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The Battlefield of Indeterminate Causation and its Additivity 不确定因果的战场及其可加性
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-09-24 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00709-y
Douglas Ehring
{"title":"The Battlefield of Indeterminate Causation and its Additivity","authors":"Douglas Ehring","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00709-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00709-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A number of philosophers have argued that causation can be indeterminate, particularly in cases of causation by omission such as Sartorio’s <i>Battlefield</i>. In <i>Battlefield</i>, an inaction is followed by the deaths of three soldiers, though had the inaction not occurred, one and only one soldier would have been saved. Some philosophers claim that with respect to any particular soldier’s death, it is indeterminate whether the inaction caused that death despite its being false that the inaction caused all three deaths. One objection to this “indeterminist option” is that if indeterminate causation is additive, then since it is indeterminate whether the inaction caused each particular death, it should be indeterminate whether the inaction caused all three deaths. But it is false that the inaction caused all the deaths. I will argue that there are restrictions built into the additivity of indeterminate causation that mean that this objection fails.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1235 - 1244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction to the Collection 藏品简介
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-09-23 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00708-z
Sarah Wright
{"title":"Introduction to the Collection","authors":"Sarah Wright","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00708-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00708-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"909 - 911"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can Normativity Be Fictional? 规范性可以是虚构的吗？
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-09-17 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00707-0
Lya Bulov, Dmitriy Zhukov
{"title":"Can Normativity Be Fictional?","authors":"Lya Bulov,&nbsp;Dmitriy Zhukov","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00707-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00707-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The article examines whether normativity itself, rather than merely normative statements or facts represented within fiction, can be fictional. The question is distinguished from the problem of imaginative resistance introduced by K. Walton: the focus is not on readers’ difficulty in imagining moral or normative alternatives, but on the metaphysical status of fictional normativity. We argue that, on the most straightforward interpretations of the question, normativity (if we interpret it as a primitive, non-reducible property) cannot be fictional. To show this, we develop a framework based on three distinctions: between objectified and non-objectified properties, primitive and compound properties, and fiction-represented and fiction-constituted properties. We then defend a restrictive principle, inspired by Hume’s account of imagination, according to which fiction-constituted properties must be compound, since the author creates fictional entities by recombining already available elements rather than by generating primitive properties ex nihilo. If normativity is represented in fiction, it remains real-world normativity rather than fictional in the relevant sense. If it is constituted by fiction as an alternative normativity, then it must be compound and therefore cannot be a version of proper normativity, which is primitive. Thus, in this interpretation, normativity is either genuine but not fictional, or fictional but not genuine.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1299 - 1319"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unjustified Defeaters and the Role of Incoherence in Epistemic Defeat 不合理的失败者和不连贯在认知失败中的作用
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-09-09 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00704-3
João R. Fett
{"title":"Unjustified Defeaters and the Role of Incoherence in Epistemic Defeat","authors":"João R. Fett","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00704-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00704-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the possibility of unjustified defeaters and the explanatory role of incoherence in epistemic defeat. I reconstruct Peter Graham and Jack Lyons’s objections to Jennifer Lackey’s psychological defeaters, paying special attention to their rejection of unjustified defeaters and to their claim that incoherence plays no indispensable explanatory role in defeat. First, I argue that denying the possibility of unjustified defeaters leads to implausible verdicts about rationality in cases involving incoherent belief sets. Second, I argue that incoherence is essential for explaining the epistemic damage generated by such defeaters, even when a subject’s total evidence remains unchanged. Finally, I examine different ways of accommodating this phenomenon and argue that, regardless of whether it is understood in terms of full loss of justification, structural irrationality, or some combination of the two, incoherence remains an indispensable component of its explanation. I conclude that, although evidentialist accounts plausibly explain many ordinary cases of defeat, they cannot fully account for defeat involving unjustified defeaters, where incoherence itself becomes the source of the epistemic downgrade.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1161 - 1179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00704-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Common Knowledge Attainability: A Response to Lederman’s Sailboat Argument 常识可得性：对莱德曼帆船论的回应
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-09-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00705-2
Renjia Xiao
{"title":"Common Knowledge Attainability: A Response to Lederman’s Sailboat Argument","authors":"Renjia Xiao","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00705-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00705-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Common knowledge requires that everyone knows a proposition, knows that everyone knows it, and so on. Lederman’s Sailboat Argument claims that ideal agents may fail to attain common knowledge. The argument appeals to small differences in how a mast may appear to two agents. Its key premise says that an agent who sees the mast as having a certain height cannot rule out its appearing slightly shorter to the other agent. This paper rejects that premise. Perceptual closeness between two apparent heights does not establish that the lower appearance remains epistemically possible for that agent. Such a possibility must be tied to the epistemic state produced by the agent’s own observation. A revised premise that makes this connection may apply to an apparent height delivered by an agent’s observation, but not to lower apparent heights generated by reasoning rather than observation. The argument therefore fails.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1181 - 1198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Wholehearted Decisions 关于全心全意的决定
