Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献

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Common Ground and Charity in Conflict 冲突中的共同立场与慈善
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-06-29 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00523-2
Callie K. Phillips
{"title":"Common Ground and Charity in Conflict","authors":"Callie K. Phillips","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00523-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00523-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>Few critics of the received view in metaphysics that ontological disputes are generally substantive have stirred as much response as those that have developed Carnapian arguments turning on considerations of language and interpretation. The arguments from deflationists like Thomasson (2009, 2014) and Neo-Fregeans like Hale and Wright (2009), focus on features of actual language use, others like those from Hirsch (2002, 2009) focus on interpretation. In this paper, I offer a novel challenge to the latter sort of argument. I argue that through their use of the principle of charity, they have unacceptable consequences beyond the ontology room: the best accounts of some natural language phenomena—most importantly, presupposition—cannot be maintained.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45515347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context? 合理性标准取决于资源环境吗?
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-06-14 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00521-4
Eric Sampson
{"title":"Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context?","authors":"Eric Sampson","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00521-4","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00521-4","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lottery or borrowing from loan sharks. Are these agents acting irrationally? The standard answer is “yes.” But, in a recent award-winning paper, Jennifer Morton argues “no.” On her view, the norms of practical reasoning an agent ought to follow depend on that agent’s resource context (roughly, how rich or poor they are). If Morton is correct, the orthodox view that the same norms of practical rationality apply to all agents needs revision. I argue that Morton’s arguments fail on empirical and philosophical grounds. What’s at stake? If Morton is correct, poverty relief agencies ought to re-design their incentives so resource-scarce agents can rationally respond to them. If I’m correct, resource-scarce agents do act irrationally in the cases under discussion, and we shouldn’t be shy about saying so. Instead of declaring them rational, we should try to understand the causes of their irrational behavior and help them better succeed by their own lights.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44543671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Explaining Higher-order Defeat 解释高阶失败
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-06-14 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00522-3
Marco Tiozzo
{"title":"Explaining Higher-order Defeat","authors":"Marco Tiozzo","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00522-3","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00522-3","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Higher-order evidence appears to have the ability to defeat rational belief. It is not obvious, however, why exactly the defeat happens. In this paper, I consider two competing explanations of higher-order defeat: the “Objective Higher-Order Defeat Explanation” and the “Subjective Higher-Order Defat Explanation.” According to the former explanation, possessing sufficiently strong higher-order evidence to indicate that one’s belief about p fails to be rational is necessary and sufficient for defeating one’s belief about p. I argue that this type of explanation is defective or at best collapses into the other type of explanation. According to the latter explanation, Believing that one’s belief about p fails to be rational (in response to higher-order evidence about p) is necessary and sufficient for defeating one’s belief about p. I argue that this type of explanation is better suited to explain higher-order defeat given that what one is rational to believe partly depends on the relations among one’s doxastic attitudes. Finally, I address an peculiar feature of the Subjective Higher-Order Defeat Explanation: higher-order defeat becomes contingent on one’s response to the higher-order evidence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00522-3.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46009387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Timeless Causation? 永恒的因果关系?
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-05-27 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00520-5
Zhiheng Tang
{"title":"Timeless Causation?","authors":"Zhiheng Tang","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00520-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00520-5","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper presents a line of thought against the possibility of causation without time. That possibility, insofar as it is supposedly rested upon a Lewisian counterfactual theory of causation, does not stand up to scrutiny. The key point is that, as a reflection on the trans-world identity of events reveals, (distinct) events deprived of times are—according to Lewis’s own semantics of counterfactuals—no longer eligible to stand in counterfactual dependence.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49588913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Gruesome Truth About Semantic Dispositionalism 关于语义倾向论的可怕真相
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-05-18 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00517-0
Adam C. Podlaskowski
{"title":"The Gruesome Truth About Semantic Dispositionalism","authors":"Adam C. Podlaskowski","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00517-0","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00517-0","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The resemblance is plain to see between Kripke’s Wittgenstein introducing bizarre rules such as <i>quaddition</i> (in illustrating the <i>sceptical paradox</i> against theories of meaning) and Goodman’s introducing the equally bizarre <i>grue</i> (in generating the <i>new riddle of induction</i>). But the two sorts of bizarre cases also differ in interesting respects. For those familiar with Goodman’s case, this similarity sparks a strong temptation to enlist to the meaning sceptic’s cause key elements of Goodman’s new riddle, which are missing from Kripke’s case. In this essay, I characterize a natural way of doing just this, which targets dispositionalist solutions to the sceptical paradox. I also show that, despite initial appearances, this new objection to dispositionalism (the symmetry problem) is not nearly as worrisome as originally thought. The solution offered on behalf of semantic dispositionalists does require a trade-off, though, from the severe form of indeterminacy advanced by the meaning sceptic to a much milder thesis.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47181270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Naïve Realism Face to Face with the Time Lag Argument 天真的现实主义与时间滞后的争论
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-04-22 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00519-y
Fabio Bacchini
