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Metaethics as Therapy 作为治疗的元伦理学
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-07-18 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00649-z
Jason Dockstader
{"title":"Metaethics as Therapy","authors":"Jason Dockstader","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00649-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00649-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper defends the claim that metaethics can be done therapeutically. It does so by first showing how metaethics can fit into recent systemizations of philosophy as therapy. Borrowing from the work of Martha Nussbaum and Eugen Fischer, the paper discusses how metaethics can fulfill the criterion for both a philosophical therapy and a therapeutic philosophy. Then, it argues that there are examples of both robust moral realists and anti-realists doing metaethics as therapy. On the realist side, there is evidence of moral naturalists and non-naturalists doing metaethics for therapeutic ends. Likewise, on the anti-realist side, there are cases of both Pyrrhonian moral skeptics and moral error theorists, in how they answer the “now what?” question, displaying therapeutic motivations for their views. In the process, the concepts of health often implicitly employed by metaethicists are addressed and made explicit. The paper thus suggests that not only has metaethics been done as a kind of therapy, doing metaethics as therapy remains a live option for us today.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"501 - 520"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00649-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beyond Impossibility 除了不可能
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-06-23 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00648-0
Zack Garrett, Zachariah Wrublewski
{"title":"Beyond Impossibility","authors":"Zack Garrett,&nbsp;Zachariah Wrublewski","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00648-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00648-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There has been a sharp increase in the use of impossible worlds as theoretical tools for solving difficult philosophical problems. Some philosophers, however, warn against their use. For example, Timothy Williamson argues that impossible worlds should not be used in an analysis of conditionals because they do not provide a compositional semantics. In this paper, we set out to resolve some of the potential problems associated with impossible worlds, thereby providing justification for their uses in a variety of contexts and applications. Graham Priest provides two directives for an account of impossible worlds. We argue that Priest’s directives, and, thus, the traditional view on impossibility, overextend the class of impossible worlds. We argue that all worlds, possible or impossible, are describable and that nonsense cannot play a role in a proper description. So, putative worlds that include nonsense are not worlds at all, possible or impossible. The exclusion of nonsense sentences from worlds undermines Priest’s two directives, but by separating nonsense from impossibility, we can resolve many of the worries about the use of impossible worlds.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"347 - 367"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00648-0.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Even Bigger-Picture Causalism 更宏观的因果论
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00647-1
Olof Leffler
{"title":"Even Bigger-Picture Causalism","authors":"Olof Leffler","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00647-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00647-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Causalism about action explains what an action is in terms of its causes. Causalism about free action explains what a free action is in terms of its causes. Carolina Sartorio (2023) suggests that they add up into ‘big-picture causalism’. This paper develops an even bigger-picture causalism. The central addition comes from the distinction between structural and substantive rationality. The problem of the disappearing agent is raised for Sartorio’s causalism about action, and a solution based on dispositions of structural rationality is presented. However, such dispositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for free action. As Sartorio suggests, we should rather appeal to a disposition of substantive rationality or reasons-responsiveness (and some extra qualifications) to capture free action. But by combining the two types of rationality, we capture a broader range of types of control than Sartorio—and develop an even bigger-picture causalism that features action, free action, and rational action.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"273 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00647-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Composition as Trans-Scalar Identity 作为跨标量恒等式的复合
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-06-07 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00645-3
Alexander Schumm, Waldemar Rohloff, Gualtiero Piccinini
{"title":"Composition as Trans-Scalar Identity","authors":"Alexander Schumm,&nbsp;Waldemar Rohloff,&nbsp;Gualtiero Piccinini","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00645-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00645-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a portion of reality at different scales in the precise sense employed by measurement theory. The purpose of these scales is the numerical representation of primitive relations between quantities of being. To show this, we prove representation and uniqueness theorems for composition. We conclude that mereologically invariant composition is trans-scalar identity.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"321 - 346"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00645-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rational Inconsistency Against Non-skeptical Infallibilism 理性矛盾论反对非怀疑无谬论
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-06-07 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00646-2
Nathan Lauffer
{"title":"Rational Inconsistency Against Non-skeptical Infallibilism","authors":"Nathan Lauffer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00646-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00646-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Recent epistemological literature features compelling and novel arguments for thinking that an agent can rationally believe each member of a set of propositions while knowing that one of the members is false. Perhaps more provocatively, these proponents of “Rational Inconsistency,” as it were, claim that it’s also possible to <i>know</i> each true member of the set while knowing that one of the members is false. Call this “Knowledgeable Inconsistency.” In this article, I explain why, if Knowledgeable Inconsistency is true, then, on pain of an absurd implication about how confirmation works, we should reject non-skeptical Infallibilism about knowledge. For that same reason, the recent proponents of Rational Inconsistency should also reject non-skeptical Infallibilism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 1","pages":"151 - 166"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147337764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Applying Alex Broadbent’s Reverse Counterfactual Theory to the Outbreak of World War I: A Novel Causal Analysis 运用亚历克斯·布罗德本特的反向反事实理论分析第一次世界大战的爆发：一种新颖的因果分析
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-06-06 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00644-4
John Hanssen