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-09-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00706-1
yuanfan HUANG
{"title":"On Wholehearted Decisions","authors":"yuanfan HUANG","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00706-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00706-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To complete his theory of free will, Harry Frankfurt introduces the condition of wholeheartedness. Specifically, he asserts that one’s will is free if and only if their second-order volition endorses their first-order desire to pursue that will wholeheartedly. However, many critics argue that Frankfurt’s requirement of wholeheartedness is excessively demanding, as individuals can act freely even in the absence of wholeheartedness. To address this concern, this paper proposes a redefinition of Frankfurtian wholeheartedness by dividing it into two sub-concepts: wholehearted care and wholehearted decision. A wholehearted decision can logically exist independently of wholehearted care. This reason-based decision can be viewed as a form of conceptual engineering that refines our conventional understanding of wholeheartedness. By redefining the Frankfurtian notion of wholehearted decision, we can effectively tackle two major challenges to Frankfurt’s condition: the challenge to his resolution argument and the challenge to his argument from self-defeat.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1361 - 1379"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Judgment, Reality, and Temporality: Gareth Evans Reconsidered 判断、现实与时间性：加雷思·埃文斯的再思考
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-08-17 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00703-4
Zijian Zhu
{"title":"Judgment, Reality, and Temporality: Gareth Evans Reconsidered","authors":"Zijian Zhu","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00703-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00703-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Gareth Evans infers the absoluteness of truth and reality from the absoluteness of the correctness of assertion: since the correctness of assertion does not vary with time, he concludes that truth and reality cannot vary with time either. In this paper, I argue that Evans’s argument fails and diagnose why it fails. In doing so, I aim to shed some new light on the relationship between the temporality of judgment and that of reality. To understand this relationship fully, we must attend not only to the temporality of the correctness of judgment but also to the temporality of the act of judgment itself.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1321 - 1338"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conspiracy Theorists and Appreciating Evidence 阴谋论者和鉴赏证据
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-08-11 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00702-5
Auke Montessori, Harmen Ghijsen
{"title":"Conspiracy Theorists and Appreciating Evidence","authors":"Auke Montessori,&nbsp;Harmen Ghijsen","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00702-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00702-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Debates on the rationality of endorsing conspiracy theories often focus on the primary evidence conspiracy theorists have: errant data, eyewitnesses, revealed documentation, and the kind of facts typical investigators would use. Once we focus on the appreciation of this primary evidence, a significant portion of conspiracy theorists (most Flat Earthers, for example), turn out not to appreciate their primary evidence. They use evidence that, in fact, does not support their beliefs at all. Thus, if we only focus on primary evidence, we would be forced to posit a deep kind of irrationality in order to explain how these conspiracy theorists arrive at their beliefs. We propose a more palatable alternative on which (the appreciation of) secondary evidence plays a crucial role in the formation of conspiratorial beliefs: conspiracy theorists often don’t (just) rely on primary evidence; they also rely on testimonies that point out to them what such evidence (supposedly) supports. While there often still is something irrational to accepting poorly supported conspiracy theories, that irrationality is no longer blatant. We compare our approach to other social epistemological alternatives in the literature and argue that it is descriptively more accurate and normatively more satisfying.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"977 - 1003"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00702-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemologizing Technology: On the Technological Scaffolding of Epistemic Exchanges and Violence 技术认识论化：论知识交流与暴力的技术框架
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-08-05 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00701-6
Justin Simpson
{"title":"Epistemologizing Technology: On the Technological Scaffolding of Epistemic Exchanges and Violence","authors":"Justin Simpson","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00701-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00701-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Bringing together Philosophy of Technology and Social Epistemology, this paper investigates how technology can engender worlds and affective atmospheres that structure epistemic exchanges. In addition to mediating the perception and actions of the speaker and audience, the materiality of technology can contribute to the persistence of identity prejudices, the reliability of ignorance, and the recalcitrance of maladjusted epistemological systems. In particular, this paper critically analyzes how technology such as Confederate monuments can consequently provide material scaffolding for epistemic violence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1027 - 1048"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reconfiguring Epistemic Reparations Through a Decolonial Lens 通过非殖民化镜头重新配置认知赔偿
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-07-04 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00700-7
Alina Anjum Ahmed, Josué Piñeiro
{"title":"Reconfiguring Epistemic Reparations Through a Decolonial Lens","authors":"Alina Anjum Ahmed,&nbsp;Josué Piñeiro","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00700-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00700-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper reconfigures epistemic reparations through a decolonial lens. Shifting away from reparations as restoring the victim’s epistemic standing to contribute to a “common pool of knowledge,” we focus on epistemic sovereignty. In so doing, we explore the epistemic violence of coloniality identifying two resulting epistemic harms: epistemic jurisdiction-harm and epistemic capability-harm. To address these harms, we propose an intervention consisting of three reparative moves: (1) the decolonizing of testimonial spaces, (2) the right to not be known, and (3) an expanded notion of the right to return. We conclude by hinting at our broader project of going beyond reparations and toward reclamation.\u0000</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1049 - 1070"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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