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Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

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Avoiding Strawson’s Crude Opposition: How to Straddle the Participant and Objective Stances 避免斯特劳森的粗暴对立:如何跨越参与者立场与客观立场
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-04-06 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00552-5
Neil Campbell, Alexander Carty
{"title":"Avoiding Strawson’s Crude Opposition: How to Straddle the Participant and Objective Stances","authors":"Neil Campbell,&nbsp;Alexander Carty","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00552-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00552-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Commentators on P.F. Strawson’s reactive attitudes emphasize the opposition between the participant and objective attitudes. This tendency overlooks Strawson’s attempt to mitigate what he saw as “a crude opposition” between these two perspectives. Strawson called attention to phenomena involving the “half-suspension” of reactive attitudes, or the “straddling” of the objective and participant stances in order to diminish this crudity. This has been largely ignored in the literature, and as a result, the phenomena that Strawson mentions are poorly understood. Drawing on the work in the philosophy of emotion by Amélie Rorty and a multidimensional account of the reactive attitudes, we provide a framework to explain how such a half-suspension is possible and highlight some of its more prominent features.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"39 1","pages":"117 - 141"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48913245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
ACT-Endorsing Libertarianism, Constitutive Luck, and Basic Moral Responsibility 支持act的自由意志主义、构成运气和基本道德责任
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-04-04 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00551-6
Christopher P. Taggart
{"title":"ACT-Endorsing Libertarianism, Constitutive Luck, and Basic Moral Responsibility","authors":"Christopher P. Taggart","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00551-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00551-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Because an agent’s constitutive luck may seem to preclude free will, it may seem to preclude moral responsibility. An agent is basically morally responsible for performing action <i>A</i> at time <i>t</i> only if there is another possible world with the same past up to <i>t</i> and the same laws of nature in which the agent does not perform <i>A</i> at <i>t</i>. A compatibilist can solve the constitutive luck problem for moral responsibility without worrying about basic moral responsibility. According to compatibilism, if determinism is true, then agents can be morally responsible for performing actions without being basically morally responsible for performing them. But a libertarian who thinks agents can be basically morally responsible for what they do must explain how basic moral responsibility is possible. ACT-endorsing libertarianism can both solve the constitutive luck problem for moral responsibility and explain how agents can be basically morally responsible for what they do.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 4","pages":"707 - 716"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00551-6.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44749297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What is Existence? A Matter of Co(n)text 什么是存在？Co（n）文本的问题
IF 0.3 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00550-7
Carola Barbero, Filippo Domaneschi, Ivan Enrici, Alberto Voltolini
{"title":"What is Existence? A Matter of Co(n)text","authors":"Carola Barbero,&nbsp;Filippo Domaneschi,&nbsp;Ivan Enrici,&nbsp;Alberto Voltolini","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00550-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00550-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, we present some experimental findings whose best explanation, first of all, provides a positive answer to a philosophical question in ontology as to whether, in the overall domain of beings, there are fictional characters (<i>ficta</i>) over and above concrete individuals. Moreover, since such findings arise out of different comparisons between fictional characters and concrete individuals on the one hand and fictional characters again and non-items that do not belong at all to such an overall domain on the other hand, they also suggest that <i>ficta</i> are allowed as inhabiting a particular subrealm of that domain distinct from the one inhabited by concrete individuals, as previous findings in cognitive psychology had suggested.</p>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"39 1","pages":"1 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00550-7.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48645748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Taming Holism: an Inferentialist Account of Communication 驯服整体主义：传播学的一种推论
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-03-25 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00549-0
Haruka Iikawa
{"title":"Taming Holism: an Inferentialist Account of Communication","authors":"Haruka Iikawa","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00549-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00549-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract  </h2><div><p>Robert Brandom’s inferentialism notoriously entails meaning holism, which has often been seen as unacceptable because it seems to make communication impossible. This paper aims to improve Brandom’s conception of communication as “navigation-across-perspectives” to reconcile meaning holism and the possibility of communication. The conception proposed here entails keeping track of speakers’ own and the other’s scores of commitments and entitlements. I argue that the whole of commonly endorsed inferences in each practice should determine the contents of utterances and those of the commitments of the participants. The local norm defined by such inferences is holistic and can make sense of each other’s commitments. Contents or meaning can be primarily determined at the level of each practice, not that of an individual, the whole community, or the objective world.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 4","pages":"593 - 612"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48678485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Carroll’s Regress Times Three 卡罗尔的遗憾时代三
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-03-06 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00548-1
Gilbert Plumer
{"title":"Carroll’s Regress Times Three","authors":"Gilbert Plumer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00548-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00548-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I show that in our theoretical representations of argument, vicious infinite regresses of self-reference may arise with respect to each of the three usual, informal criteria of argument cogency: the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable. They arise needlessly, by confusing a cogency criterion with argument content. The three types of regress all are structurally similar to Lewis Carroll’s famous regress, which involves quantitative extravagance with no explanatory power. Most attention is devoted to the sufficiency criterion, including its relation to the view <i>au courant</i> that inferring necessarily involves the thinker taking her premises to support her conclusion. I contend that this view is mistaken and likewise that arguments make no such assumption or inference claim as that the premises support the conclusion. The core of the positive alternative model I propose is that there is commitment to, but not claiming, the proposition that the premises support the conclusion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 4","pages":"551 - 571"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44268660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What the Remnant Person Problem Really Implies 遗存者问题的真正含义
