Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献_第2页

From Metaphysics to Methods?: Pluralism in Cancer Research 从形而上学到方法论？癌症研究中的多元化

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00601-7

Katherine Valde

引用次数: 0

Towards a Realist Shifty Semantic Account of Moral Vagueness 实现对道德模糊性的现实主义模糊语义解释

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-07-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00603-5

Z. Huey Wen

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Moral Responsibility in a Vat 大桶中的道德责任

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00602-6

Miloš Kosterec

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Many Bombers of the Principle of Double Effect: An Analysis of Strategic/Terror Bomber Thought Experiment Variants 许多轰炸机的双重效应原理：战略/恐怖轰炸机思想实验变体分析

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-07-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00600-8

Ignacy Kłaput

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Having a Disposition and Making a Contribution 有意愿，做贡献

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-07-03 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00599-y

Marc Johansen

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Epistemic Bystander 认知旁观者

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00598-z

Lukas Schwengerer

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Truth-Ratios, Evidential Fit, and Deferring to Informants with Low Error Probabilities 真相比、证据拟合和对低错误概率举报人的服从

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00597-0

Michael Roche, William Roche

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引用次数: 0

Antipathy as an Emotion 作为一种情感的反感

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-06-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00596-1

Bertille De Vlieger

{"title":"Antipathy as an Emotion","authors":"Bertille De Vlieger","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00596-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-024-00596-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then essential to be able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology.</p>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 1","pages":"133 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141370078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Knowing What One Likes: Epistemicist Solution to Faultless Disagreement 知道自己喜欢什么：无懈可击的分歧的认识论解决方案

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-05-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00593-4

Maciej Tarnowski

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引用次数: 0

False Authorities 假权威

IF 0.3 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2024-04-18 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00594-3

Christoph Jäger

引用次数: 0