发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious 丹尼特泛心论:多重草案，都是有意识的
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-10-09 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00496-8
L. Roelofs
{"title":"Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious","authors":"L. Roelofs","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00496-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00496-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"53136565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious 丹尼特泛心论:多重草案，都是有意识的
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-10-09 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00496-8
Luke Roelofs
{"title":"Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious","authors":"Luke Roelofs","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00496-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00496-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I explore some surprising convergences between apparently opposite theories of consciousness—panpsychism (specifically constitutive panpsychism) and eliminativism (specifically Dennett’s multiple drafts model). I outline what a ‘Dennettian panpsychism’ might look like, and consider some of the challenging but fertile questions it raises about determinacy, holism, and subjecthood.</p><p>What unites constitutive panpsychism and the multiple drafts model is that both present the unitary consciousness we can report as resting atop a multiplicity of independent processes; both reject as misguided the search for a definite threshold between processing that is truly conscious and that which is merely preconscious. What divides them is that Dennett regards it as unreasonable to posit inaccessible consciousness, but reasonable to doubt or deny the existence of consciousness, while panpsychists think the opposite.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50016893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge as Objectively Justified Belief 知识作为客观证明的信念
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-09-26 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00495-9
Byeong D. Lee
{"title":"Knowledge as Objectively Justified Belief","authors":"Byeong D. Lee","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00495-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00495-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>According to Lehrer’s defeasibility account of knowledge, we can understand knowledge as undefeated justified true belief. But this account faces many serious problems. One important problem is that from one’s subjective point of view, one can hardly bridge the gap between one’s personal justification and objective truth. Another important problem is that this account can hardly accommodate the externalist intuition that the epistemic status of a belief is not entirely determined by factors that are internal to the subject’s perspective. The goal of this paper is to offer an alternative account of knowledge which can successfully deal with these problems. On the basis of a Sellarsian social practice theory of justification, I argue that we can understand knowledge as objectively justified belief.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44208818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection 更正:结构分离主义、不可区分性和内省
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00493-x
D. Franken
{"title":"Correction to: Structural Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability and Introspection","authors":"D. Franken","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00493-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00493-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43451045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Markosian’s Sideways Music and Aesthetic Value Gluts 马可辛的横向音乐与审美价值过剩
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00494-w
Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin
{"title":"Markosian’s Sideways Music and Aesthetic Value Gluts","authors":"Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00494-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00494-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In “Sideways Music”, Ned Markosian presents the aesthetic value variance of <i>sideways</i> music as a case against what the Spacetime Thesis—the thesis that time is one of four similar dimensions that make up spacetime. Critics have already raised worries about the premises of his argument. In this paper, I focus on Markosian’s assumed aesthetic realism. I argue that there is a version of aesthetic realism—a version that admits aesthetic value <i>gluts</i>—that is consistent with both the Spacetime Thesis and the aesthetic variance of sideways music. If this is right, then sideways music may simply be a non-issue for proponents of the Spacetime Thesis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50041552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Coherentist Justification of Epistemic Principles and Its Merits 认识论原则的一致性论证及其优点
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-09-07 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00463-3
Byeong D. Lee
{"title":"A Coherentist Justification of Epistemic Principles and Its Merits","authors":"Byeong D. Lee","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00463-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00463-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The problem of epistemic circularity involved in justifying fundamental epistemic principles is one of the fundamental problems of epistemology. One important way out of this problem is a Sellarsian social practice theory of justification, according to which we are justified in accepting an epistemic principle if we can answer all objections raised against it in our social practice of demanding justification and responding to such demands. The main goal of this paper is to show that this social practice theory can accomplish better than its rival theories, such as Alston’s doxastic practice approach, Sosa’s reliabilist virtue epistemology, and Wright’s entitlement theory, by making comparisons with these influential theories.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49017345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge 证据，认知运气，可靠性和知识
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-09-03 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00490-0
Mylan Engel Jr.
{"title":"Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge","authors":"Mylan Engel Jr.","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00490-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00490-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article, I develop and defend a version of reliabilism – <i>internal reasons reliabilism –</i> that resolves the paradox of epistemic luck, solves the Gettier problem by ruling out veritic luck, is immune to the generality problem, resolves the internalism/externalism controversy, and preserves epistemic closure.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-021-00490-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39411859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rationality, Success, and Luck 理性、成功和运气
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-08-30 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00486-w
Ram Neta
{"title":"Rationality, Success, and Luck","authors":"Ram Neta","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00486-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00486-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Rationality, whatever exactly it demands of us, promotes success, whatever exactly that is. Some philosophers interpret that slogan as something that can provide them with a way of <i>reductively explaining</i> the demands of rationality by appeal to some independently intelligible notion of success: being rational, they might say, is just having whatever property it is that promotes success. Other philosophers may interpret the same slogan as something that can provide them with a way of reductively explaining the notion of success by appeal to some independently intelligible notion of the demands of rationality: having success, they might say, is just having whatever property it is that is promoted by being rational. In this paper, I argue that neither of these reductive efforts can succeed. I then argue that understanding the way in which rationality <i>promotes</i> success requires us to understand why the promotion relation between rationality and success can be severed by some kinds of luck, but not by others. To explain the kind of luck that can sever promotion, we should conceive of both rationality and success as distinct but related facets of something more fundamental than either of them.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50055154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction 科学证据与内外主义的区别
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00491-z
Jonathan Egeland
{"title":"Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction","authors":"Jonathan Egeland","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00491-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00491-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with the dialectical upper hand in the internalism–externalism debate. How so? A couple of reasons are forthcoming in the literature. (1) Williamson (2000) argues that the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. (2) Kelly (<i>Philosophy Compass</i>, 3 (5), 933–955, 2008; 2016) argues that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this article, I respond to Williamson and Kelly’s arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor externalism over internalism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s12136-021-00491-z","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41899539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
More than Just a Passing Cognitive Show: a Defence of Agentialism About Self-knowledge 不仅仅是一场短暂的认知表演:为自我认知的代理主义辩护
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2021-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-021-00492-y
Adam J. Andreotta
{"title":"More than Just a Passing Cognitive Show: a Defence of Agentialism About Self-knowledge","authors":"Adam J. Andreotta","doi":"10.1007/s12136-021-00492-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-021-00492-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper contributes to a debate that has arisen in the recent self-knowledge literature between agentialists and empiricists. According to agentialists, in order for one to know what one believes, desires, and intends, rational agency needs to be exercised in centrally significant cases. Empiricists disagree: while they acknowledge the importance of rationality in general, they maintain that when it comes to self-knowledge, empirical justification, or warrant, is always sufficient.</p><p>In what follows, I defend agentialism. I argue that if we could only come to know our judgement-sensitive attitudes in the way described by empiricism, then we would be self-estranged from them when we acquire knowledge of them. We would relate to our own attitudes as if we were watching the movies of our inner lives unfold. Given that this is not the position we typically inhabit, with respect to our judgement-sensitive attitudes, I conclude that empiricism fails. This is the self-estrangement argument against empiricism. I then consider a response that Brie Gertler, an empiricist, offers to the objection that empiricism fatally portrays us ‘mere observers of a passing cognitive show’ (2016, p. 1). I argue that her response is unsuccessful. Hence, we should endorse agentialism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s12136-021-00492-y","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46624177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信