Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition最新文献_第8页

Lost Disagreement: On Predicates of Personal Taste and the Superiority Approach 迷失的分歧：论个人品味的谓语与优越论

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-04-03 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00640-8

Marián Zouhar

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引用次数: 0

Some Reflections on the Goal-Directed Theory of Emotion 对目标导向情感理论的几点思考

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-28 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00637-3

David Pineda-Oliva

引用次数: 0

Pragmatic Encroachment Defended: A Response to Wolfgang Barz 为实用主义侵占辩护：对沃尔夫冈·巴尔茨的回应

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-25 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00636-4

Tim Oakley

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引用次数: 0

We Can Defend Normative Error Theory 我们可以为规范性错误理论辩护

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-24 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00639-1

Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz

{"title":"We Can Defend Normative Error Theory","authors":"Mustafa Khuramy, Erik Schulz","doi":"10.1007/s12136-025-00639-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s12136-025-00639-1","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Normative error theorists maintain the view that normative judgements ascribe normative properties, but these normative properties don’t exist. Many philosophers have tried objecting to this view, like Case (<i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i>, <i>98</i>(1), 92–104, 2019) arguing that it faces self-defeat. Others, like Streumer (<i>Journal of Philosophy</i>, <i>110</i>(4), 194–212, 2013), have argued that it can’t even be believed because beliefs (in the full, rational sense) possess certain normative requirements. So, there is no self-defeating ‘belief’ in normative error theory. Recently, Taccolini (<i>European Journal of Analytic Philosophy</i>, <i>20</i>(1), 131-154, 2024) has accepted that Streumer’s response to self-defeat might work, and builds a stronger self-defeat argument. The argument attempts to illustrate that one cannot defend the normative error theory, regardless of whether they believe it or not. In response, we illustrate various plausible interpretations of ‘defense’ that are consistent with error theory, thereby diffusing the modal objection that one can’t defend error theory.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"41 1","pages":"99 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147341488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An Ultimate Argument Against Nominalistic Relationalism 反对唯名论关系主义的终极论证

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-19 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00635-5

Julien Tricard

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引用次数: 0

Necessary Facts 必要的事实

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00631-9

Kai Michael Büttner

引用次数: 0

Associative Inferential Transitions, or One Problem with Siegel’s Response Hypothesis 联想推理转换，或西格尔反应假说的一个问题

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-15 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00632-8

Ilia Patronnikov

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引用次数: 0

Is There a Disappearing Agent Problem for Agent Causalists? Agent因果论存在消失的Agent问题吗？

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-14 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00633-7

Robin T. Bianchi, Antoine Taillard

引用次数: 0

Causality and Reliability 因果关系和可靠性

IF 0.2 3区文学

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2025-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00634-6

Yingying Tang, Lei Zhong

引用次数: 0

Deontic Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem 道义上的推诿和错误的理由问题