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-02-06 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00545-4
Joungbin Lim
{"title":"What the Remnant Person Problem Really Implies","authors":"Joungbin Lim","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00545-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00545-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The goal of this paper is to defend animalism from the remnant person problem. Specifically, I argue that animalism is consistent with the view that one could become a remnant person in virtue of psychological continuity. For this argument, I show that the dilemma for the remnant person parallels the dilemma animalists use when they argue that one could become a human vegetable or corpse. I then argue that animalists who claim that psychological continuity is not necessary for our persistence through time should say that biological continuity is not necessary either. This implies that psychological continuity is sufficient, though not necessary, for personal identity over time in some cases. Finally, I show how my argument points animalists toward anti-criterialism and defend it from a fission problem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 4","pages":"667 - 687"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43227351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rescuing Mele/Robb-Style Cases 拯救混战/抢劫式案件
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-02-04 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00547-2
Pablo Rychter
{"title":"Rescuing Mele/Robb-Style Cases","authors":"Pablo Rychter","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00547-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00547-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A good part of the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility in the last fifty years has revolved around so-called Frankfurt-style cases. One of the most important milestones in this debate is the case described by Mele and Robb (1998), which was intended to avoid some earlier objections directed at Frankfurt’s original argument. However, the success of Mele and Robb’s case has been contested by Pereboom (2001), Widerker (2003), and Moya (2003, 2017), among others. The present paper aims to vindicate Mele and Robb’s (and Frankfurt’s) general argument by describing a variation of their case that overcomes or avoids the objections of those authors.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 4","pages":"689 - 705"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00547-2.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46708865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Belief Holism and the Scope of Doxastic Norms 信仰整体论与多克主义规范的范围
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-02-01 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00544-5
Alexander Miller, Seyed Ali Kalantari
{"title":"Belief Holism and the Scope of Doxastic Norms","authors":"Alexander Miller,&nbsp;Seyed Ali Kalantari","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00544-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00544-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>\u0000Much of the recent literature on the normativity of belief has focused on undermining or defending narrow scope readings of doxastic norms. Wide scope readings are largely assumed to have been decisively refuted. This paper will oppose this trend by defending a wide scope reading of the norm of belief. We shall argue for the modest claim that if it is plausible to regard belief as constitutively normative (in the minimal sense that false belief is <i>eo ipso</i> defective), then a modified version of the wide scope reading of the norm of belief should be preferred to the narrow scope reading. (This is subject to certain attractive conditions relating to the holism involved in the fixation and confirmation of belief.)</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 4","pages":"575 - 584"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00544-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46012140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Enhancement Is Irrational 道德建设是不合理的
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-01-31 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-023-00546-3
Stephen Napier
{"title":"Moral Enhancement Is Irrational","authors":"Stephen Napier","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00546-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-023-00546-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>\u0000Debates on moral enhancement focus legitimate attention on the questions of whether it is possible and/or what could count as a moral enhancement given deep ethical disagreement. I argue here that moral enhancements might not even be rational to consider—from the perspective of the agent. At issue is the assessment of whether the enhancement is truly reliable. Since we assess reliable belief forming processes by their outputs, whether they are true, an agent who is entertaining a putative moral enhancement faces a trilemma. If she already believes the promised outputs of the enhancement, the enhancement is obsolete. If she does not believe the promised outputs, it would be irrational from her current perspective to undertake the “enhancement.” If she is uncertain, she has no reason <i>for</i> thinking that the enhancement truly augments her moral beliefs. On any option, the agent has no reason for taking a putative moral enhancement.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 4","pages":"653 - 665"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00546-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42932974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Curiosity, Checking, and Knowing: a Virtue-Theoretical Perspective 好奇、检查和了解:一个美德理论的视角
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2023-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00538-9
Nenad Miscevic
{"title":"Curiosity, Checking, and Knowing: a Virtue-Theoretical Perspective","authors":"Nenad Miscevic","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00538-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00538-9","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>In his important and original book, <i>Knowing and Checking</i>, Guido Melchior provides advice on how to tackle skepticism. I argue that his analysis points to a possible virtue-theoretic answer to skepticism, which I call the <i>restraint solution</i>, i.e., activate your self-trust and restrain your inquisitiveness! It leads one to the ideal of bounded reflective curiosity: when it comes to knowledge, we should restrain our second-order, reflective curiosity and stay content with the somewhat Moorean trust in ordinary everyday beliefs. We can preserve our ordinary, first-order vigilance and investigative interest (curiosity) without falling into skeptical over-caution which is basically a reflective, second-order vicious attitude.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"38 1","pages":"53 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2023-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00538-9.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45814114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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