Spatial competitive games with disingenuously delayed positions

IF 1.1 Q3 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
M. Soltanolkottabi, D. Ben-Arieh, John Wu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

During the last decades, spatial games have received great attention from researchers showing the behavior of populations of players over time in a spatial structure. One of the main factors which can greatly affect the behavior of such populations is the updating scheme used to apprise new strategies of players. Synchronous updating is the most common updating strategy in which all players update their strategy at the same time. In order to be able to describe the behavior of populations more realistically several asynchronous updating schemes have been proposed. Asynchronous game does not use a universal clock and players can update their strategy at different time steps during the play. In this paper, we introduce a new type of asynchronous strategy updating in which some of the players hide their updated strategy from their neighbors for several time steps. It is shown that this behavior can change the behavior of populations but does not necessarily lead to a higher payoff for the dishonest players. The paper also shows that with dishonest players, the average payoff of players is less than what they think they get, while they are not aware of their neighbors' true strategy.
虚假延迟位置的空间竞技游戏
在过去的几十年里,空间游戏受到了研究人员的极大关注,他们展示了玩家群体在空间结构中随时间变化的行为。可以极大地影响这些群体行为的主要因素之一是用于评估玩家新策略的更新方案。同步更新是最常见的更新策略,所有玩家都在同一时间更新策略。为了能够更真实地描述种群的行为,已经提出了几种异步更新方案。异步游戏不使用通用时钟,玩家可以在游戏过程中的不同时间步长更新策略。在本文中,我们介绍了一种新型的异步策略更新,其中一些参与者将其更新的策略向邻居隐藏几个时间步长。研究表明,这种行为可以改变群体的行为,但不一定会给不诚实的玩家带来更高的回报。论文还表明,对于不诚实的玩家,玩家的平均回报低于他们认为的,而他们并不知道邻居的真实策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Dynamics and Games
Journal of Dynamics and Games MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
26
期刊介绍: The Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG) is a pure and applied mathematical journal that publishes high quality peer-review and expository papers in all research areas of expertise of its editors. The main focus of JDG is in the interface of Dynamical Systems and Game Theory.
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