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Existence Is Not Relativistically Invariant—Part 1: Meta-ontology 存在并非相对不变--第一部分：元本体论
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-02-20 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00586-3
Florian Marion
{"title":"Existence Is Not Relativistically Invariant—Part 1: Meta-ontology","authors":"Florian Marion","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00586-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00586-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the view that what exists is only what exists <i>now</i> or <i>presently</i>. Partisans of presentism (the motto ‘only present things exist’) had very difficult times since, and no presentist theory of time seems to have been able to satisfactorily counter the objection raised from Special Relativity. One of the strategies offered to the presentist consists in <i>relativizing</i> existence to inertial frames. This unfashionable strategy has been accused of counterfeiting, since the meaning of the concept of existence would be incompatible with its relativization. Therefore, existence could only be relativistically invariant. In this paper, I shall examine whether such an accusation hits its target, and I will do this by examining whether the different criteria of existence that have been suggested by the Philosophical Tradition from Plato onwards imply that existence cannot be relativized.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140448260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dead Past, Ad hocness, and Zombies 死亡往事、临时性和僵尸
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00585-4
Ernesto Graziani
{"title":"Dead Past, Ad hocness, and Zombies","authors":"Ernesto Graziani","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00585-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00585-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Dead Past Growing Block theory of time—<i>DPGB-theory</i>—is the metaphysical view that the past and the present tenselessly exist, whereas the future does not, and that only the present hosts mentality, whereas the past lacks it and is, in this sense, dead. One main reason in favour of this view is that it is immune to the now-now objection or epistemic objection (which aims at undermining the certainty, within an A-theoretical universe, of being currently experiencing the objective present time). In this paper, I examine the additional arguments offered by P. Forrest and G. A. Forbes to back the DPGB-theory and show that they do not work. I also examine a proposal to rescue the DPGB-theory suggested by an anonymous reviewer for this journal and argue that it does not work either. Moreover, in line with D. Braddon-Mitchell and against Forbes, I argue that the DPGB-theory is indeed committed to the existence of zombies in the past. Being ad hoc and burdened by a very odd and counterintuitive ontological commitment, the DPGB-theory turns out to be rather unpalatable.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139960938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism 逻辑不熟悉？如何破解逻辑现实主义的麦克斯维尼难题
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-01-27 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00583-6
Matteo Baggio
{"title":"Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism","authors":"Matteo Baggio","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00583-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00583-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if logical realism is true, we encounter a dilemma. Either we cannot determine which of the two logically equivalent theories holds a fundamental status, or neither theory can be considered fundamental. These two conclusions together constitute what is known as the <i>Unfamiliarity Dilemma</i>, which poses significant challenges to our understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical features of logic. In this article, I present two strategies to address McSweeney’s dilemma. If these arguments prove effective, they would demonstrate that our knowledge of logic is not susceptible to the skeptical concerns raised by McSweeney’s hypothesis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139592217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Wittgenstein’s Dispensation with “ = ” in the Tractatus and its Philosophical Background. A Critical Study 论维特根斯坦在《论语》中对"="的处理及其哲学背景。批判性研究
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00581-0
Matthias Schirn
{"title":"On Wittgenstein’s Dispensation with “ = ” in the Tractatus and its Philosophical Background. A Critical Study","authors":"Matthias Schirn","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00581-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00581-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this essay, I critically analyze Wittgenstein’s dispensation with “ = ” in a correct concept-script. I argue <i>inter alia</i> (a) that in the <i>Tractatus</i> the alleged pseudo-character of sentences containing “ = ” or = -sentences remains largely unexplained and propose how it could be explained; (b) that at least in some cases of replacing = -sentences with equivalent identity-sign free sentences the use of the notion of a translation seems inappropiate; (c) that in the <i>Tractatus</i> it remains unclear how identity of the object as that which is expressed by identity of the sign should be understood specifically; (d) that there are = -sentences which have no obvious equivalent in Wittgenstein’s novel notation; (e) that Wittgenstein’s adherence to (non-relational) identity, although he dispenses with “ = ”, is probably motivated by his desire to ensure that the expressive power of an identity-sign free concept-script of first-order is on a par with standard first-order logic containing “ = ”. In the concluding section, I critically discuss some claims in Lampert and Säbel (<i>The Review of Symbolic Logic, 14</i>, 1–21, 2021) and defend Wehmeier’s account of pseudo-sentences in the <i>Tractatus</i> (2012) against the objections they raise.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00581-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139625590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities 虚构与非定形：关于虚构实体理论的建议
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-12-20 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00580-1
Manuele Dozzi
{"title":"Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities","authors":"Manuele Dozzi","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00580-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00580-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The aim of this paper is to propose an exploratory artefactual theory of fictional objects based on Evnine’s amorphism, with the goal of reconciling the inconsistent intuitions surrounding these entities. While not presenting a fully developed and comprehensive theory, I aim to explore the possibilities of amorphism and to offer a preliminary investigation into the nature of fictional objects and the challenges posed by our basic intuitions regarding their non-existence, creation, and property attribution. I formulate a two-level criterion of identity-based on creative acts and utilize the notion of internal predication to account for how fictional objects possess the properties attributed to them in relevant stories. Additionally, I propose considering a subset of essential properties to fix the identity of <i>ficta</i> across stories. Lastly, I address the challenge of negative existential statements by equating non-existence with unreality, asserting that fictional objects are constituted by the properties attributed to them but do not fully exemplify them.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139170645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Della Rocca’s Relations Regress and Bradley’s Relations Regresses 德拉罗卡的关系回归和布拉德利的关系回归
