发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments Fregean论点的奎因修正
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00535-y
Nathaniel Gan
{"title":"A Quinean Reformulation of Fregean Arguments","authors":"Nathaniel Gan","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00535-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00535-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>In ontological debates, realists typically argue for their view via one of two approaches. The <i>Quinean approach</i> employs naturalistic arguments that say our scientific practices give us reason to affirm the existence of a kind of entity. The <i>Fregean approach</i> employs linguistic arguments that say we should affirm the existence of a kind of entity because our discourse contains reference to those entities. These two approaches are often seen as distinct, with <i>indispensability arguments</i> typically associated with the former, but not the latter, approach. This paper argues for a connection between the two approaches on the grounds that the typical arguments of the Fregean approach can be reformulated as indispensability arguments. This connection is significant in at least two ways. First, it implies that indispensability arguments provide a common framework within which to compare the Quinean and Fregean approaches, which allows for a more precise delineation of the two approaches. Second, it implies the possibility of analogical relations that allow proponents and opponents of each approach to draw upon the ideas that have been developed regarding the other.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00535-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46154309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals 贝叶斯仍然没有从条件句中学习
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-09-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00527-y
Mario Günther, Borut Trpin
{"title":"Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals","authors":"Mario Günther,&nbsp;Borut Trpin","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00527-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00527-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (<i>Mind</i> 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00527-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47906362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Why Be Rational? 为什么要理性？
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-09-17 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00530-3
Nicholas Waghorn
{"title":"Why Be Rational?","authors":"Nicholas Waghorn","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00530-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00530-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The question ‘Why be rational?’ could be calling into question a commitment to respond to the requirements of subjective rationality, or could be calling into question a commitment to respond to objective reasons. I examine the question in this second sense, placing it in the mouth of the arationalist — an individual who has not ruled out the possibility of not acting or believing on the basis of objective reasons. In evaluating responses to the arationalist’s question, I consider the replies of three philosophers, where these exemplify a shared conceptual strategy: to claim that reasons-responsiveness is self-justifying. I argue that each reply fails, and that the overall strategy is not only dialectically ineffective against the arationalist but is also ineffective even for the goal of reassuring those already committed to reasons-responsiveness. The question ‘Why be rational?’ is yet to be answered, and so a commitment to respond to objective reasons is ungrounded.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00530-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49147513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Note on Knowing and Checking 关于认识与检查的一点注记
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00528-x
Danilo Šuster
{"title":"A Note on Knowing and Checking","authors":"Danilo Šuster","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00528-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00528-x","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I raise some questions about differentiations between methods, checking methods, and appropriate methods in terms of their modal profiles. Melchior argues that there can be sensitive checking methods which are not safe. I try to show that such methods are epistemically deficient. I introduce restricted sensitivity (RS) and investigate its checking profile. RS with respect to a proposition <i>p</i> requires that we consider more non-p worlds (not just the closest ones) but not those which are irrelevant (outside a sphere of seriously possible worlds). Restrictedly sensitive methods (vacuously sensitive and strongly safe) based on the appropriate type of Bayesian reasoning might be sufficient for some kind of “modest” checking. Melchior defends a uniform account of checking based on insensitivity even in the case of necessary true propositions and he introduces the apparatus of impossible worlds. I argue that an unsatisfactory method for checking a necessary true proposition is a way of reaching a belief in the target proposition (different from the original one) which might easily not have delivered a true one. I also indicate some limitations of the idea that checking (and knowing) is essentially modal in character.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44796024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Norms of Constatives 构语规范
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00531-2
Grzegorz Gaszczyk
{"title":"Norms of Constatives","authors":"Grzegorz Gaszczyk","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00531-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00531-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion’s conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00531-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46799699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Sensitivity: Checking into Knowing? 敏感性：了解？
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-09-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00529-w
Kelly Becker
{"title":"Sensitivity: Checking into Knowing?","authors":"Kelly Becker","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00529-w","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00529-w","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>In this paper, I describe some of the highlights of Melchior’s checking account and then suggest that its explanatory value could be enhanced with a less analyzed concept of checking. This thought inspires a rearguard defense of sensitivity, by no means aiming to rescue it from all its well-known problems, wherein it is suggested that sensitivity fares better as a necessary condition for knowledge when all the bells and whistles with which it has been adorned over the years are stripped away. Finally, I investigate a recognizably Moorean position involving methods that can be construed as sensitive, such that persons using them can claim to have checked that skeptical hypotheses are false.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44234449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Checking out Checking 签出签出
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-08-23 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00526-z
Peter Baumann
{"title":"Checking out Checking","authors":"Peter Baumann","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00526-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00526-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>Guido Melchior’s important and rich book (Melchior <i>Knowing and Checking. </i><i>An Epistemological Investigation</i> 2019) draws our attention to the much neglected topic of checking. There are many new leads to follow. Here, I will pick a few that seem to me to allow the most room for discussion and disagreement: the alleged modal profile of checking (Sect. 1), the contrastive aspects of checking (Sect. 2), and the relation of checking to closure (Sect. 3). I will end with two smaller points worth bringing up here (Sect. 4).</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00526-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46671462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind 阻碍克里普克对心智类型同一性理论的反驳
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-07-14 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00525-0
Simone Gozzano
{"title":"Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind","authors":"Simone Gozzano","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00525-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00525-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, I present a two-pronged argument devoted to defending the type-identity theory of mind against the argument presented by Kripke in <i>Naming and Necessity</i>. In the first part, the interpersonal case, I show that since it is not possible to establish the metaphysical conditions for phenomenal identity, it is not possible to argue that there can be physical differences between two subjects despite their phenomenal identity. In the second part, the intrapersonal case, I consider the possibility of imagining one and the same individual having the same phenomenal state while counterfactually being in very different physical states. I argue that this case should respect Kripke’s implicit theory of personal identity—but this proves to be a very difficult task to accomplish, thus preventing the argument from getting off the ground. Therefore, I maintain, that the type-identity theory is still the better option to solve the mind–body problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00525-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43328523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Cardinality Argument Against Quidditism 论反对魁地主义的基数论
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-07-12 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00524-1
Deborah C. Smith
{"title":"On the Cardinality Argument Against Quidditism","authors":"Deborah C. Smith","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00524-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00524-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Robert Black argues against quidditism on the grounds that the quidditist is either committed to proper-class many possible worlds and proper-class many possible fundamental properties or must adopt an unacceptably arbitrary restriction on the number of possible fundamental properties. In this paper, I examine Black’s cardinality argument against quidditism and argue that quidditists and non-quidditists alike have reason to reject a key premise of that argument. While it may be the case that the quidditist is committed to nomically indiscernible possible worlds that mark distinctions that make no difference to the physicist, it does not appear that the cardinality of the class of possible worlds or the class of possible fundamental properties postulated by the quidditist is any more problematic than that postulated by the non-quidditist.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47991636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox 关于悖论概念的几点注记
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-07-05 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2
Sergi Oms
{"title":"Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox","authors":"Sergi Oms","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion that should be implied by an acceptance of the truth of the premises and the validity of the argument.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00515-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42184735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信