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Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

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Are Stereotypers Wronged When Stereotyped? On Defeated Doxastic Rights and Structural, Doxastic Injustice 刻板印象是冤枉的吗？论失败的专制权利与结构性的专制不公正
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2026-01-08 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00670-2
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
{"title":"Are Stereotypers Wronged When Stereotyped? On Defeated Doxastic Rights and Structural, Doxastic Injustice","authors":"Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00670-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00670-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Several philosophers have recently defended the view that, in virtue of holding a certain belief, we might be doing something that is morally objectionable even if our evidence supports the belief in some sense. Such philosophers generally take the moral objectionableness in question to be a personal, doxastic wrong. In the case of personal, non-doxastic wrongs, sometimes an act that would otherwise have constituted such a wrong does not do so; that is, the rights in question are defeated in these cases. Such defeat can arise either because of how the benefits of the act to the rights holder clearly outweigh the harms in such a manner that consent to the act in question can be presumed or because of what the victim of that act does; that is, they waive or forfeit the right against others that they do not subject them to the relevant treatment. If doxastic rights exist, then something similar can occur when it comes to personal, doxastic wrongs. But even if such situations might not involve any personal, doxastic wrongs, they might still involve structural, doxastic injustice. We need the notion of structural, doxastic injustice to explain the sense that some such situations are morally objectionable despite the absence of any personal doxastic wrongs. These two ideas — that doxastic rights are sometimes defeated and the notion of structural, doxastic injustice — are the two contributions made by this article to the ethics of belief.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"771 - 788"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Slurs and Insults: a Reply to David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms” 污语与侮辱：对大卫·米格尔·格雷“污语冒犯的修辞性和认识性来源”的回应
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-23 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00669-9
Helen L. Daly
{"title":"Slurs and Insults: a Reply to David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms”","authors":"Helen L. Daly","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00669-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00669-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>David Miguel Gray’s “Doxastic and Epistemic Sources of Offense for Slurring Terms,” published in this journal in 2025, proposes and defends a novel account of slurs. Here, I give an additional reason in favor of his account: it coheres well with recent philosophical theories of insults. This kind of fortuitous external consistency is a significant theoretical virtue. In this brief response paper, I will summarize Gray’s account of slurs and explain its natural fit with recent philosophical work on insults. After that central task is done, I will make two further observations: in section 3, about the relationship between epistemic and linguistic sources of offense, and in section 4, about a possibility for future research raised by Gray’s taxonomy of negatively valenced terms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"883 - 891"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Mereological Anti-Conservatism Is No Better Than Conservatism 为什么狭义的反保守主义并不比保守主义好
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-22 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00668-w
Francesco Franda
{"title":"Why Mereological Anti-Conservatism Is No Better Than Conservatism","authors":"Francesco Franda","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00668-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00668-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Declos and Grandjean (2025) have introduced <i>Mereological Anti-Conservatism</i> as a new answer to the Special Composition Question. According to this view, extraordinary composite objects like fusions of trouts and turkeys exist, whereas ordinary objects like trouts and turkeys do not. Their aim is not to defend this bizarre ontology but to argue that it is, surprisingly, more plausible than Conservatism, according to which only ordinary composites exist. They claim that Anti-Conservatism avoids the problems of vagueness, change, and common sense that afflict Conservatism, and that, modally, it is more epistemically inclusive, counting more possible worlds as ontologically correct. I argue that this comparative assessment fails: the view’s alleged advantages concerning vagueness, change, and common sense do not hold, and the modal argument they advance rests on a faulty assumption about infinite cardinalities and an uneven application of evaluative criteria.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"657 - 668"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00668-w.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does Neuroscience Provide Reasons for Anti-Retributivist Penal Reform? 神经科学为反报复主义刑罚改革提供了理由吗？
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00666-y
Christopher P. Taggart
{"title":"Does Neuroscience Provide Reasons for Anti-Retributivist Penal Reform?","authors":"Christopher P. Taggart","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00666-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00666-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen predict that neuroscience’s growing predictive power will motivate anti-retributivist penal reform by amplifying our conviction that we lack free will. According to one agent-causal libertarian position, ACT libertarianism, we often exercise free will by satisfying the conditions that ACT, an agent-causal account of free will, posits for its exercise. This paper argues that, even if compatibilism is false, ACT’s account of free will implies that, for us, neuroscience’s growing predictive power is epistemically irrelevant to whether we have free will in the sense that it can provide us only unquantifiable epistemic risk regarding whether we have it. Since retributivism’s definitive tenet is that satisfying a criminal wrongdoer’s negative desert justifies legal punishment independently of any good consequences that might result, neuroscience’s growing predictive power cannot provide us any reason to implement anti-retributivist penal reform.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"607 - 617"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00666-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Neo-Humean Moral Contingentism 新休谟的道德偶然主义
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00665-z
Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier
{"title":"Neo-Humean Moral Contingentism","authors":"Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00665-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00665-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The neo-Humean account of moral principles (NHM) is a theory about the metaphysical status of moral principles. According to NHM, moral principles (in the genetic, non-propositional sense) are entities that supervene upon, and are nothing over and above, the distribution of properties located at the Humean mosaic (the set of fundamental, non-modal, physical properties). In this paper, I do two things. First, I make the case for NHM: NHM explains pure moral principles in a straightforward way while also explaining moral supervenience in a dialectically advantageous way. Secondly, I defend the contingentist aspect of NHM: the properties that figure in the Humean mosaic are governed by a principle of recombination. And the fact that moral properties figure in that mosaic contingently suggests that moral principles are also contingent (i.e. they differ depending on a given world’s distribution of base-properties). This makes NHM susceptible to a normative authority problem, an epistemological problem, a moral luck problem, and a modal miracle problem. I show that NHM can meet these challenges, thus making it superior to other moral contingentist proposals on the market.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"711 - 733"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
