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Journal of Dynamics and Games最新文献

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Market games and walrasian equilibria 市场博弈与瓦尔拉斯均衡
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2020004
Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García
{"title":"Market games and walrasian equilibria","authors":"Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020004","url":null,"abstract":"In this work, we recapitulate and compare the market game approaches provided by Shapley and Shubik [ 35 ] and Schmeidler [ 33 ]. We provide some extensions to economies with infinitely many commodities and point out some applications and lines for future research.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70032946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Solow-Swan model with endogenous population growth 人口内生增长的索洛-斯旺模型
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2020014
G. Cayssials, S. Picasso
{"title":"The Solow-Swan model with endogenous population growth","authors":"G. Cayssials, S. Picasso","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020014","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a reformulation of the classical Solow-Swan growth model where a dynamic of the endogenous population is incorporated. In our model, the population growth rate continually depends on per capita consumption. We find that – as in the classic Solow-Swan model – there is a steady state for the capital-labour ratio, which is always lower than that deduced from the original model with zero population growth rate, but it is not necessarily unique. Under certain conditions, there is an odd amount, and only the smallest and the largest are locally stable. Finally, a study of comparative static of stationary states is performed by varying the total factor productivity, and the results are compared with those of the original model. It is found that the effects of exogenous variables on endogenous variables differ from the original model.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70033500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Behavior-based pricing in service differentiated industries 服务差异化行业的行为定价
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2020027
D. Ma, Hua-ming Song
{"title":"Behavior-based pricing in service differentiated industries","authors":"D. Ma, Hua-ming Song","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020027","url":null,"abstract":"Firms often upgrade service level to enhance their profitability, which leads to competing firms at service disadvantages using behavior-based pricing (BBP) strategy to fight back. The interaction between service differentiation and BBP affects the profits of both competitors. In order to explore the impact of BBP on the competition of firms with service differentiation, we use game theory method to construct a two-period dynamic pricing model. We explore the optimal BBP strategy by comparing and analyzing firms sub-game equilibrium profits. The main conclusions are as follows: (ⅰ) the degree of service differentiation and the relative service cost interact to influence firms optimal pricing strategy. Specifically, when the degree of service differentiation is low (high) and the relative service cost is small (large), both firms do not adopt (adopt) BBP. When the degree of service differentiation is low (high) but the relative service cost is large (small), competing firms have mixed strategic Nash equilibrium, and both firms have a certain probability to adopt BBP. (ⅱ) BBP can help low-service firms to make up for the profits loss caused by the service disadvantage under certain conditions. However, it can lead to fierce price competition, which will damage the profits of both.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70034032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Game theoretical modelling of a dynamically evolving network Ⅱ: Target sequences of score 1 动态演化网络的博弈论建模Ⅱ:得分1的目标序列
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2020003
C. Cannings, M. Broom
{"title":"Game theoretical modelling of a dynamically evolving network Ⅱ: Target sequences of score 1","authors":"C. Cannings, M. Broom","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020003","url":null,"abstract":"In previous work we considered a model of a population where individuals have an optimum level of social interaction, governed by a graph representing social connections between the individuals, who formed or broke those links to achieve their target number of contacts. In the original work an improvement in the number of links was carried out by breaking or joining to a randomly selected individual. In the most recent work, however, these actions were often not random, but chosen strategically, and this led to significant complications. One of these was that in any state, multiple individuals might wish to change their number of links. In this paper we consider a systematic analysis of the structure of the simplest class of non-trivial cases, where in general only a single individual has reason to make a change, and prove some general results. We then consider in detail an example game, and introduce a method of analysis for our chosen class based upon cycles on a graph. We see that whilst we can gain significant insight into the general structure of the state space, the analysis for specific games remains difficult.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70032813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Mean-field games and swarms dynamics in Gaussian and non-Gaussian environments 高斯和非高斯环境下的平均场博弈和群体动力学
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2020001
M. Hongler
{"title":"Mean-field games and swarms dynamics in Gaussian and non-Gaussian environments","authors":"M. Hongler","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020001","url":null,"abstract":"The collective behaviour of stochastic multi-agents swarms driven by Gaussian and non-Gaussian environments is analytically discussed in a mean-field approach. We first exogenously implement long range mutual interactions rules with strengths that are weighted by the real-time distance separating each agent with the swarm barycentre. Depending on the form of this barycentric modulation, a transition between two drastically different collective behaviours can be unveiled. A behavioural bifurcation threshold due to the tradeoff between the desynchronisation effects of the stochastic environment and the synchronising interactions is analytically calculated. For strong enough interactions, the emergence of a soliton propagating wave is established. Alternatively, weaker interactions cannot overcome the environmental noise and evanescent diffusive waves result. In a second and complementary approach, we show that the emergent solitons can alternatively be interpreted as being the optimal equilibrium of mean-field games (MFG) models with ad-hoc running cost functions which are here exactly determined. These MFG's soliton equilibria are therefore endogenously generated. Hence for the classes of models here proposed, an explicit correspondence between exogenous and endogenous interaction rules leading to similar collective effects is explicitly constructed. For non-Gaussian environments our results offer a new class of exactly solvable mean-field games dynamics.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70033228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Network ANOVA random effects models for node attributes 节点属性的网络方差分析随机效应模型
