Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献_第3页

The Prudential 'Now What?' Problem 保诚的“现在怎么办？”问题

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-04-23 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00692-4

Ethan Moore

{"title":"The Prudential 'Now What?' Problem","authors":"Ethan Moore","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00692-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00692-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The ‘Now What?’ problem for moral error theorists concerns whether (and how) error theorists should maintain or abolish moral discourse. If moral discourse is systematically error-ridden, one must decide whether to abandon it, as we have abandoned talk of phlogiston, or maintain it, as most mathematical error theorists retain number discourse. Prompted by companions-in-guilt arguments, some moral error theorists have also endorsed <i>prudential</i> error theories. These developments pave the way for a novel metanormative debate — a ‘Now What?’ problem for prudential discourse. Just as moral error theorists must decide what to do with their error-ridden discourse, so must prudential error theorists decide what to do with theirs. This paper addresses this novel problem, by (i) arguing that multiple forms of moral error theory lead to prudential error theory, (ii) characterising the prudential ‘Now What?’ problem, and (iii) proposing a method for how error theorists can answer it (and practically deliberate in general). Finally, (iv) the paper takes a substantive position on the debate by recommending that moral and prudential error theorists adopt metaphorist prudential fictionalism.\u0000</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1339 - 1360"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00692-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Wittgenstein on the Intelligibility of the Tractatus 维特根斯坦论《论论》的可理解性

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-04-21 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00691-5

Krystian Bogucki

{"title":"Wittgenstein on the Intelligibility of the Tractatus","authors":"Krystian Bogucki","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00691-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00691-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In §6.54 of the <i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>, Ludwig Wittgenstein famously claims that his work consists of nonsensical sentences. Both resolute and orthodox readers try to explain this claim, but the nonsensicality of Tractarian sentences poses a problem for the mechanism of their functioning and our understanding of them. Typically, if I understand a sentence <i>s</i>, then I entertain proposition <i>p</i>, which is expressed by the sentence <i>s</i>. However, nonsensical sentences do not express any propositions. It is also a standard assumption that if a sentence is nonsensical, then it makes no sense to talk of it as implying or entailing anything. If we understand Tractarian sentences, how is this possible? How do we understand nonsensical sentences even though they do not express propositions? The main objective of this paper is to explain the mechanism behind understanding nonsensical Tractarian sentences and how this understanding differs from understanding meaningful sentences in other philosophical works. I develop Cora Diamond’s suggestion that understanding nonsense requires an imaginative activity, and I propose interpreting imagination in terms of pretence, as is common in theories of fiction. Nonsensical sentences do not express any propositions, but we pretend that they do. Understanding a nonsensical sentence amounts to understanding the make-believe proposition expressed by this sentence. My proposal has a number of advantages: it favours neither the resolute nor the orthodox readings of the <i>Tractatus</i>; it shows that nonsense attributions are meaningful and that understanding nonsense is conceptual, and it explains the difference between understanding meaningful sentences and understanding nonsensical sentences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"857 - 881"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Non-Reductionist View of the Self in Tension with the Block Universe 非还原论的自我观与块宇宙的张力

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-04-17 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00688-0

Jean Campos

引用次数: 0

Platonism in Better Shape 理想中的柏拉图主义

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-04-17 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00687-1

Michele Paolini Paoletti

{"title":"Platonism in Better Shape","authors":"Michele Paolini Paoletti","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00687-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00687-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Platonism about properties holds that there are uninstantiated properties. For properties do not depend on their instances, whereas their instances depend on them. In this paper, I shall discuss two ‘heterodox’ versions of Platonism about properties: Meinongian Essentialist Platonism about Properties and Mutualist Essentialist Platonism about Properties. In Section 1 I shall introduce what I label ‘Orthodox Platonism about Properties’, its virtues and problems. In Section 2 I shall present a weaker form of Platonism, i.e., Essentialist Platonism about Properties (EPP), which only takes into account the essential dependence relations between Platonic properties and their instances. In line with this view, in Section 3 and Section 4 two versions of EPP will be presented: Meinongian EPP and Mutualist EPP. The former roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties do not have the sort of existence that is typical of substances, though they are endowed with essences. The latter roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties existentially depend on their instances but their instances essentially depend upon them. In Section 5 and in Section 6 I shall reconsider the problems that affect Platonism about properties and show how Meinogian EPP and Mutualist EPP can successfully cope with them.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1199 - 1234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Correction to: Priority Perdurantism and Ordinary Temporary Predication 更正：优先持久和普通临时预测

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-04-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00690-6

Riccardo Baratella

引用次数: 0

What Do We Owe Experts? Epistemic Authority and Social Responsibility 我们欠专家什么？认知权威与社会责任

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-03-24 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00680-8

Dominik Jarczewski

引用次数: 0

Personal and Subpersonal Explanations in Forensic Psychiatry: A Co-evolutionary Perspective 法医精神病学的个人和亚个人解释：一个共同进化的视角

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-03-24 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00685-3

Mladen Bošnjak, Marko Jurjako

{"title":"Personal and Subpersonal Explanations in Forensic Psychiatry: A Co-evolutionary Perspective","authors":"Mladen Bošnjak, Marko Jurjako","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00685-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00685-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Doubts about an offender’s criminal competence typically lead courts to mandate a psychiatric evaluation to determine whether a mental disorder impaired the defendant’s capacity to understand their actions or to control their will. While criminal law relies on folk-psychological concepts to determine responsibility, psychiatry examines behavior through cognitive and neurobiological frameworks. This contrast raises the question of how the folk-psychological explanations central to legal reasoning relate to, and can be integrated with, the neurobiological and mechanistic explanations employed in psychiatric assessment. The issue exemplifies the broader philosophical problem known as the interface problem, which concerns how to understand the relationship between personal- and subpersonal-levels of explanation and the constructs associated with them. The paper considers three solutions—autonomism, functionalism, and the co-evolutionary view—and argues that the co-evolutionary view provides the most suitable framework for forensic psychiatry.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1005 - 1025"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00685-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149099143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Against Infinite Intensive Magnitudes: A Reply to Pruss 反对无限密集数量级：对普鲁斯的回答

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00683-5

Michael Huemer

引用次数: 0

From Enumerative Induction to Mathematical Consistency 从枚举归纳法到数学一致性

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00681-7

Guanglong Luo

{"title":"From Enumerative Induction to Mathematical Consistency","authors":"Guanglong Luo","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00681-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00681-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Enumerative inductive methods, which infer universal claims from a finite set of positive instances, are a cornerstone of empirical science and are also implicitly employed to justify belief in unproven mathematical conjectures like Goldbach’s Conjecture. This paper examines the scope and limits of this justificatory strategy. While I defend its use against simple “size-biased” skepticism for first-order mathematical claims, I argue that its application to justify the consistency of foundational axiomatic theories like Peano Arithmetic (PA) or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) is fundamentally problematic. The core of the argument is that evidence for consistency is not merely enumerative but also dimensional, crucially dependent on the length or complexity of the derivations surveyed. Drawing on proof theory, I demonstrate that inconsistencies can reside exclusively in proofs of lengths that transcend human practical and cognitive limits. Therefore, the inductive evidence from the absence of contradictions in all humanly surveyed proofs is probably weak and incomplete. Justified belief in consistency, I conclude, must be grounded not in enumerative induction alone, but in a holistic framework.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"815 - 825"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Correction to: Reasoning With Maps, a Dynamic Approach 更正：用地图推理，一种动态的方法

IF 0.4 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-026-00679-1

Mariela Aguilera

引用次数: 0