High Hopes for Eternalism 对永恒主义寄予厚望
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00664-0
Jakub Węgrecki
{"title":"High Hopes for Eternalism","authors":"Jakub Węgrecki","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00664-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00664-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I present two puzzles that pose a challenge for semantic eternalism, i.e., the thesis that propositions do not change their truth-values over time. The puzzles concern the attitude of hope. The first one is generated by the intuitive condition for hope’s satisfaction, according to which a hope that <i>p</i> is satisfied at <i>t</i> if and only if <i>p</i> is true at <i>t</i>. The second puzzle follows from the standard assumptions about probability. I argue that proponents of semantic eternalism can solve both puzzles. Firstly, I propose an alternative account of hope’s satisfaction. The second puzzle is addressed by revisiting the link between truth and probability. My conclusion is that the case for eternalism is not yet lost.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"411 - 428"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00664-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revisiting Fodor’s Argument Against the Unity of Science 重新审视福多反对科学统一性的论点
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-12 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00667-x
Tadej Todorović, Janez Bregant
{"title":"Revisiting Fodor’s Argument Against the Unity of Science","authors":"Tadej Todorović,&nbsp;Janez Bregant","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00667-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00667-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The article offers an internal critique of Fodor’s original argument against the unity of science, claiming that multiple realization in special sciences blocks reduction to physical science and secures their autonomy. Fodor’s argument has been a cornerstone of the argument against reductionism in the philosophy of mind. In this article, we aim to show that it fails even when Fodor’s own presuppositions and his own understandings of key terms are considered. In this sense, the article probes the original argument for its internal consistency. Firstly, we provide an overview of multiple realization, along with the main motivation for it, i.e., the rejection of psychophysical reductionism, and a detailed discussion of Fodor’s claims and key terminology. This is followed by examining Fodor’s argument against psychophysical reductionism using his key example of multiple realization, Gresham’s law in economics. We argue that the law is either not multiply realized or basic sciences are also multiply realized, both options being problematic for Fodor. Turning to the apparent impossibility of reducing ceteris paribus special science laws via exceptionless bridge laws to exceptionless physical laws, we argue that the problem lies in the notion of “proper law”: if understood as an exceptionless law, the argument rests on a contradiction, and if understood as a “not gerrymandered” (not arbitrary) law, the key assumption of the argument, i.e., that special science kinds are natural, is simply false. The original argument, therefore, fails to establish the autonomy of special sciences even if Fodor’s own understanding of key terms is adopted, which leaves him, contrary to his opinion, empty-handed in the battle against psychophysical reductionism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"639 - 655"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00667-x.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dead Past Minus the Zombies Dead Past减去僵尸
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-09 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00661-3
Hugo Luzio
{"title":"Dead Past Minus the Zombies","authors":"Hugo Luzio","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00661-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00661-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper defends Forrest’s (2004, 2006) “Dead Past” response to the Epistemic Objection to the Growing Block theory, against the common charge—voiced by Braddon-Mitchell (2004, 2013), Grandjean (2022), and Graziani (2024)—that it populates the past with philosophical zombies. I argue that this objection rests on a mischaracterization of the nature of past beings in a “Dead Past” GB-universe, and support an inactivist account of the past. I then address a potential objection to this response and conclude by advancing what I take to be more pressing concerns about the nature of past beings within the “Dead Past” view, given my preferred inactivist account.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"393 - 409"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Epistemology of Skeptical Theism, Excessive Skepticism, and Hendricks’ Epistemic Gambit 怀疑有神论的认识论、过度怀疑论与亨德里克斯的认识论策略
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-03 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00662-2
Timothy Perrine
{"title":"The Epistemology of Skeptical Theism, Excessive Skepticism, and Hendricks’ Epistemic Gambit","authors":"Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00662-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00662-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Skeptical theists criticize arguments from evil by defending skepticism about our ability to reflectively identify God’s plans for the world. Critics routinely lodge an “excessive skepticism” objection that such skepticism will lead to more excessive skepticism about, for instance, the external world. Recently, Perry Hendricks has defended skeptical theism from this charge by claiming that skeptical theism only undermines certain inferences, the so-called noseeum inferences. In this paper, I do three things. First, I clarify the epistemology of skeptical theistic critiques of arguments from evil. Second, I argue that, given that epistemology, Hendricks’ defense fails. Specifically, it is false that skeptical theism only undermines noseeum inferences. Lastly, I briefly suggest a superior strategy for evaluating the “excessive skepticism” objection to skeptical theism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 4","pages":"1087 - 1105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149098534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: An Attributionist View 无意疏忽的责任：归因论观点
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-12-02 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00663-1
Seyyed Abbas Kazemi
{"title":"Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: An Attributionist View","authors":"Seyyed Abbas Kazemi","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00663-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00663-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to attributionist accounts of moral responsibility, an individual is morally responsible for an action, omission, or mental state if and only if it reflects his moral orientation. One objection to this family of views argues that there are situations in which an agent is intuitively morally responsible for something, yet this responsibility cannot be attributed to a defect in his moral orientation. Unwitting omissions serve as a key example of such situations. In this paper, I will articulate the challenge that unwitting omissions pose to attributionism and evaluate some responses that attributionist theorists have offered—or could offer—to address this challenge. I will demonstrate that these responses are ultimately unsatisfactory. Following this critique, I will propose my own attributionist account of moral responsibility, which I argue, effectively rebuts the challenge posed by unwitting omissions. Finally, I will compare and contrast my account with some similar accounts in the literature, demonstrating the superiority of my account.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 3","pages":"689 - 709"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148903254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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