Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献_第2页

Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths? 棘手的真相阿勒泰多元论应如何容纳种族真理？

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00572-1

Ragnar van der Merwe, Phila Msimang

引用次数: 0

Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action 美德、自我叙述和行动原因

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-10-23 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w

David Lumsden, Joseph Ulatowski

{"title":"Virtue, Self-Narratives, and the Causes of Action","authors":"David Lumsden, Joseph Ulatowski","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Virtues can be considered to play a causal role in the production of behaviour and so too can our self-narratives. We identify a point of connection between the two cases and draw a parallel between them. But, those folk psychological notions, virtues and self-narratives, fail to reduce smoothly to the underlying human physiology. As a first step towards handling that failure to connect with the scientific framework that is the familiar grounding for our understanding of causation, we consider the causal theory of action, a leading theory of action, which shows how reasons, understood as an appropriate pair of beliefs and desires, can be treated as <i>causes</i> of action. Davidson’s picture is based on cause as a relation between events, which can have both a description in scientific terms and in folk psychological terms. The character of both virtues and self-narratives is not that of events, even extended ones, so we need to refer to examples of scientific explanation that incorporate structural properties of objects. While we retain the spirit of the causal theory, we wish to guard against any unwarranted optimism that an explicitly scientific explanation for human action lies in our future, drawing on Chomsky’s view that a causal explanation of human actions is likely to remain beyond human science forming capacities. We take a mild-realist view of virtues and self-narratives, in the style of Dennett. We argue that, in spite of that limited form of realism, underlined by Chomsky’s mysterian position in this domain, we still need to frame our explanations of behaviour based on virtues and self-narratives in causal terms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00569-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135413113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument 对怀疑论解决方案和自我反驳论证的非事实主义解读

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-10-21 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00571-2

Michał Wieczorkowski

引用次数: 0

The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance 幻象论证和表象论证的无效性

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-10-16 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00570-3

Zhiwei Gu

{"title":"The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance","authors":"Zhiwei Gu","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00570-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00570-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are two kinds of defences for the Phenomenal Principle in the literature, namely, the epistemological one (e.g. H.H. Price) and the semantic one (e.g. Frank Jackson). I argue that neither consolidates the Phenomenal Principle. I particularly demonstrate that the appearance verb in premise 1 of the argument from illusion is not used in the phenomenal sense as it is used in the Phenomenal Principle, which renders the argument essentially invalid. To avoid invalidity, the proponents either give up the phenomenal use, which makes the argument unable to serve its original purpose, i.e. inferring an unusual existence, or they insist on the phenomenal use in all premises of the argument, which will trivialise the argument. I also demonstrate that a similar objection applies to the argument from appearance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136078458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Qualification in Philosophy 哲学专业资格

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-10-05 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00568-x

Boris Hennig

引用次数: 0

What Matters in Survival: Self-Determination and the Continuity of Life Trajectories 生存的意义：自我决定与生命轨迹的连续性

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-09-30 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00567-y

Heidi Erika Savage

引用次数: 0

Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism 泛灵论的三种论据

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-09-11 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00566-z

Jacek Jarocki

{"title":"Three Kinds of Arguments for Panpsychism","authors":"Jacek Jarocki","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00566-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00566-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00566-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135938899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Two Concepts of Truthmaking: a Compatibilist Solution to the Controversy Between Substantive and Deflationary Approach Truthmaking的两个概念：实质方法与通货紧缩方法之争的兼容解决方案

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-08-10 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00564-1

Błażej Mzyk

引用次数: 0

Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument 副现象主义与认识论论证

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-07-31 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00565-0

Jan Rostek

引用次数: 0

Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism 动机怀疑论

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00563-2

Guido Tana

{"title":"Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism","authors":"Guido Tana","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00563-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00563-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The aim of this paper is to analyse and develop how scepticism becomes an intelligible question starting from requirements that epistemologists themselves aim to endorse. We argue for and defend the idea that the root of scepticism is the underdetermination principle by articulating its specificity as a respectable epistemic principle and by defending it against objections in current literature. This engagement offers a novel understanding of underdetermination-based scepticism. While most anti-sceptical approaches challenge scepticism by understanding it as postulating uneliminated scenarios of mass deception, or as endorsing unnatural epistemic requirements, we argue here that both contentions are mistaken. Underdetermination-based scepticism targets our beliefs by issuing a genuine question about the rational support they enjoy. If we cannot establish that the sources of our beliefs provide them the required epistemic merit and authority, they lack non-arbitrary grounds. This has a sizable impact on what constitutes a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy. Strategies that merely focus on the scenario-based aspect of scepticism, or on the truth-functional evaluation of our beliefs, are shown to miss the mark of the sceptical threat. The proposed analysis ultimately provides a shift in perspective concerning the character and reach of philosophical doubt.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00563-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47043382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0