{"title":"Naïve Realism Face to Face with the Time Lag Argument","authors":"Fabio Bacchini","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00519-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00519-y","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Naïve realists traditionally reject the time lag argument by replying that we can be in a direct visual perceptual relation to temporally distant facts or objects. I first show that this answer entails that some visual perceptions—i.e., those that are direct relation between us and an external material object that has visually changed, or ceased to exist, during the time lag—should also count as illusions and hallucinations, respectively. I then examine the possible attempts by the naïve realist to tell such perceptions apart from illusions and hallucinations, and after showing the inadequacy of the answers relying on a mere counterfactual or causal criterion, I explain why the problem is solved by introducing a view of visual perception as temporally extended into the past of objects and, in particular, as consisting in the whole causal chain of events or states of affairs going from external material object <i>x</i> to subject <i>S</i>. But this solution is not immune from defects for the naïve realist. I show that this view of perception raises a number of significant concerns, hence leaving the issue of the time lag problem still open for naïve realism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00519-y.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45707695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer 布拉德利的关系回归与关系特定答案的不足
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-04-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00516-1
Jani Hakkarainen, Markku Keinänen
{"title":"Bradley’s Relation Regress and the Inadequacy of the Relata-Specific Answer","authors":"Jani Hakkarainen,&nbsp;Markku Keinänen","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00516-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00516-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><h2>Abstract\u0000</h2><div><p>F. H. Bradley’s relation regress poses a difficult problem for metaphysics of relations. In this paper, we reconstruct this regress argument systematically and make its presuppositions explicit in order to see where the possibility of its solution or resolution lies. We show that it cannot be answered by claiming that it is not vicious. Neither is one of the most promising resolutions, the relata-specific answer adequate in its present form. It attempts to explain adherence (relating), which is a crucial component of the <i>explanandum</i> of Bradley’s relation regress, in terms of <i>specific</i> adherence of a relational trope to its relata. Nevertheless, since we do not know the consequences and constituents of a trope adhering to its specific relata, it remains unclear what specific adherence is. It is left as a constitutively inexplicable primitive. The relata-specific answer only asserts against Bradley. This negative conclusion highlights the need for a metaphysical account of the constitution of  the holding of adherence.</p></div></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00516-1.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43217248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Musical Types and Musical Flexibility 音乐类型和音乐灵活性
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-04-14 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00518-z
Peter Alward
{"title":"Musical Types and Musical Flexibility","authors":"Peter Alward","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00518-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00518-z","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A central motivation for the type-token model of music works is its ability to explain musical multiplicity—the fact that musical works are capable of having multiple performances through which they can be experienced and which cannot be individually identified with the works themselves. The type-token model explains multiplicity by identifying musical works with structural types and taking performances to be tokens of those types. In this paper, I argue that musical works are flexible in ways which permit performances which are tokens of distinct structural types to be performances of the same musical work. And I argue that various attempts to reconcile the type-token model with musical flexibility are ultimately unsuccessful.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-022-00518-z.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43059286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox 普特南-古德曼-克里普克悖论
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-03-24 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00507-2
Robert Kowalenko
{"title":"The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox","authors":"Robert Kowalenko","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00507-2","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00507-2","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The extensions of Goodman’s ‘grue’ predicate and Kripke’s ‘quus’ are constructed from the extensions of more familiar terms via a reinterpretation that permutes assignments of reference. Since this manoeuvre is at the heart of Putnam’s model-theoretic and permutation arguments against metaphysical realism (‘Putnam’s Paradox’), both Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction and the paradox about meaning that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are instances of Putnam’s. Evidence cannot selectively confirm the green-hypothesis and disconfirm the grue-hypothesis, because the theory of which the green-hypothesis is a part has an unintended model in which the grue-hypothesis is equally confirmed; and there are no meaning-facts that determine reference, because the objects referred to by the referring terms of any language or set of intentional mental states are permutable in a way that is consistent with the truth-values of all other sentences in that language or beliefs in that set. The upshot is that the three paradoxes need to be solved in a unified way.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43027861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck 安全性、证据和认知运气
IF 0.4 3区 文学
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-022-00511-6
Michael J. Shaffer
{"title":"Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck","authors":"Michael J. Shaffer","doi":"10.1007/s12136-022-00511-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-022-00511-6","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper critically explores Timothy Williamson’s view of evidence, and it does so in light of the problem of epistemic luck. Williamson’s view of evidence is, of course, a crucially important aspect of his novel and influential “knowledge-first” epistemological project. Notoriously, one crucial thesis of this project is that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This has come to be known as the E = K thesis. This paper specifically addresses Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology and the E = K thesis in the context of anti-luck epistemology (i.e., the view that knowledge is not compatible with certain forms of epistemic luck) and the idea that knowledge is factive (i.e., the view that knowledge implies truth). Williamson’s views on these matters are worth investigating in some detail because he subscribes to a well-worked out anti-luck view of knowledge that incorporates what is perhaps the most common anti-luck condition (i.e., the safety condition). But this paper is also of more general importance because the critique of Williamson’s views on these matters reveals some important things about the nature of evidence and evidence is one of the most fundamental concepts in epistemology.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50029272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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