{"title":"Explanatory Relevance of Ineffable Qualia","authors":"Kristjan Loorits","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00682-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00682-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p> The notion of qualia is often seen as a suspicious philosophical invention that bears no relevance to the research of psychological and cognitive mechanisms that govern our behavior. The idea of “ineffable” phenomenal qualities has been criticized, inter alia, as unscientific and empirically unsupported. Against that popular conception, it is here argued that some complex human behavior cannot be explained without accepting the existence of qualia as more or less traditionally understood: ineffable, structurally unanalyzable, and distinctively qualitative properties of our conscious experiences. It is first pointed out that in the domain of art research, it is common to acknowledge the existence of aesthetic properties whose perceived value depends partly on the very fact that they cannot be analyzed in precise structural terms (at least not in the context where their value is recognized). It is then argued that the infamous sensory qualia can have similar psychological effects and significance and that there is no sharp boundary between “simple” qualia and more complex artistic properties. According to the resulting view, qualia and the corresponding artistic properties ought to be accepted as legitimate objects of special sciences—perhaps reducible in some heavily idealized sense, yet indispensable in certain explanatory contexts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"619 - 637"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00682-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Priority Perdurantism and Ordinary Temporary Predication","authors":"Riccardo Baratella","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00678-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00678-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Priority Perdurantism integrates two crucial theses. The first thesis is that ordinary objects perdure. The second thesis is the middleist thesis that some composite wholes of common-sense reality – e.g., humans, cats, trees – are fundamental and their proper parts are ontologically derivative. This theory, first formulated by Skrzypek (2024), promises to combine and extend many advantages of classical perdurantism with the descriptive ontology stance inherent to the middleist view. The goal of this article is to clarify and advance Priority Perdurantism by providing adequate accounts of ordinary temporary predication. First, we develop the accounts of ordinary temporary predications sketched by Skrzypek (2024), by formulating improved and rigorous frameworks and by exploring the consequences of the resulting accounts with respect to the problem from temporary intrinsics. Second, we argue that, within these novel accounts for temporary predications, temporal parts do not play any theoretical role. Third, we formulate some motivations for Priority Perdurantism to commit to temporal parts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"669 - 687"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Neutral But Better: The Possibility of Null Hierarchies","authors":"Andrés G. Garcia","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00673-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00673-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Can two items both be neutral in value yet differ in rank? I argue that they can, with significant implications: not everything neutral should be treated equally. This challenges the widespread assumption that neutral value marks a point of evaluative equivalence. I defend the intuitive case for neutral hierarchies through examples from aesthetics and welfare, then show that both major accounts of neutral value—comparative and non-comparative—can accommodate such hierarchies once divorced from certain theoretical commitments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"735 - 750"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00673-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiction, Identity, and Existence: A Study in Experimental Philosophy","authors":"Jansan Favazzo, Roberto Burro","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00674-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00674-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Fictional entities (<i>ficta</i>, for short) are extensively debated in contemporary metaphysics. Different accounts are compared on the basis of their theoretical virtues, among which intuitive appeal is typically included. Still, it is not always clear whether a theory should count as more intuitive than its rivals. In order to delve deeper into this matter, we conducted an empirical study involving persons with little or no philosophical training. In this article, we shall present the results of our study, which was aimed at testing the following hypotheses. With respect to the identity of <i>ficta</i>, (h1) whether it can be observed an intuitive response to each of the selected identity conundrums raised by fictional stories. With respect to the existence of <i>ficta</i>, (h2) whether it can be observed an intuitive preference about their ontological and metaphysical status (respectively, whether <i>ficta</i> are genuine entities and, if so, what kind of entities they are).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"827 - 856"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Right to Forgiveness","authors":"Sam Ridge","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00676-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00676-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>An almost universally held view in the literature on forgiveness is that wrongdoers cannot have a right to be forgiven. I argue this claim is false. Sometimes wrongdoers have a right to be forgiven. In Section 2, I show how widespread the view is that wrongdoers never have a right to be forgiven. In Section 3, I present a counterexample to this widely held view, arguing that promises can ground rights to be forgiven. In Section 4, I show how the case of promised forgiveness is instructive, as it points to other possible grounds for a right to forgiveness. In Section 5, I consider three objections to my view. Section 6 concludes by considering how the existence of a right to forgiveness informs debates about what forgiveness is, arguing that it gives us reason to prefer certain kinds of views of forgiveness over others.