{"title":"不可能知道断言的悖论","authors":"Rafał Palczewski, Patryk Popławski","doi":"10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We show that taking together the principle <i>‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’</i> (OIC) and <i>The Knowledge Norm of Assertion</i> (KNA) leads to a contradiction as long as we assume that there are situations in which we ought to assert what we cannot know. We call this <i>The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion</i> (PIKA) and argue that this is a genuine problem. At the end, we point out a generalization of PIKA.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":44390,"journal":{"name":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","volume":"40 3","pages":"455 - 472"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion\",\"authors\":\"Rafał Palczewski, Patryk Popławski\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We show that taking together the principle <i>‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’</i> (OIC) and <i>The Knowledge Norm of Assertion</i> (KNA) leads to a contradiction as long as we assume that there are situations in which we ought to assert what we cannot know. We call this <i>The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion</i> (PIKA) and argue that this is a genuine problem. At the end, we point out a generalization of PIKA.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44390,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition\",\"volume\":\"40 3\",\"pages\":\"455 - 472\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"文学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-024-00613-3","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that taking together the principle ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ (OIC) and The Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) leads to a contradiction as long as we assume that there are situations in which we ought to assert what we cannot know. We call this The Paradox of Impossible to Know Assertion (PIKA) and argue that this is a genuine problem. At the end, we point out a generalization of PIKA.
期刊介绍:
Acta Analytica is an international journal for philosophy in the analytical tradition covering a variety of philosophical topics including philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Special attention is devoted to cognitive science. The journal aims to promote a rigorous, argument-based approach in philosophy. Acta Analytica is a peer reviewed journal, published quarterly, with authors from all over the world.