{"title":"Epiphenomenalism and the Epistemic Argument","authors":"Jan Rostek","doi":"10.1007/s12136-023-00565-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its essential assumptions. This was made possible by an upgraded property exemplification account of events. I also argue against a view which, if true, gives substantial support to the epistemic argument: that a belief justified by other beliefs is knowledge only if it is caused by those beliefs in virtue of their contents.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-023-00565-0.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-023-00565-0","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The epistemic argument against epiphenomenalism aims to prove that even if epiphenomenalism is true, its adherents are not able to justify their inferential beliefs. This would mean that they cannot know that they are right which is a self-stultifying consequence. I elaborate on this problem and then present an updated version of epiphenomenalism based on property dualism. I argue that this position is capable of refuting the conclusion of the epistemic argument even in spite of accepting its essential assumptions. This was made possible by an upgraded property exemplification account of events. I also argue against a view which, if true, gives substantial support to the epistemic argument: that a belief justified by other beliefs is knowledge only if it is caused by those beliefs in virtue of their contents.
期刊介绍：
Acta Analytica is an international journal for philosophy in the analytical tradition covering a variety of philosophical topics including philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Special attention is devoted to cognitive science. The journal aims to promote a rigorous, argument-based approach in philosophy. Acta Analytica is a peer reviewed journal, published quarterly, with authors from all over the world.
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