{"title":"Victimhood Without Personhood.","authors":"Johnny Sakr","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2026.2657651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2026.2657651","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>New York's Reproductive Health Act 2019 (RHA) reshaped the legal treatment of pregnancy-loss violence by confining homicide to the death of a \"person\" and removing earlier provisions that integrated certain late-term abortion and abortive offences into the homicide framework. This article traces New York's statutory development from the 1965 Penal Law to the RHA and uses the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act 2004 (UVVA) as a comparator. It argues that the apparent tension between abortion permissibility and fetal-protection liability is better explained by jurisdictional triggers and consent-based gating than by fetal personhood. After the RHA, New York generally channels pregnancy-loss harm through offences against the mother. In contrast, the UVVA can create a consent-gated two-victim structure for specified federal crimes while exempting consensual abortion and medical treatment. Bioethically, these victim categories function as governance tools protecting women's decisional authority without resolving fetal moral status.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147646699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OnlyFans and Deep Fake Porn - Can We Accept the Former but Condemn the Latter?","authors":"Joona Räsänen","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2610910","DOIUrl":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2610910","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Many people think that producing online pornography, such as creating sexual content at OnlyFans, is permissible. Many of the same people also think that creating deepfake pornography without or against the consent of the person is wrong. I argue that accepting online sex work is inconsistent with judging pornographic deepfakes as worse than non-pornographic deepfakes. This claim resembles similarity with a broader problem in sexual ethics raised by David Benatar. I apply Benatar's argument in the context of online sexual activities to highlight the ethical issues recent technological developments raise. I do this neither as a case against the permissibility of online sex work nor as a defense of pornographic deep fakes. The purpose is to point out the inconsistency. One could avoid the problem by extending or limiting the range of permissible sexual practices online. But if I am right, we cannot both accept OnlyFans and condemn non-consensual pornographic deep fakes.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"55-65"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146120621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Morality of Incentivising Organ Donations from Prisoners.","authors":"Timothy Kirschenheiter","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2610916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2025.2610916","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Any programme that runs the risk of mistreating already-marginalized persons deserves significant moral scrutiny. So, when a proposal was put forth in the Massachusetts state legislature that would incentivise organ donations from prisoners, it was quite reasonable for the initial reaction to be against the proposal. However, does this initial reaction survive moral analysis? In this paper, I argue that it can be morally permissible to implement programmes that incentivise organ donations from prisoners. I reach this conclusion by considering eight objections against this proposal, offering three reasons in favour of it, and then giving three guidelines for the permissible implementation of these programmes. Still, I conclude that the permissible implementation of these programmes would need to also include the input of many others, including prisoners and those who advocate for them.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"32 1","pages":"39-54"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147500125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Human Flourishing & Christian Hippocratism: A Philosophical & Theological Approach to Healthcare & the Good of the Patient.","authors":"Jesse Michael Kay","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2610886","DOIUrl":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2610886","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Bioethics has long been concerned with human flourishing. With advances in healthcare, science, and technology, different accounts of flourishing have been proposed. Furthermore, societal changes and organizational statements have led to the overemphasis of health in human flourishing and patient autonomy, which have resulted in consumeristic medicine. Some have noted that health may be the ultimate good of the patient, while this manuscript argues that there is a need for a return to a philosophy of healthcare grounded in a teleology of humanity seen in philosophical and religious accounts of human flourishing and health. This manuscript discusses the concepts of human flourishing and health to propose a return to a religious philosophy of healthcare found in Christian Hippocratism. It then briefly applies this framework to abortion and physician-assisted suicide to inform its readers of the implications for those who adhere to particular philosophical or Christian theological convictions.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"14-38"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145913376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Abortion and Infant Mortality: Termination Does Not Prevent Death.","authors":"Nicholas Colgrove, Monica Snyder","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2589634","DOIUrl":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2589634","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Alison Gemmill <i>et al</i>. claim that infant mortality in Texas increased following its 2021 abortion restrictions, and several sources reported that abortion restrictions harm infants. This is misleading. Gemmill <i>et al</i>.'s findings show that infant deaths increased primarily because abortion for \"congenital anomalies\" decreased, and a subset of those subjects died in infancy. In other words, infant mortality rose because fetal mortality fell. By analogy, one can reduce teenage deaths by causing deaths before age thirteen, but this does not save lives. Likewise, abortion restrictions may lead to more infants dying (since fewer subjects are aborted), but this does not imply that abortion restrictions harm infants. The opposite seems true. We argue that it is reasonable to regard Texas's abortion restrictions as a net benefit for infants. We also highlight ableist assumptions surrounding Gemmill <i>et al</i>.'s study and call for bipartisan efforts to support people with disabilities and their families.