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"751 - 769"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00676-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perception Under Constraint: A Dual-Constraint Model Reconciling Positivism and Constructivism","authors":"Levente Orbán","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00677-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00677-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I propose the Dual-Constraint Model (DCM), a formal framework that locates perceptual content at the intersection of (i) internal generative inference and (ii) explicit world-imposed invariance constraints. Percepts are cast as solutions of an optimization that combines sensory likelihood, endogenous priors, and a penalty for hypotheses that violate ecological or physical invariances. DCM preserves the positivist insight that the world imposes non-arbitrary constraints while preserving constructivist insight that internal models select among admissible interpretations under uncertainty. The formulation yields clear, falsifiable dissociations: manipulations that degrade invariance structure produce perceptual and early-sensory effects that cannot be mimicked merely by shifting priors. I present explicit operational forms for the invariance penalty, outline empirical designs and analysis procedures, and provide concrete criteria under which DCM is empirically distinguishable from pure-prior or pure-constraint accounts. The argument is presented as a theoretical synthesis rather than a definitive resolution, recognizing that empirical and philosophical questions remain open.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"803 - 814"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adequacy of Representations as their Approximation to Truth: A Non-factive Theory of Knowledge","authors":"Miloš Taliga","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00671-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00671-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper introduces a new non-factive theory of knowledge, employing the recent theory of verisimilitude developed by Jakob Süskind to model the relative adequacy of representations as their approximation to truth. It makes the relation of representation one of the necessary conditions of knowledge without requiring the truth condition to be satisfied. However, the relation of knowledge to truth is built at the meta-level into the notion of the adequacy of representations, which enables the proposed theory to cover any thinkable case of research yielding real knowledge, although of a non-factive kind. Despite its universality, the theory relativizes knowledge to a set of research questions, while rejecting alethic relativism, which — it is argued — does not provide a satisfactory explanation of truth in reasoning about the growth and extinction of scientific knowledge.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"789 - 802"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-026-00671-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contextualism, Sensitivity, and Skepticism","authors":"Bin Zhao","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00672-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00672-8","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Ichikawa (2011) proposes a sensitivity account of knowledge adapted in a contextualist framework. On the one hand, this seems to be an attractive response to skepticism as it gives skeptics their due while preserving ordinary knowledge (at least in some contexts). On the other hand, it does not imply closure failure for knowledge. In this paper, it is argued that the account could not respond to skepticism successfully while retaining epistemic closure. If the possible worlds that should be considered in a non-skeptical context always include the closest possible world where the target proposition is false, then the account implies epistemic closure; if not, then the account makes it too easy to know the negation of a skeptical hypothesis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"521 - 528"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2026-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Is Identity? Frege’s Argument in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ Scrutinized and Newly Interpreted with Glances at Grundgesetze","authors":"Matthias Schirn","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00658-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00658-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this essay, I subject Frege’s line of argument in the opening passage of ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ to critical scrutiny, reveal its weaknesses and show what someone might nonetheless learn from it if pondering over the nature of identity and the cognitive value of identity statements. I argue that (a) Frege’s epistemological argument against the metalinguistic view of identity is inconclusive, (b) he fails to argue for the plausibility and strength of the objectual view of identity, (c) any acknowledgement by Frege that, in general, the cognitive value of true statements of the form “<span>(a = b)</span>” is not negatively affected by the arbitrariness of the name-object relation would have amounted to a concession that the metalinguistic view of identity statements is epistemologically on a par with the objectual view, i.e. that both views allow a plausible explanation of the fact that such statements, unlike statements of the form “<span>(a = a)</span>”, often contain a piece of valuable knowledge. I argue that in his mature period after 1892, Frege was right in calling into question the “coincidence view of (ordinary) proper names” according to which the sense of a proper name coincides with the sense of a “privileged” coreferential definite description. I also comment on the sense of a concept-script proper name as well as on Frege’s transformation of a metalinguistic, but non-definitional stipulation of coreferentiality into an objectual identity in <i>Grundgesetze</i> I. In the penultimate section, I discuss the question of whether the objectual view of identity was a <i>conditio sine qua non</i> for Frege’s attempt to establish the analyticity of (true) non-trivial arithmetical equations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"549 - 588"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2026-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00658-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Method Before Ontology: Reconstructing the Core of Eliminative Materialism","authors":"Serdal Tümkaya","doi":"10.1007/s12136-026-00675-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-026-00675-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>William Ramsey’s recent account of eliminative materialism (EM) treats EM as an ontological thesis about what mental kinds do not exist. I argue, by contrast, that the core of EM in Quine, Feyerabend, Rorty, and Stich is methodological: it concerns how to revise, replace, or retire psychological posits under scientific pressure, with any ontological eliminations derivative of method. A close reading of the founding texts shows that inventory‑style realism and a fixed priority of metaphysics over method misclassify EM’s commitments. Restoring a method‑first order clarifies confusions that have shaped the debate and aligns “scientific eliminativism” with the founders’ method‑first orientation. The result is a historically grounded reorientation: EM primarily counsels conceptual re‑engineering in light of successful science, rather than a priori ontological austerity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"589 - 605"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}