{"title":"The Overgeneralization of the Future Like Ours Argument.","authors":"Joe Slater","doi":"10.1080/20502877.2025.2483588","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Future Like Ours (FLO) argument, provided by Don Marquis remains one of the most persuasive arguments against the general permissibility of abortion. Marquis is aware of concerns that his argument overgeneralizes, but thinks by requiring that it is possible to specify <i>individuals</i> who are deprived, he is able to overcome them. In this paper, I argue that Marquis' account <i>does</i> overgeneralize. To do this I demonstrate that <i>having</i> an FLO (Future Like Ours) must be understood as having an FLO <i>in favourable circumstances</i>. However, once the favourable circumstances caveat is exposed, the possibility of artificial enhancement of lower order animals would entail that those animals - and the fetuses of those animals - would also have FLOs. This overgeneralization commits the defender of the Future Like Ours argument to accept conclusions that seem independently implausible and which many explicitly reject. I argue that the FLO argument should instead be rejected.</p>","PeriodicalId":43760,"journal":{"name":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","volume":" ","pages":"1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"New Bioethics-A Multidisciplinary Journal of Biotechnology and the Body","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2025.2483588","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The Future Like Ours (FLO) argument, provided by Don Marquis remains one of the most persuasive arguments against the general permissibility of abortion. Marquis is aware of concerns that his argument overgeneralizes, but thinks by requiring that it is possible to specify individuals who are deprived, he is able to overcome them. In this paper, I argue that Marquis' account does overgeneralize. To do this I demonstrate that having an FLO (Future Like Ours) must be understood as having an FLO in favourable circumstances. However, once the favourable circumstances caveat is exposed, the possibility of artificial enhancement of lower order animals would entail that those animals - and the fetuses of those animals - would also have FLOs. This overgeneralization commits the defender of the Future Like Ours argument to accept conclusions that seem independently implausible and which many explicitly reject. I argue that the FLO argument should instead be rejected.