Descartes vs. the Scholastics: Lessons from Contemporary Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience

IF 0.3 3区文学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Pub Date : 2022-10-21 DOI:10.1007/s12136-022-00536-x

Yakir Levin

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Abstract

The demise of the scholastic worldview and the rise of the mechanistic one may give the impression of a parallel demise of the scholastic explanatory framework. In this paper, I argue that this impression is wrong. To this end, I first outline Descartes’ representative and particularly sharp mechanistic criticism of the scholastic notion of explanation. Deploying conceptual machinery from contemporary philosophy of science, I then suggest a reconstruction of the scholastic notion that is immune to Descartes’ criticism. Based on this reconstruction, I reinterpret the dispute between Descartes and the scholastics as one that concerns the extent of two legitimate conceptions of explanation. Finally, I outline a contemporary dispute within cognitive neuroscience that reflects the Cartesian-scholastic one as thus reinterpreted, thereby showing that aspects of the world may well require a scholastic-like approach for their explanation. The aim of this paper, then, is to shed light on a most important philosophical-cum-scientific historical controversy from a modern perspective, but also to highlight the deep historical roots of a related contemporary dispute. Based on this, the paper also seeks to draw a substantial philosophical conclusion concerning the issue under dispute in both controversies.

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笛卡尔与经院哲学家:来自当代哲学和认知神经科学的教训

学院派世界观的消亡和机械论世界观的兴起可能会给人一种学院派解释框架同时消亡的印象。在本文中，我认为这种印象是错误的。为此，我首先概述了笛卡尔对学院派解释概念的代表性和特别尖锐的机械论批评。利用当代科学哲学的概念机制，我建议重建不受笛卡尔批判影响的学术概念。基于这种重构，我将笛卡尔与经院哲学家之间的争论重新解释为一种涉及两种合理解释概念的程度的争论。最后，我概述了认知神经科学中的一个当代争论，它反映了笛卡尔学派的争论，因此被重新解释，从而表明世界的各个方面很可能需要一种类似学术的方法来解释。因此，本文的目的是从现代的角度来阐明一个最重要的哲学和科学的历史争议，同时也突出了一个相关的当代争议的深刻历史根源。在此基础上，本文还试图对两场争论中的争议问题得出一个实质性的哲学结论。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.20

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Acta Analytica is an international journal for philosophy in the analytical tradition covering a variety of philosophical topics including philosophical logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Special attention is devoted to cognitive science. The journal aims to promote a rigorous, argument-based approach in philosophy. Acta Analytica is a peer reviewed journal, published quarterly, with authors from all over the world.