发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Dynamics and Games最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Risk-sensitive control, single controller games and linear programming 风险敏感控制、单控制器博弈和线性规划
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-10-26 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023024
V. Borkar
{"title":"Risk-sensitive control, single controller games and linear programming","authors":"V. Borkar","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023024","url":null,"abstract":"This article recalls the recent work on a linear programming formulation of infinite horizon risk-sensitive control via its equivalence with a single controller game, using a classic work of Vrieze. This is then applied to a constrained risk-sensitive control problem with a risk-sensitive cost and risk-sensitive constraint. This facilitates a Lagrange multiplier based resolution thereof. In the process, this leads to an unconstrained linear program and its dual, parametrized by a parameter that is a surrogate for Lagrange multiplier. This also opens up the possibility of a primal - dual type numerical scheme wherein the linear program is a subroutine within the subgradient ascent based update rule for the Lagrange multiplier. This equivalent unconstrained risk-sensitive control formulation does not seem obvious without the linear programming equivalents as intermediaries. We also discuss briefly other related algorithmic possibilities for future research.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139313159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Network games and solutions from decomposition techniques 网络游戏和解决方案从分解技术
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023009
J. Sánchez-Pérez
{"title":"Network games and solutions from decomposition techniques","authors":"J. Sánchez-Pérez","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72559820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Self-regulated biological transportation structures with general entropy dissipations, part Ⅰ: The 1D case 具有一般熵耗散的自我调节生物运输结构，部分Ⅰ:一维情况
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023022
Clarissa Astuto, Jan Haskovec, Peter Markowich, Simone Portaro
{"title":"Self-regulated biological transportation structures with general entropy dissipations, part Ⅰ: The 1D case","authors":"Clarissa Astuto, Jan Haskovec, Peter Markowich, Simone Portaro","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023022","url":null,"abstract":"We study self-regulating processes modeling biological transportation networks as presented in [15]. In particular, we focus on the 1D setting for Dirichlet and Neumann boundary conditions. We prove an existence and uniqueness result under the assumption of positivity of the diffusivity $ D $. We explore systematically various scenarios and gain insights into the behavior of $ D $ and its impact on the studied system. This involves analyzing the system with a signed measure distribution of sources and sinks. Finally, we perform several numerical tests in which the solution $ D $ touches zero, confirming the previous hints of local existence in particular cases.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135709289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal economic policy and growth in an open economy 开放经济中的最优经济政策与增长
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023008
E. Casares, M. García-Salazar
{"title":"Optimal economic policy and growth in an open economy","authors":"E. Casares, M. García-Salazar","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023008","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77076684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Turret escape differential game 炮塔逃生微分对策
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023012
Alexander Von Moll, Zachariah Fuchs, Daigo Shishika, Dipankar Maity, Michael Dorothy, Meir Pachter
{"title":"Turret escape differential game","authors":"Alexander Von Moll, Zachariah Fuchs, Daigo Shishika, Dipankar Maity, Michael Dorothy, Meir Pachter","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023012","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a zero-sum differential game is formulated and solved in which a mobile Evader seeks to escape from within a circle at whose origin lies a stationary, turn-constrained Turret. The scenario is a variant of the famous Lady in the Lake game in which the shore-constrained Pursuer has been replaced with the Turret. As in the former, it is assumed that the Turret's maximum angular rate is greater than the linear velocity of the Evader. Since two outcomes are possible, a Game of Kind arises - either the Evader wins by reaching the perimeter of the circle, or the Turret wins by aligning with the latter's position. A barrier surface partitions the state space into two regions corresponding to these two outcomes and a Game of Degree is solved within each region. The solutions to the Games of Degree are comprised of the Value functions (i.e., the equilibrium value of the cost/utility as a function of the state) and the saddle-point equilibrium control policies for the two players. Like the Lady in the Lake game, the equilibrium policy of the Evader is not uniquely defined where it has angular rate advantage over the Turret. Unlike the Lady in the Lake game, the losing region for the Evader is present for all speed ratios, and there is an additional semi-permeable surface separating center- and shore-bound Evader trajectories. The solution depends heavily upon the speed ratio of the agents; in particular, there are two speed ratio regimes with distinctive solution structures.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135550570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Appraising the convenience of a call-based dynamical hedging strategy for an oil-company 评价石油公司基于看涨期权的动态套期保值策略的便利性
