A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments

Abstract

In ontological debates, realists typically argue for their view via one of two approaches. The Quinean approach employs naturalistic arguments that say our scientific practices give us reason to affirm the existence of a kind of entity. The Fregean approach employs linguistic arguments that say we should affirm the existence of a kind of entity because our discourse contains reference to those entities. These two approaches are often seen as distinct, with indispensability arguments typically associated with the former, but not the latter, approach. This paper argues for a connection between the two approaches on the grounds that the typical arguments of the Fregean approach can be reformulated as indispensability arguments. This connection is significant in at least two ways. First, it implies that indispensability arguments provide a common framework within which to compare the Quinean and Fregean approaches, which allows for a more precise delineation of the two approaches. Second, it implies the possibility of analogical relations that allow proponents and opponents of each approach to draw upon the ideas that have been developed regarding the other.