对未来的过度概括就像我们的论点。

IF 1.5 Q2 ETHICS
Joe Slater
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引用次数: 0

摘要

唐·马奎斯(Don Marquis)提出的“未来如我们”(FLO)论点,仍然是反对普遍允许堕胎的最具说服力的论点之一。马奎斯意识到人们担心他的论点过于笼统,但他认为,通过要求有可能指定被剥夺权利的个人,他就能够克服这些问题。在本文中,我认为马奎斯的描述过于笼统。为了做到这一点,我证明拥有一个像我们一样的未来(FLO)必须被理解为拥有一个有利环境下的FLO。然而,一旦有利的环境条件暴露出来,人工增强低等动物的可能性将导致这些动物——以及这些动物的胎儿——也会有FLOs。这种过度概括使得“像我们一样的未来”论点的捍卫者接受了一些看似不可信的结论,许多人明确拒绝了这些结论。我认为FLO的论点应该被拒绝。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Overgeneralization of the Future Like Ours Argument.

The Future Like Ours (FLO) argument, provided by Don Marquis remains one of the most persuasive arguments against the general permissibility of abortion. Marquis is aware of concerns that his argument overgeneralizes, but thinks by requiring that it is possible to specify individuals who are deprived, he is able to overcome them. In this paper, I argue that Marquis' account does overgeneralize. To do this I demonstrate that having an FLO (Future Like Ours) must be understood as having an FLO in favourable circumstances. However, once the favourable circumstances caveat is exposed, the possibility of artificial enhancement of lower order animals would entail that those animals - and the fetuses of those animals - would also have FLOs. This overgeneralization commits the defender of the Future Like Ours argument to accept conclusions that seem independently implausible and which many explicitly reject. I argue that the FLO argument should instead be rejected.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
16.70%
发文量
45
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