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00578-9
Kevin Morris
{"title":"Della Rocca’s Relations Regress and Bradley’s Relations Regresses","authors":"Kevin Morris","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00578-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00578-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In his recent <i>The Parmenidean Ascent</i>, Michael Della Rocca develops a regress-theoretic case, reminiscent of F. H. Bradley’s famous argument in <i>Appearance and Reality</i>, against the intelligibility of relations and in favor of a monistic conception of reality. I argue that Della Rocca illicitly supposes that “internal” relations — in one sense of that word — lead to a “chain” regress, a regress of relations relating relations and relata. In contrast, I contend that if “internal” or grounded relations lead to a regress at all, it is a kind of “fission” regress within the relata themselves, and that a chain regress for relations only arises, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. In this way, I contend that Della Rocca pursues a regress for so-called “internal” or grounded relations that only arise, if at all, for so-called “external” relations, relations not grounded in their relata. I compare Della Rocca’s case against relations with Bradley’s reasoning in <i>Appearance and Reality</i> and suggest in this context that Bradley may, perhaps, have the upper hand.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139180278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification 相识、关注和自省的理由
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00576-x
Samuel A. Taylor
{"title":"Acquaintance, Attention, and Introspective Justification","authors":"Samuel A. Taylor","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00576-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00576-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper develops a version of the acquaintance theory of introspective justification. In the process, it rejects the view that acquaintance is <i>sui generic</i> in favor of a view that identifies acquaintance with availability for selection by attention mechanisms. Moreover, unlike many recent accounts of knowledge by acquaintance, it explains the epistemic significance of acquaintance in terms of the epistemic basing relation without any need to appeal to the structure or existence of phenomenal concepts. Lastly, while in ideal cases acquaintance will provide a kind of infallible justification, the paper shows how to extend these ideas to allow that acquaintance can provide fallible introspective justification.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139181657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Semantic and Ontic Truth 论语义真理和本体真理
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00574-z
Karen Green
{"title":"On Semantic and Ontic Truth","authors":"Karen Green","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00574-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00574-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is argued that we should distinguish ontic truth––the True––that Frege claimed is sui generis and indefinable, from the semantic concept, for which Tarski provided a definition. Frege’s argument that truth is not definable is clarified and Wittgenstein’s introduction of the distinction between saying and showing is interpreted as an attempted response to Frege’s rejection of the correspondence theory. It is argued that conflicts between realism and Dummettian anti-realism result from their proponents not thoroughly distinguishing between the two closely connected ways of thinking about truth. Last, the distinction is used to clarify and endorse the Fregean claim that all true sentences indicate the True, identified as ontic truth.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142410254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defending Pure Moral Deference: an Argument from Rationality 为纯粹的道德推崇辩护：理性论证
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-11-30 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00577-w
Yuzhou Wang
{"title":"Defending Pure Moral Deference: an Argument from Rationality","authors":"Yuzhou Wang","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00577-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00577-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Pessimists about moral deference argue that there is something special about moral beliefs which make it impermissible for agents to defer on moral matters. In this paper, I argue that, even if pessimists are right that there is something special about moral beliefs, that is not enough to render moral deference impermissible. A stronger requirement—the rationality requirement—makes deferring to experts not only permissible but also rationally required. When one does not defer to one’s perceived moral expert, one either violates Belief Consistency or violates Belief Closure. The moral considerations, such as moral understanding or virtue, for not deferring to experts either fail to show that not deferring is a better option than deferring or fail to show that those moral considerations outweigh rationality requirements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139208006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Whether It Is and What It Is 关于 "是否 "和 "是什么
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00573-0
Francesco Franda
{"title":"On Whether It Is and What It Is","authors":"Francesco Franda","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00573-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00573-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This dialogue, taking place between Prof. Whether and Prof. What, focuses on the nature of the relationship between ontology, conceived as the branch of philosophy concerned with the question of <i>what entities exist</i>, and metaphysics, conceived as the complementary part of philosophy that seeks to explain, of those entities, <i>what they are</i>. Most philosophers claim that it is not possible to address the first question without at the same time addressing the second, since knowing whether an entity exists requires knowing what that entity is. Prof. Whether argues against this popular position and offers a detailed analysis of the idea according to which it is possible to do ontology without engaging in metaphysics. Prof. Whether and Prof. What agree that, rather than being merely possible, in some cases it is, for methodological reasons, even preferable to start with a metaphysics-free ontology, postponing any inquiry concerning the nature of the entities included in the ontological inventory to a later stage. However, Prof. What notes that it is not always possible to do ontology without metaphysics, because there are certain kinds of entities, such as universals and possible worlds, that necessarily need a prior metaphysical characterization.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00573-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135433059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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