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145994612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ethical challenges of using artificial intelligence in suicide prevention: a literature review.","authors":"Liliana Mondragón-Barrios, Gladys Inés Bustamante Cabrera, Myrna Marti, Agueda Muñoz Del Carpio Toia","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2026.2620302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2026.2620302","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is a tool that could provide useful prevention strategies for people at risk of suicide. However, there are many ethical challenges regarding sensitive or confidential data in the use of AI<i>.</i> This article identifies ethical issues in the use of AI for suicide prevention, analyzed from a mental health perspective and the current Durkheimian approach. A non-systematic review of the literature and a critical analysis of the information were carried out. Data employed for suicide prevention using AI are obtained for other purposes, including untargeted surveys without explicit informed consent, chatbot clinical care records, and non-standardized medical records, which may lead to inappropriate use of information<i>.</i> The use of AI in suicide prevention requires consideration of ethical data management, and issues such as informed consent, privacy, and respect for dignity and autonomy, and must be analyzed in light of social and behavioural transformations.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"1-19"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147311024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Making a Success of Life: 'Human Flourishing' and Healthcare.","authors":"Joshua Hordern","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2026.2620356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2026.2620356","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article considers rival views of flourishing and their significance for healthcare, compassion and professional practice. It argues that 'making a success of life' is ultimately not in our hands and so criticises quasi-Aristotelian interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount that call for an intentional formation and achievement of virtuous character as a condition of flourishing. Close attention is paid to the moral concepts and instruction arising from the Psalms and the beatitudes of Matthew's gospel. Civic, economic and biotechnological dimensions of healthcare are explored through study of the beatitudes, guided by William Tyndale, John Wesley, Martin Luther King Jr and Rebekah Eklund, and against the background of divine providential and eschatological agency. What making a success of life means for healthcare is identified by attention to covetousness, arrogance, distinguishing good and evil, discerning the presence of God among healthcare staff and patients, contending with societal violence and whistleblowing.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"1-31"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146144049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patient as Citizen: Pluralism, Persuasion, and Liberal Politics.","authors":"Dallas Gingles","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2026.2620355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2026.2620355","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The tyranny of compassion is a consequence of defaulting to the model of patient as citizen. Borrowed from Rawls's liberalism, this is the notion that everyone should be free and equal. Hordern's attempt to recover compassion is an attempt to recover a fuller account of the political person - the citizen - as more, not less, than free and equal. The physician enters into a covenantal relationship of reciprocity with the patient, enabling persuasion beyond just shared decision making. This sort of relationship has implications not only for the clinic, but also as a potential source of repair in the broader political sphere.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146087261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher A Bobier, Adam Omelianchuk, Daniel Rodger, Daniel Hurst
{"title":"Public Health, Xenozoonosis, and the Right to Withdraw from Long Term Xenotransplant Biosurveillance.","authors":"Christopher A Bobier, Adam Omelianchuk, Daniel Rodger, Daniel Hurst","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2572255","DOIUrl":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2572255","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Is it ethically defensible to remove xenotransplant recipients' right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance on grounds of theoretically possible but potentially excessive third-party risk? Some think so arguing that to protect public health from potential infectious diseases originating in the xenograft, xenotransplant recipients should not be allowed to withdraw from long term biosurveillance. We present a dilemma for this view: if xenotransplant research poses such significant risk to public health as to warrant the requirement that xenotransplant recipients voluntarily waive their right to withdraw, then the research warrants long term quarantine. If the risk is not so great as to require long term quarantine, however, then individuals should not have to forfeit this right in order to participate in xenotransplant research. Either way, xenotransplant recipients should not be required to waive their right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"75-85"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145287211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reaffirming the moral and legal significance of birth: a critical response to Giubilini and Minerva.","authors":"Johnny Sakr","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2602377","DOIUrl":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2602377","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article offers a sustained philosophical and legal critique of Giubilini and Minerva's controversial thesis in 'After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?' The authors argue that newborns, like foetuses, lack full moral status and that infanticide may be ethically permissible in circumstances analogous to abortion. This response challenges that view on three grounds: (1) conceptually, the claim that birth is morally irrelevant is inconsistent with established theories of moral worth rooted in potentiality and the value of a future-like-ours; (2) legally, neonates acquire personhood at birth in both domestic and international legal systems, making their killing unlawful; and (3) ethically, societal practices and intuitions clearly ascribe value and rights to newborns, regardless of developmental stage. The article concludes that the thesis of after-birth abortion is ethically indefensible and legally untenable.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"108-119"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145805984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}