{"title":"False Authorities","authors":"Christoph Jäger","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00594-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An epistemic agent <i>A</i> is a false epistemic authority for others if they falsely believe <i>A</i> to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call <i>epistemic quacks</i>, who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and <i>epistemic charlatans,</i> i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Neither type of false authority covers what Lackey (2021) calls <i>predatory experts</i>: experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic status as a cover for predatory behavior. Qua experts, predatory experts are competent and thus <i>could</i> (and maybe sometimes do) help their clients. But should we count them as genuine epistemic authorities? No. I argue that they are false epistemic authorities because in addition to their practical and moral misconduct, such experts systematically deceive their clients, thereby thwarting the clients’ epistemic ends.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"39 4","pages":"643 - 661"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-024-00594-3.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-024-00594-3","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority for others if they falsely believe A to be in a position to help them accomplish their epistemic ends. A major divide exists between what I call epistemic quacks, who falsely believe themselves to be relevantly competent, and epistemic charlatans, i.e., false authorities who believe or even know that they are incompetent. Neither type of false authority covers what Lackey (2021) calls predatory experts: experts who systematically misuse their social-epistemic status as a cover for predatory behavior. Qua experts, predatory experts are competent and thus could (and maybe sometimes do) help their clients. But should we count them as genuine epistemic authorities? No. I argue that they are false epistemic authorities because in addition to their practical and moral misconduct, such experts systematically deceive their clients, thereby thwarting the clients’ epistemic ends.
如果他人错误地认为 A 有能力帮助他们实现其认识论目的，那么认识论代理人 A 对他人来说就是一个虚假的认识论权威。我所说的认识论庸医和认识论江湖骗子之间存在着重大分歧，前者虚假地认为自己有相关能力，后者则是相信甚至知道自己无能的虚假权威。这两类虚假权威都不包括莱基（2021 年）所说的掠夺性专家：即系统性地滥用其社会学地位作为掠夺性行为幌子的专家。作为专家，掠夺性专家是称职的，因此可以（有时也许确实）帮助他们的客户。但我们应该把他们视为真正的认识论权威吗？不。我认为他们是虚假的认识论权威，因为除了在实践和道德上的不当行为之外，这些专家还系统地欺骗他们的客户，从而挫败客户的认识论目的。
期刊介绍：
Acta Analytica is an international journal for philosophy in the analytical tradition covering a variety of philosophical topics including philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Special attention is devoted to cognitive science. The journal aims to promote a rigorous, argument-based approach in philosophy. Acta Analytica is a peer reviewed journal, published quarterly, with authors from all over the world.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
