Public Health, Xenozoonosis, and the Right to Withdraw from Long Term Xenotransplant Biosurveillance.

Abstract

Is it ethically defensible to remove xenotransplant recipients' right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance on grounds of theoretically possible but potentially excessive third-party risk? Some think so arguing that to protect public health from potential infectious diseases originating in the xenograft, xenotransplant recipients should not be allowed to withdraw from long term biosurveillance. We present a dilemma for this view: if xenotransplant research poses such significant risk to public health as to warrant the requirement that xenotransplant recipients voluntarily waive their right to withdraw, then the research warrants long term quarantine. If the risk is not so great as to require long term quarantine, however, then individuals should not have to forfeit this right in order to participate in xenotransplant research. Either way, xenotransplant recipients should not be required to waive their right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance.