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Essentialist Arguments for Discernibility are Unsound 可辨性的本质主义论点是站不住脚的
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-07-18 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00562-3
Antoine Taillard
{"title":"Essentialist Arguments for Discernibility are Unsound","authors":"Antoine Taillard","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00562-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00562-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>It is common to argue that something <i>x</i> is distinct from something <i>y</i> by pointing out that <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> do not share all their essential properties. I show that arguments of this type are unsound. This unsoundness is rooted in the fact that sentences of the form ‘<i>x</i> is essentially F’ are ambiguous. Under one reading, the sentence says of <i>x</i> that it has a property of a unique and special kind. Interpreted in that way, the sentence is false, for there are no such properties. Under another reading, the sentence says of <i>x</i> that it has a property and adds that this property is essential to <i>x</i>. Interpreted in that way, the sentence may be true but it does not allow to reach the desired conclusion that <i>x</i> is distinct from <i>y</i>. Thus, if someone argues that <i>x</i> is distinct from <i>y</i> by pointing out that <i>x</i> and <i>y</i> differ in essential properties, they face the following dilemma: either one of the argument’s premises implies the existence of the special property and it is false, or none of the premises implies the existence of the special property and the argument is invalid.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00562-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44905145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Value Pluralism versus Value Monism 价值多元主义与价值一元论
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-07-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00560-5
Christian Blum
{"title":"Value Pluralism versus Value Monism","authors":"Christian Blum","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00560-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00560-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Value pluralism is the metaphysical thesis that there is a plurality of values at the fundamental level of the evaluative domain. Value monism, on the other hand, is the claim that there is just one fundamental value. Pluralists, it is commonly argued, have an edge over monists when it comes to accounting for the conspicuous heterogeneity of the evaluative domain and the rationality of regretting well-justified decisions. Monists, in turn, seem to provide a far more plausible account of rational evaluative decision-making. I argue that the impression of a theoretical stalemate, which is suggested by the exchange of those arguments, is premature. An assessment of the sub-positions in both camps, in conjunction with an analysis of value fundamentality based on the notion of grounding, reveals that certain versions of pluralism and monism—which I call moderate positions—can counter the respective objections. Thus, moderate value pluralism and moderate value monism emerge as the strongest positions in both camps. I conclude that the further debate should center around those two positions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00560-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44517452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Carnap and Quine on Explanationism in Ontology 卡纳普与奎因论本体论中的解释主义
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-07-05 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00558-z
Anthony Dardis
{"title":"Carnap and Quine on Explanationism in Ontology","authors":"Anthony Dardis","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00558-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00558-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Let “explanationism” be the view that ontology is fundamentally an explanatory enterprise. What it does is “on a par” with natural science, as Quine put it. Carnap appears to offer a “lighter weight” alternative in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”: ontology is concerned with semantics and language choice. This paper argues that Carnap’s account of the internal/external distinction is of less use than Carnap suggests for diagnosis of disputes in ontology. But he largely agrees with Quine about explanationism. I propose that explanationism is an attractive metametaphysical position between “heavy weight” and “light weight” views. Its method is abductive inference, which is broader than “light weight” methods. Since it is “on a par” with natural science, ontology contributes nothing beyond the claim that what there is, is what our best theories say there is. Hence, it is not “heavy weight”.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47833446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge as a Social Kind 知识是一种社会性的东西
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00561-4
Tammo Lossau
{"title":"Knowledge as a Social Kind","authors":"Tammo Lossau","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00561-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00561-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I argue that knowledge can be seen as a quality standard that governs our sharing and storing of information. This standard satisfies certain functional needs, namely it allows us to share and store trustworthy information more easily. I argue that this makes knowledge a social kind, similar in important ways to other social kinds like money. This provides us with a way of talking about knowledge without limiting ourselves to the concept of knowledge. I also outline three ways in which this view of knowledge can shed light on familiar epistemological problems: it can explain why knowledge is the norm of assertion, it can help us carve out the harm associated with testimonial injustice, and it can provide us with a clear analysis of the dangers associated with spreading misinformation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48213785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Partially Autonomous Belief 部分自主信念
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00559-y
Lukas Schwengerer
{"title":"Partially Autonomous Belief","authors":"Lukas Schwengerer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00559-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00559-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Adam Carter (2022) recently proposed that a successful analysis of knowledge needs to include an autonomy condition. Autonomy, for Carter, requires a lack of a compulsion history. A compulsion history bypasses one’s cognitive competences and results in a belief that is difficult to shed. I argue that Carter’s autonomy condition does not cover partially autonomous beliefs properly. Some belief-forming processes are partially bypassing one’s competences, but not bypassing them completely. I provide a case for partially autonomous belief based on processing fluency effects and argue that partially autonomous beliefs only amount to knowledge in some cases. I finally suggest how to adjust the autonomy condition to capture partially autonomous belief properly.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00559-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41615572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction to: Carroll’s Regress Times Three 更正：卡罗尔的遗憾三次
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-05-10 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00557-0
Gilbert Plumer
{"title":"Correction to: Carroll’s Regress Times Three","authors":"Gilbert Plumer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00557-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00557-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49493371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Entity Realism Meets Perspectivism 实体现实主义遇到透视主义
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-05-03 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00554-3
Mahdi Khalili
{"title":"Entity Realism Meets Perspectivism","authors":"Mahdi Khalili","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00554-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00554-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Relying on the notion of “overlapping perspectives,” this paper argues that entity realism and perspectivism are complementary. According to entity realism, it is justified to maintain a positive attitude toward the existence of unobservable entities with which multiple experimental interactions are possible. Perspectivism also explains that our beliefs about these entities are bounded by historically contingent theoretical and instrumental perspectives. The argument of the paper is developed through a discussion of Ronald Giere’s versions of realism: entity realism, constructive realism, and perspectival realism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00554-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41583326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism 对索引可靠性的挑战
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-04-25 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00556-1
Balder Edmund Ask Zaar
{"title":"A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism","authors":"Balder Edmund Ask Zaar","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00556-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00556-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The new evil demon problem amounts to a difficult challenge for the externalist about epistemic justification. Many solutions to the problem have been proffered in the almost 40 years since its first appearance in the literature. Among the more promising responses is indexical reliabilism, a combination of two versions of actual world reliabilism where “actual” denotes either the world of utterance or a rigidly determined actual world. This paper does three things. First, it attempts to clarify indexical reliabilism and how it purports to solve the new evil demon problem. Second, it attempts to mitigate some of the prominent criticism that has been leveled against the theory. Third, it poses an explanatory challenge for the theory which remains even after all of the premises supporting indexical reliabilism are accepted. The conclusion is that indexical reliabilism is not tenable until a linguistic mechanism for the use of “actually reliable” has been offered that explains how the theory avoids collapsing into a two-concepts response to the new evil demon problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00556-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46808301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deduction, Abduction, and Creativity 演绎、诱拐与创造力
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00555-2
Tomáš Hanzal
{"title":"Deduction, Abduction, and Creativity","authors":"Tomáš Hanzal","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00555-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00555-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a discussion of Sherlock Holmes’ “science of deduction” and the related “method of exclusion,” I show that Holmes’ claim that his inferences are deductive makes sense, if we consider his theoretical presuppositions. So, it is more accurate to say that he tries to reduce abduction to deduction than that he confuses them. His theoretical framework, albeit inadequate as a theory of empirical reasoning, can be seen as a basic model of classical (symbolic) AI. The main problems of this approach are surveyed, and abduction is brought into play as both a better characterization of Holmes’ inferences and a better guide for building AI systems. This is a good background for raising the question of creativity because, according to Peirce, it relates to abduction in a substantial way. Is Sherlock Holmes creative? Can machines be creative? An affirmative answer to the second question might be given by a “logic of discovery” but the problem remains that inventing such a logic already presupposes creativity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00555-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45596406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Subset View of Realization and the Part-Whole Problem 实现的子集观与部分-整体问题
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-04-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00553-4
Takeshi Akiba
{"title":"The Subset View of Realization and the Part-Whole Problem","authors":"Takeshi Akiba","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00553-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00553-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to the subset view of realization, a property realizes another if the causal powers of the latter are a subset of those of the former. Against this view, some authors (in particular, Kevin Morris and Paul Audi) have argued that it has an untenable consequence that realizing properties are less fundamental than the properties they realize, because the subset view characterizes realized properties as parts (subsets) of their realizers whereas it is generally true that a part is prior to its whole. This paper defends the subset view from this “part-whole” objection, by arguing that if we compare individual powers of realizer and realizee with particular attention to their manifestation conditions, it turns out that each power of a realizee is grounded in some power of its realizer. This grounding relation between powers, I shall argue, allows subset theorists to explain why a realizer is more fundamental than its realizee, even while having the latter as a part.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42836082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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