barcan Formula, at least assuming a standard, Tarskian conception of truth and truth preservation. I end by proposing a logic for contingentist actualists that validates the Barcan Formula. This logic has the surprising feature of also validating the Converse Barcan Formula, □∀<b>xB</b> → ∀<b>x</b>□<b>B</b>, while still invalidating related formulas—such as □∀<b>x</b>□∃<b>y x</b> = <b>y</b> (NNE)—that contingentist actualists should reject. It does this by employing models with fixed domains but assignments to the identity predicate that vary across worlds.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 1","pages":"133 - 159"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42494482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck 安全性、证据和认知运气
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00511-6
M. Shaffer
{"title":"Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck","authors":"M. Shaffer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00511-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-022-00511-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"37 1","pages":"121 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"53136680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction 意识、神经科学和物理主义:乐观归纳法的悲观主义
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-02-17 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00512-5
Giacomo Zanotti
{"title":"Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction","authors":"Giacomo Zanotti","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00512-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00512-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Nowadays, physicalism is arguably the received view on the nature of mental states. Among the arguments that have been provided in its favour, the inductive one seems to play a pivotal role in the debate. Leveraging the past success of materialistic science, the physicalist argues that a materialistic account of consciousness will eventually be provided, hence that physicalism is true. This article aims at evaluating whether this strategy can provide support for physicalism. According to the standard objection raised against the inductive line of reasoning, the argument would beg the question by assuming some sort of metaphysical uniformity between consciousness and the rest of the natural domain. Here, I concede that there is a way to avoid this criticism. However, I argue that the argument still fails to support physicalism due to a structural problem of justification transmission.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 2","pages":"283 - 297"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00512-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47239278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism 分歧、观点与真理相对主义
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00504-x
Antti Hautamäki
{"title":"Disagreement, Points of View, and Truth-Relativism","authors":"Antti Hautamäki","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00504-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00504-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Truth-relativism is the claim that the truth of statements is dependent on the context in which they are made. In this article, truth-relativism is considered as a way to explain disagreements. Viewpoint relativism, a recent version of truth-relativism, is introduced as a useful framework to analyse how truth-relativism approaches disagreements. Viewpoint relativism is based on contextual semantics and the logic of viewpoint, which is a two-dimensional modal logic. In viewpoint relativism, the central concept is a point of view in relation to which truth claims are evaluated. Viewpoint relativism is compared to the truth-relativism of Peter Lasersohn and John MacFarlane. Finally, truth-relativism is defended against the critique of Paul Boghossian that it represents untenable ‘replacement relativism’.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"37 4","pages":"531 - 550"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00504-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42108436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Problem in Standard Presentations of the Mere Addition Paradox 单纯加法悖论标准表示中的一个问题
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00505-w
Oscar Horta, Mat Rozas
{"title":"A Problem in Standard Presentations of the Mere Addition Paradox","authors":"Oscar Horta,&nbsp;Mat Rozas","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00505-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00505-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>This paper argues that the Repugnant Conclusion which the Mere Addition Paradox generates is not the same as the one which a sum-aggregative view like impersonal total utilitarianism leads to, but a slightly more moderate version of it. Given a spectrum of outcomes {A, B, C, …, X, Y, Z} such that in each of them there is a population that is twice as large as the previous one and has a level of wellbeing that is just barely lower than the previous one, the Mere Addition Paradox implies that while almost all the outcomes of the spectrum are better than A, the last ones, such as Y and Z, will not, lest we accept that adding lives at a negative level is positive or neutral. This affects the way the Mere Addition Paradox should be presented.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"37 4","pages":"611 - 615"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49398297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic 认识论矛盾不会威胁古典逻辑
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-02-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00506-9
Philipp Mayr
{"title":"Epistemic Contradictions Do Not Threaten Classical Logic","authors":"Philipp Mayr","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00506-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00506-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Epistemic contradictions are now a well-known and often discussed phenomenon among those who study epistemic modals. These contradictions are expressed by sentences like ‘It is raining and it might not be raining’ whose oddness to the common ear demands an explanation. However, it has turned out to be a rather controversial enterprise to provide such an explanation in a sufficiently precise and general manner. According to pragmatic explanations, epistemic contradictions are semantically consistent but pragmatically defective. According to semantic explanations, one should regard epistemic contradictions as plain semantic inconsistencies. Endorsing such a semantic solution is, however, tantamount to rejecting classical logic, which predicts the consistency of epistemic contradictions. After arguing that all existing solutions to this problem face as yet unmet challenges, I will present a new solution that adequately overcomes these challenges. I will propose to view epistemic contradictions as semantically consistent but epistemically defective sentences. The main thesis emerging will be that we need neither abandon the inference rules of classical logic nor the classical truth-conditional approach to semantics to deal adequately with epistemic contradictions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"37 4","pages":"551 - 573"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00506-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42753906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic Luck and Knowledge 认知运气和知识
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-02-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00510-7
Michael J. Shaffer
{"title":"Epistemic Luck and Knowledge","authors":"Michael J. Shaffer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00510-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00510-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"37 1","pages":"1 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43784050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism 经验主义第三教条的根源:戴维森与奎因的事实论
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-02-05 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00509-0
Ali Hossein Khani
{"title":"The Root of the Third Dogma of Empiricism: Davidson vs. Quine on Factualism","authors":"Ali Hossein Khani","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00509-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00509-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Davidson has famously argued that conceptual relativism, which, for him, is based on the content-scheme dualism, or the “third dogma” of empiricism, is either unintelligible or philosophically uninteresting and has accused Quine of holding onto such a dogma. For Davidson, there can be found no intelligible ground for the claim that there may exist untranslatable languages: all languages, if they are languages, are in principle inter-translatable and uttered sentences, if identifiable as utterances, are interpretable. Davidson has also endorsed the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. The early Quine, as well as the later Quine, believe that the indeterminacy of translation casts serious doubt on the existence of facts of the matter about correct translation between languages. In this paper, I will argue that Quine cannot be the target of Davidson’s argument against conceptual relativism, and that Davidson’s argument is in conflict, among others, with his endorsement of the Quinean indeterminacy-underdetermination distinction. I will show how this conflict results in a radical departure from Quine with respect to the matter of factualism about fine-grained meanings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 1","pages":"161 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46036978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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