{"title":"Applying Alex Broadbent’s Reverse Counterfactual Theory to the Outbreak of World War I: A Novel Causal Analysis","authors":"John Hanssen","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00644-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00644-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article applies Alex Broadbent’s reverse counterfactual theory of causation to the causes of World War I (WWI), providing a novel framework for historical causal analysis. According to Broadbent’s theory, which differs radically from the more familiar account of David Lewis, an event Q is a cause of event R only if, without R, Q would not have occurred. The hypothesis posited here is that understanding the causes of WWI lies in identifying them based on a well-motivated causal philosophical framework. After showing that Broadbent’s theory is <i>prima facie</i> plausible, this study employs it to re-evaluate the extensively debated causes of WWI. Through doing so, it becomes evident that the Russian mobilization, rather than other frequently cited events, was the pivotal cause of Germany’s declaration of war and, consequently, the broader conflict. This analysis not only simplifies the complex causal reasoning process but also offers fresh insights into the historical narrative of WWI as well as reveals how a philosophical account of causation can have a weighty bearing on debates in social science. The implications of this approach extend beyond historical inquiry, suggesting broader applications for reverse counterfactual theory in understanding causation in complex events.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 1","pages":"15 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00644-4.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147337796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Doxastic Precautionary Principle as Political Encroachment 作为政治侵占的专制预防原则。
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-05-23 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00642-6
Maciej Juzaszek
{"title":"Doxastic Precautionary Principle as Political Encroachment","authors":"Maciej Juzaszek","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00642-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00642-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article aims to reconcile the intuitions grounding two important positions from the ethics of belief: epistemic purism and reason pragmatism. They can conflict, especially at the level of what we ought to believe all-things-considered. They manifest themselves in two important meta-principles that constrain law and policy-making that seem to be in tension as well. The first is the principle of evidence-based regulation, which says that legal rules should only be based on current scientific knowledge. The second is the precautionary principle, according to which authorities should regulate (or even prohibit) an activity that may cause harm to humans or the environment, even if there is insufficient scientific evidence to support such a claim. However, I argue that the precautionary principle can be interpreted from the perspective of ethics of belief as political encroachment on evidence-based regulation. As such, it can reconcile both the epistemic and pragmatic intuitions underlying these two principles.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 1","pages":"131 - 150"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12913246/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146229973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Scientific Understanding: No Veritism Without Realism, No Realism Without Veritism 科学理解：没有实在论就没有实在论，没有实在论就没有实在论
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-05-22 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00643-5
Mariano Martín-Villuendas
{"title":"Scientific Understanding: No Veritism Without Realism, No Realism Without Veritism","authors":"Mariano Martín-Villuendas","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00643-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00643-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Scientific understanding constitutes one of the most firmly settled topics in the philosophy of general science. The most accepted approach within the debate has been the so-called “factivism of understanding.” Here, I show analytically how the latter is articulated through the acceptance of two interrelated theses: an epistemological—veritism—and an ontological one—realism. Recently, a group of authors challenged this line of thought by dissociating ontological and epistemological commitments. I examine these proposals, elucidating to what extent they fail in their attempt to formulate a consistent account of scientific understanding. I argue that if one wants to articulate an account committed to a truth-centered epistemology, one should adopt a realist stance; if one wants to formulate a realist account of scientific understanding, one should subscribe to a truth-centered epistemology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 2","pages":"251 - 271"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-025-00643-5.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147985135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
De re Necessity and de se Intention: Defending a Further Restricted Essential Indexical Thesis “必要”与“意图”：再辩一个限制性本质索引命题
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-04-22 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00641-7
Lian Zhou
{"title":"De re Necessity and de se Intention: Defending a Further Restricted Essential Indexical Thesis","authors":"Lian Zhou","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00641-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00641-7","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>“Essential Indexical Thesis” is a label for a collection of theses claiming there are essential connections between explanations of actions and the first-person perspective (or <i>de se</i> mental state). Recently there are two notable defences for essential indexical theses: Babb’s defence of the thesis that all intentional actions are essentially indexical, and Francescotti’s defence of the thesis that necessarily all intention-to actions have <i>de se</i> origin. Through a critical examination of these defences, I discover that although Francescotti has defended a <i>de dicto</i> claim that “necessarily, an intention-to action results from an intention that necessarily has <i>de se</i> content”, his defence remains compatible with the <i>de re</i> claim that “no (first-order) action necessarily results from an intention that necessarily has <i>de se</i> content”, because his defence fails to eliminate another <i>de re</i> claim that “no (first-order) action necessarily is an intention-to action.” Since Francescotti’s defence is compatible with the first <i>de re</i> claim, the essential indexical thesis he defends is vulnerable to the risk brought up by this <i>de re</i> claim: if the first <i>de re</i> claim is true, then no (first-order) action is necessarily/essentially indexical in Francescotti's sense. To fix this problem, I demonstrate that some (first-order) actions, for example, looking-for and pursuit, necessarily are intention-to actions. Then I propose my defence for a new essential indexical thesis called the further restricted essential indexical thesis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 1","pages":"81 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147340976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotions Can Account for Valence and Irrationality: Reply to Objections 目标导向的情绪理论如何解释价态和非理性：回应反对意见
IF 0.2 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00638-2
Agnes Moors
{"title":"How the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotions Can Account for Valence and Irrationality: Reply to Objections","authors":"Agnes Moors","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00638-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00638-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this reply paper, I address three objections that were raised against the goal-directed theory of emotions (Moors 2022). The first objection questions the appropriateness of aligning all emotions, including positive ones, with decision-making processes. The second objection challenges the theory’s ability to account for the valence aspect of all positive and negative emotions, highlighting two sets of counterexamples. The third objection asserts that the theory fails to give a satisfactory account of the irrational flavor of certain emotions, in particular recalcitrant ones.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 1","pages":"187 - 201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147337609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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