Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献_第2页

Memory Scepticism and Particularism 记忆怀疑主义与特殊主义

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00699-x

Changsheng Lai

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引用次数: 0

In Defense of Epistemic Perceptualism 为认知感知主义辩护

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-06-10 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00697-z

Donnie Barnett

引用次数: 0

Physicalism, Continuity, and the Changing Face of Physics 物理主义、连续性和物理学的变化

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-06-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00698-y

David Buzaglo

引用次数: 0

Terminal Boredom, Longevity, and Narrative 终极无聊、长寿和叙事

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-06-05 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00696-0

Alessandro Fiorello

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引用次数: 0

Disentangling GPS from Nudging: Why the Distinction Matters for the Ethics of Nudging 从助推中分离GPS：为什么这种区别对助推的伦理很重要

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-06-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00695-1

Ritesh Bansal, Joby Varghese

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引用次数: 0

Armchair Epistemology: Knowledge, Necessity, and Epistemic Luck 扶手椅认识论：知识、必然性和认识论运气

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-05-29 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00684-4

Mylan Engel Jr.

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引用次数: 0

Modelling Collective Epistemic Trust 集体认知信任建模

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-05-25 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00686-2

Benjamin W. McCraw

引用次数: 0

Social Progress: When and How? Two Conservative Responses and Their Limits 社会进步：何时、如何？两种保守的回应及其局限性

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-05-11 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00694-2

Benoit Gaultier

引用次数: 0

Intuition is Evidence 直觉就是证据

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00693-3

Vincent Tanzil

引用次数: 0

The Logic of Proper Accidents 适当事故的逻辑

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00689-z

Matteo Casarosa, Claudio Antonio Testi

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引用次数: 0