{"title":"Sharing Vulnerabilities in the Woman Patient/Doctor Encounter","authors":"J. Herring","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2072262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2072262","url":null,"abstract":"This article is an examination of the doctor–woman patient encounter through a vulnerability lens. This relationship has been traditionally been critiqued as a paternalistic encounter in which the remedy was to recognize the patient’s rights of autonomy. In this article, it is suggested that a more helpful approach is to recognize the vulnerability of both the patient and doctor. This encourages an interaction that involves seeking a mutual and collaborative response to the issues facing the patient.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"223 - 237"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47751010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Killing and Impairing Fetuses.","authors":"Prabhpal Singh","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2030507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2030507","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Could it be that if a fetus is not a person abortion is still immoral? One affirmative answer comes in the form of 'The Impairment Argument', which utilizes 'The Impairment Principle' to argue that abortion is immoral even if fetuses lack personhood. I argue 'The Impairment Argument' fails. It is not adequately defended from objections, and abortion is, in fact, a counterexample to the impairment principle. Furthermore, it explains neither what the wrong-making features of abortion are nor what features of fetuses ground their supposed moral significance. By presupposing the fetus lacks personhood and providing no alternate account of the basis of fetuses' moral significance, there is nothing to constitute abortion's wrongness. Attempts to modify it fail for the same reasons. Thus, the impairment argument fails to show abortion is immoral.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 2","pages":"127-138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39591435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Feminine Body and the Culture of Care","authors":"M. Rodriguez","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2067626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2067626","url":null,"abstract":"Can we speak of a feminine approach to caring for the body? If there is such an approach, how does culture influence or even construct it? Do we need a new culture of care in the medical field? What can a woman’s contribution be to transform culture in this area? In this analysis, I take the human body and its way of being in the world as my starting point, so that we could speak, using Sartrean terminology, of a ‘psychical body’. Then I consider the symbiosis that occurs during pregnancy, and I speak of it as a ‘relational modality’, that gives an ‘existential orientation’ to women, whether or not they are biological mothers. Finally, I show some implications of this relational modality for the culture of care.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"199 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41389295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The sentience shift in animal research","authors":"Heather Browning, W. Veit","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2077681","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2077681","url":null,"abstract":"One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition of the presence of sentience in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"299 - 314"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45752192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Embodied trauma and healing: critical conversations on the concept of health","authors":"A. Sloane","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2076297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2076297","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"377 - 379"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45428692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The right to choose to abort an abortion: should pro-choice advocates support abortion pill reversal?","authors":"M. Pruski, Dominic Whitehouse, S. Bow","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2073857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2073857","url":null,"abstract":"Abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment aims to halt an initiated medical abortion, wherein a pregnant woman takes progesterone after having taken the first of the two consecutive abortion pills, typically because she has changed her mind and no longer wants to abort the pregnancy. It is a controversial intervention, generally supported by those identifying as pro-life and opposed by those identifying as pro-choice. This paper examines whether, in principle, those identifying with the pro-choice view should support APR. We firstly examine the commitments of the pro-choice stance. We then briefly outline the evidence supporting the APR. Following this, we discuss potential consequences of APR on women’s mental health and its safety. We conclude that those espousing the pro-choice standpoint should be, in principle, committed to supporting the availability of APR, while recognising that data on its efficacy may be difficult to obtain.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"252 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42769204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Love, Dying Alone, and Community","authors":"Thana C. de Campos-Rudinsky","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2067625","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2067625","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the problem of dying alone in the context of no-visitors hospital policy during the COVID-19 pandemic. It critically analyses a rights-based solution, offering a democratized visitors policy alternative, premised on the value of legal justice. While an inclusive, participatory, and thoroughly justified visitors' policy, which takes into account the good of all stakeholders in the process, is indeed the right alternative to the paternalistic, top-down no-visitors policy, I argue that the democratized visitors' policy alternative ought to be grounded on reasons of both justice and love. Legal justice and claimable individual rights, though important, are limited and cannot fully capture the vicissitudes of mutual vulnerabilities and the moral stringency of duties of mutual care. In the context of suffering and death, instances of extreme vulnerability and interdependence, individual rights of autonomy and self-determination prove insufficient to meet our most basic needs for love, human presence, and accompaniment.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"238 - 251"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47839523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Love as a Journey in the Informed Consent Context: Legal Abortion in England and Wales as a Case Study","authors":"C. Milo","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2067627","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2067627","url":null,"abstract":"The right to informed consent (IC), as established in the Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, I claim involves a ‘journey of love’ between clinicians and patients. The latter entails a process of dialogue and support between the parties, concerning disclosure of risks, benefits and alternatives to medical treatment(s). In this paper, I first claim that IC, in the light of the spirit of Montgomery, is predicated upon two pillars, namely patients’ autonomy and medical partnership. I will then explore a case study: the case of legal abortion in England and Wales. Regarding this case, the progressive reduction of medical involvement has meant that little opportunity has been provided for this ‘journey’ to be unpacked in a medical context. I will ultimately claim that more needs to be done to safeguard IC as a ‘journey of love’ through valuing both patients’ autonomy and medical partnership.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"208 - 222"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45677672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Losing our Dignity: How Secularized Medicine is Undermining Fundamental Human Equality","authors":"B. Blackshaw","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2069318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2069318","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"380 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48799345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why inconsistency arguments fail: a response to Shaw","authors":"B. Blackshaw, Nick Colgrove, D. Rodger","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2022.2070960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2022.2070960","url":null,"abstract":"Opponents of abortion are commonly said to be inconsistent in their beliefs or actions, and to fail in their obligations to prevent the deaths of embryos and fetuses from causes other than induced abortion. We have argued that these ‘inconsistency arguments’ conform to a pattern which is susceptible to a number of objections, and that consequently they fail en masse. In response, Joshua Shaw argues that we misrepresent inconsistency arguments, and that we underestimate the extent to which our opponents have anticipated and addressed counterarguments. In this essay we draw on aspects of Shaw’s alternative formulation of inconsistency arguments to present an improved inconsistency argument structure. While we agree with Shaw that inconsistency arguments must each be examined on their merits, we reject Shaw’s assertion that our objections are dependent on misrepresentations. Our initial objections remain largely successful, therefore, in dealing with the inconsistency arguments of which we are aware.","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":"28 1","pages":"139 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43475581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}