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2020017
Gabriel Montes-Rojas, P. Elosegui
{"title":"Network ANOVA random effects models for node attributes","authors":"Gabriel Montes-Rojas, P. Elosegui","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2020017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2020017","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a subgraph network random effects error components structure for network data to perform analysis of variance. In particular, it proposes a model for evaluating the network interdependence of nodes attributes allowing for edge and triangle specific components. The latter serve as a basal model for modeling more general network effects. Consistent estimators of the variance components and Lagrange Multiplier specification tests for evaluating the appropriate model of random components in networks structures is proposed. Monte Carlo simulations show that the tests have good performance in finite samples. The proposed tests is applied to the unsecured (Call) interbank market network in Argentina.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70033726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
From mean field games to the best reply strategy in a stochastic framework 从平均场对策到随机框架下的最佳对策
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2019-11-11 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2019020
Matt Barker
{"title":"From mean field games to the best reply strategy in a stochastic framework","authors":"Matt Barker","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2019020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2019020","url":null,"abstract":"This paper builds on the work of Degond, Herty and Liu in [ 16 ] by considering begin{document}$ N $end{document} -player stochastic differential games. The control corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of such a game is approximated through model predictive control (MPC) techniques. In the case of a linear quadratic running-cost, considered here, the MPC method is shown to approximate the solution to the control problem by the best reply strategy (BRS) for the running cost. We then compare the MPC approach when taking the mean field limit with the popular mean field game (MFG) strategy. We find that our MPC approach reduces the two coupled PDEs to a single PDE, greatly increasing the simplicity and tractability of the original problem. We give two examples of applications of this approach to previous literature and conclude with future perspectives for this research.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47189351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Spatial competitive games with disingenuously delayed positions 虚假延迟位置的空间竞技游戏
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2019-07-17 DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2019017
M. Soltanolkottabi, D. Ben-Arieh, John Wu
{"title":"Spatial competitive games with disingenuously delayed positions","authors":"M. Soltanolkottabi, D. Ben-Arieh, John Wu","doi":"10.3934/JDG.2019017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/JDG.2019017","url":null,"abstract":"During the last decades, spatial games have received great attention from researchers showing the behavior of populations of players over time in a spatial structure. One of the main factors which can greatly affect the behavior of such populations is the updating scheme used to apprise new strategies of players. Synchronous updating is the most common updating strategy in which all players update their strategy at the same time. In order to be able to describe the behavior of populations more realistically several asynchronous updating schemes have been proposed. Asynchronous game does not use a universal clock and players can update their strategy at different time steps during the play. In this paper, we introduce a new type of asynchronous strategy updating in which some of the players hide their updated strategy from their neighbors for several time steps. It is shown that this behavior can change the behavior of populations but does not necessarily lead to a higher payoff for the dishonest players. The paper also shows that with dishonest players, the average payoff of players is less than what they think they get, while they are not aware of their neighbors' true strategy.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43586684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Discrete mean field games: Existence of equilibria and convergence 离散平均场对策:平衡点的存在性和收敛性
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2019-06-18 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2019016
J. Doncel, Nicolas Gast, B. Gaujal
{"title":"Discrete mean field games: Existence of equilibria and convergence","authors":"J. Doncel, Nicolas Gast, B. Gaujal","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2019016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2019016","url":null,"abstract":"We consider mean field games with discrete state spaces (called discrete mean field games in the following) and we analyze these games in continuous and discrete time, over finite as well as infinite time horizons. We prove the existence of a mean field equilibrium assuming continuity of the cost and of the drift. These conditions are more general than the existing papers studying finite state space mean field games. Besides, we also study the convergence of the equilibria of N -player games to mean field equilibria in our four settings. On the one hand, we define a class of strategies in which any sequence of equilibria of the finite games converges weakly to a mean field equilibrium when the number of players goes to infinity. On the other hand, we exhibit equilibria outside this class that do not converge to mean field equilibria and for which the value of the game does not converge. In discrete time this non- convergence phenomenon implies that the Folk theorem does not scale to the mean field limit.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42155410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27
Cooperative dynamic advertising via state-dependent payoff weights 基于状态相关收益权重的合作动态广告
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2019-05-31 DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2019014
Simon Hoof
{"title":"Cooperative dynamic advertising via state-dependent payoff weights","authors":"Simon Hoof","doi":"10.3934/JDG.2019014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/JDG.2019014","url":null,"abstract":"We consider an infinite horizon cooperative advertising differential game with nontransferable utility (NTU). The values of each firm are parametrized by a common discount rate and advertising costs. First we characterize the set of efficient solutions with a constant payoff weight. We show that there does not exist a constant weight that supports an agreeable cooperative solution. Then we consider a linear state-dependent payoff weight and derive an agreeable cooperative solution for a restricted parameter space.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2019-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42777939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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