{"title":"Reasoning with maps, a dynamic approach","authors":"Mariela Aguilera","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00625-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00625-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There has been considerable debate among scholars as to whether maps can play an inferential role. The debate has focused on whether maps possess the representational format required for logical transitions. This paper addresses a distinct challenge, namely whether maps can satisfy the taking condition, which has been proposed as a necessary condition for inference. In doing so, the focus of the discussion is slightly shifted by analyzing not only the representational structure of maps but also the rational transitions within them. Given that one of the main reasons for the use of maps is navigation, a dynamic notion of inference is proposed which takes into account practical reasoning. According to this view, logical theoretical inferences are just one type of many different kinds of inferential processes.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"539 - 560"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145166524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Plea for Commonality Thesis","authors":"S. Sreenish","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00623-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00623-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>John. R. Searle (2015) argues that the “Commonality thesis” (CT) is a respectable view in the philosophy of perception. According to CT, indistinguishable experiences (veridical perception and corresponding hallucination) can have the same phenomenology and the same intentional content. Searle thinks that to defend CT, one must accept the Common Kind Assumption (CKA). According to CKA, “whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur where one hallucinating.” Recently, CKA received enormous criticism. Therefore, maintaining CT in support of CKA is questionable. This paper aims at a dual purpose: first, to establish that CT is a respectable thesis and second, to defend CT without endorsing CKA.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"473 - 488"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145171843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Representational Solution to the Messenger-Shooting Objection","authors":"Błażej Skrzypulec","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00622-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00622-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Representational accounts of painful experiences, which characterize contents of pain in indicative terms, face a serious problem known as the Messenger-Shooting Objection. This problem arises from the fact that indicative representational accounts do not seem to be able to accommodate the observation that painful experiences rationalize actions aimed towards their own removal. I present a novel representational account of painful experiences which can solve the Messenger-Shooting Objection while still being an indicative representational theory. I argue that the proposed account is also coherent with the contemporary scientific paradigm concerning pains.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"561 - 580"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145165645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Morality and Aesthetics of Personal Beauty","authors":"David Friedell, Madeleine Ransom","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00621-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00621-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper argues that people commonly make moral and aesthetic errors regarding personal beauty. One moral error involves treating people as if their superficial physical beauty is a key source of their value. This practice immorally objectifies people by treating them as aesthetic objects, such as paintings or sunsets, rather than persons. Physical personal beauty is overrated. And even to the extent to which it may be appropriate to appreciate personal beauty, people still commonly make an aesthetic error by treating people as if their aesthetic value derives primarily from how their faces and bodies look. We thereby overlook much of their aesthetic value, including their aesthetic agency—which involves the aesthetic choices that shape people’s appearance and conduct, as well as their inner selves and character. Moreover, tending to a person’s fuller aesthetic value may mitigate harmful consequences of lookism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 2","pages":"195 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2025-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144073939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grounding Causal Closure or Something Near Enough","authors":"Bradford Saad","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00620-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00620-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A causal argument for physicalism is widely held to pose a problem for dualism. This view has an unobvious presupposition, namely that the causal closure of the physical has a special sort of ground. The requisite sort of ground must distinguish the causal argument for physicalism from many defective causal arguments. On behalf of physicalists, I develop an account of the ground for the causal closure of the physical, thereby putting the causal argument for physicalism back in the business of causally problematizing dualism. One consequence of my account is that physicalists can pose a causal problem for dualism using a much weaker closure premise than is generally assumed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"379 - 398"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12335395/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144823310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deflating Predicativism Against the Small Clause Hypothesis for Proper Names","authors":"Katarzyna Kijania-Placek, Olga Poller","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00617-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00617-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this article, we challenge Matushansky’s (<i>Linguistics and Philosophy,</i> <i>21</i>, 573–627, 2008) small clause treatment of proper names in naming constructions. While she is widely credited with establishing, based on cross-linguistic evidence, that names should be viewed as predicates in naming constructions, we present a counterexample from Polish that questions the universal interpretation of the small clause hypothesis (SCH). This leads us to advocate for an alternative analysis of proper names in naming constructions, wherein they are considered components of the argument of a naming verb. We posit that this approach may have deflationist implications for predicativism concerning proper names, as it does not necessitate the existence of primitive name-predicates. We argue that there is no compelling positive evidence for the existence of predicative uses of names whose application conditions cannot be articulated using an equivalent phrase that quotes or mentions the name. Any apparent use of “Delia” as a predicate can be cast either (i) as not really a predicate, but rather an argument mentioning the name “Delia,” or (ii) as a genuine predicate, albeit one with an application condition defined by one of the well-established existing predicates, such as “individual called ‘Delia,’” where the name is mentioned. Predicative uses of names are thus dependent on the mention of names, and so there is a sense in which there are no primitive name-predicates.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"435 - 454"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-024-00617-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145167126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion","authors":"Rafał Palczewski, Patryk Popławski","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We show that taking together the principle <i>‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’</i> (OIC) and <i>The Knowledge Norm of Assertion</i> (KNA) leads to a contradiction as long as we assume that there are situations in which we ought to assert what we cannot know. We call this <i>The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion</i> (PIKA) and argue that this is a genuine problem. At the end, we point out a generalization of PIKA.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"455 - 472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145163852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Truthmaker Semantics, Disjunction, and Fundamentals","authors":"Mohsen Zamani","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00618-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00618-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There are two dimensions to Fine’s truthmaker semantics. One involves a claim about the nature of propositions: propositions are not structural and nothing but sets of their possible truthmakers, and the other talks about the relation between truthmaking and Boolean operations. In this paper, I show that a claim by Fine in the latter dimension—that truthmaking is distributed over “or”—faces a counterexample. I will then go on to argue that one possible way to do away with the counterexample is to restrict truthmakers to fundamentals, namely entities that are not grounded in anything else. This would, nevertheless, pose a problem for the first dimension of truthmaker semantics: certain distinct propositions would fail to be distinct.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 2","pages":"297 - 309"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144073914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Computational Approaches to Concepts Representation: A Whirlwind Tour","authors":"Mattia Fumagalli, Riccardo Baratella, Marcello Frixione, Daniele Porello","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00619-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00619-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The modelling of <i>concepts</i>, besides involving disciplines like <i>philosophy of mind</i> and <i>psychology</i>, is a fundamental and lively research problem in several <i>artificial intelligence (AI)</i> areas, such as <i>knowledge representation</i>, <i>machine learning</i>, and natural <i>language processing</i>. In this scenario, the most prominent proposed solutions adopt different (often incompatible) assumptions about the nature of such a notion. Each of these solutions has been developed to capture some specific features of concepts and support some specific (artificial) cognitive operations. This paper critically reviews the most notable computational approaches to the representation of concepts. The main goals are <i>(i)</i> to provide a shared terminology for the desiderata of concepts and their computational representation; <i>(ii)</i> to classify and assess the heterogeneous computational approaches according to the provided terminology; <i>(iii)</i> to provide a reader who may not be very familiar with theories of concepts with an introduction to major themes in this research and with pointers to different research projects, and <i>(iv)</i> to offer philosophers, and potentially AI practitioners, a well-informed guide for selecting among various (and possibly competing) computational representations of concepts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"489 - 520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145163851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Functional Plurality: A Taxonomy of Benign and Problematic Functions","authors":"Rogelio Miranda Vilchis","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00612-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00612-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Philosophers interested in conceptual engineering take it for granted that the same concept can unproblematically play diverse functions, but this view overlooks the fact that conceptual and functional change often impair concepts and even functions themselves. I demonstrate that while conceptual and functional engineering may improve concepts and functions, they can also produce detrimental effects. Therefore, it is crucial to carefully assess the potential benefits or problems before making any modifications. Frequently, we overlook the fact that, for instance, adding extra functions to our concepts modifies them; this may increase, but also impair, their theoretical and practical efficacy. I analyze and clarify these possibilities through a general classificatory framework encompassing concepts, functions, and conceptual and functional change. The larger aim of this paper is to bring attention to these complex and under-researched relationships and pave the way for further research in this area.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"521 - 538"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2024-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-024-00612-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145170211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}