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023015
Claudio RISSO, Juan Piccini, Bernardo Zimberg
{"title":"Appraising the convenience of a call-based dynamical hedging strategy for an oil-company","authors":"Claudio RISSO, Juan Piccini, Bernardo Zimberg","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023015","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a quantitative approach to hedging financial risks associated with changes in international oil prices for companies that import crude oil. The authors utilize the Geometric Brownian Motion model to capture the dynamic behavior of prices over time. To determine the optimal use of Call-options, the authors formulate a linear problem that minimizes the Conditional Value-at-Risk of the distribution of losses relative to the expected budget. The solution to this problem is obtained through a combination of Linear Programming optimization and Monte Carlo simulation. It enables the identification of the best Call-option offer that minimizes the risk of financial losses while staying within budget constraints. The validity of the proposed methodology is demonstrated through detailed examples that showcase its capabilities.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136306276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Empowering of candidates and parties in single term vs re-election schemes 在单一任期与连任计划中赋予候选人和政党权力
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023019
Fernanda Herrera López, David Cantala
{"title":"Empowering of candidates and parties in single term vs re-election schemes","authors":"Fernanda Herrera López, David Cantala","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023019","url":null,"abstract":"Agenda setting is a key feature of political systems. We propose a novel approach to contrast the respective power of candidates and parties when bargaining over agenda, which consists in comparing the simulations of four institutional models: single term with candidates proposing, single term with parties proposing, two-term with candidates proposing and two-term with parties proposing. Valences of candidates and preferences for alternation of voters are two important components of the analysis. Simulations establish that two-term schemes are inefficient, while term limits is a second order component of the agenda setting bargaining, while the offering side is the main component.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135157751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources 共同资源问题的合作
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023010
Jesús Erubiel Ordaz-Cuevas, J. Sánchez-Pérez
{"title":"Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources","authors":"Jesús Erubiel Ordaz-Cuevas, J. Sánchez-Pérez","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79669193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dynamic stability of the set of Nash equilibria in stable stochastic games 稳定随机对策中纳什均衡集的动态稳定性
IF 0.9
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023004
Divya Murali, A. Shaiju
{"title":"Dynamic stability of the set of Nash equilibria in stable stochastic games","authors":"Divya Murali, A. Shaiju","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74790398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution 纳税人均匀分配下的合谋博弈模型及影响因素
Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023016
Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian
{"title":"Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution","authors":"Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023016","url":null,"abstract":"Today, tax is the most important and at the same time the most stable source of income for countries and its significant importance indicates that the higher the proportion of taxes to government expenses, the more it remarkably hinders the occurrence of undesirable economic effects. This article addresses the modeling of the game between taxpayers and tax investigating groups in two scenarios - willing and unwilling to collusion - and analyzes the results for each of the two players. Among the most important findings are the inverse relationship between the diagnostic tax function of each group of taxpayers and their declared taxes of the same type, as well as the direct correlation between the diagnostic tax function and the declared taxes of the other group of taxpayers. Furthermore, declared taxes have a direct relationship with tax fine rates, the relevant tax investigating group for the taxpayer, and an inverse correlation with the ratio of the other tax investigating group. If the number of taxpayers increases, the declared taxes of both the willing and unwilling to collusion groups will be equal. The income function of the tax affairs organization is also decreasing toward to the number of willing to collusion taxpayers, the investigating group willing to collusion, and undesirability and increasing toward to the investigating group unwilling to collusion and the increasing number of taxpayers. Finally, it is suggested that the tax affairs organization and relevant tax authorities use the results of this research to neutralize collusion and identify factors influencing diagnostic and declared taxes.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136053980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信