Journal of Dynamics and Games最新文献_第2页

Silvopastoral and agroforestry systems: An integer linear programming model for investment decisions 森林与农林业系统:投资决策的整数线性规划模型

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023013

Rodrigo Conde, Franco Robledo, Agustín López de Lacalle

引用次数: 0

Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution 纳税人均匀分配下的合谋博弈模型及影响因素

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023016

Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian

{"title":"Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution","authors":"Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023016","url":null,"abstract":"Today, tax is the most important and at the same time the most stable source of income for countries and its significant importance indicates that the higher the proportion of taxes to government expenses, the more it remarkably hinders the occurrence of undesirable economic effects. This article addresses the modeling of the game between taxpayers and tax investigating groups in two scenarios - willing and unwilling to collusion - and analyzes the results for each of the two players. Among the most important findings are the inverse relationship between the diagnostic tax function of each group of taxpayers and their declared taxes of the same type, as well as the direct correlation between the diagnostic tax function and the declared taxes of the other group of taxpayers. Furthermore, declared taxes have a direct relationship with tax fine rates, the relevant tax investigating group for the taxpayer, and an inverse correlation with the ratio of the other tax investigating group. If the number of taxpayers increases, the declared taxes of both the willing and unwilling to collusion groups will be equal. The income function of the tax affairs organization is also decreasing toward to the number of willing to collusion taxpayers, the investigating group willing to collusion, and undesirability and increasing toward to the investigating group unwilling to collusion and the increasing number of taxpayers. Finally, it is suggested that the tax affairs organization and relevant tax authorities use the results of this research to neutralize collusion and identify factors influencing diagnostic and declared taxes.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136053980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Understanding the role of the environment on the dynamic of tourism and economic growth: New assumptions in terms of time and population growth rate 了解环境对旅游和经济增长动态的作用:关于时间和人口增长率的新假设

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023007

Pilar Lorenzo, Martín Olivera

引用次数: 0

Optimal investment in a general stochastic factor framework under model uncertainty 模型不确定性下一般随机因子框架下的最优投资

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023011

Ioannis Baltas

{"title":"Optimal investment in a general stochastic factor framework under model uncertainty","authors":"Ioannis Baltas","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023011","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper aims to study a robust-entropic optimal control problem arising in a general stochastic factor model framework. To be more precise, we consider a portfolio manager who has the possibility to invest part of her wealth in a financial market consisting of two assets: a risk-free asset (e.g., bank account) and a risky one (e.g., stock or index). Furthermore, it is assumed that the dynamics of the risky asset depend on some external stochastic factor. Model uncertainty aspects are introduced as the portfolio manager does not fully trust the model she faces, hence she decides to make her decision robust. By employing a mixture of robust control and dynamic programming techniques within a very general framework, we are able to characterize the optimal robust value function and the feedback control law by solving an expected utility maximization problem. In the special case the portfolio manager operates under the exponential utility function, we provide closed form solutions for the optimal investment decision and the optimal value function for an interesting example arising in finance. Finally, we present a numerical example of our results with special focus given on the impact of robustness on the optimal decision of the portfolio manager.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135494622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Two characterizations of cost share equilibria 成本分担均衡的两个特征

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023002

M. Graziano, Marialaura Pesce, M. Romaniello

引用次数: 0

Producer behavior with rules of origin 生产者行为与原产地规则

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023006

Laura Díaz, J. Sempere

引用次数: 0

Characteristic functions in cooperative differential games on networks 网络上合作微分对策的特征函数

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023017

Leon Petrosyan, David Yeung, Yaroslavna Pankratova

{"title":"Characteristic functions in cooperative differential games on networks","authors":"Leon Petrosyan, David Yeung, Yaroslavna Pankratova","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023017","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper, a class of cooperative differential games on networks is considered. In such games, the new characteristic function is introduced based on the possibility of stopping interaction by players outside the coalition in each time instant or imposing sanction on players from the coalition. This gives the real possibility for the computation of characteristic function. Thus, the characteristic function is evaluated along the cooperative trajectory. It measures the worth of coalitions under the process of cooperation instead of under minimax confrontation or the Nash non-cooperative stance. The approach essentially simplifies the construction of the characteristic function and cooperative solutions such as the Shapley value, Core, $ tau $-value and others. Also, it is proved that the proposed characteristic function is convex, time consistent, and as a result, the Shapley value belongs to the Core and is time consistent. Also, a modification of the dynamic game on networks, namely, dynamic network game with partner sets is considered. In this case, payoffs of a given player depend on his actions and the actions of the players from his partner set. Using previous ideas, the special type of characteristic function is introduced, and cooperative solutions are proposed.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135009466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Salah-Mohammad triangular distribution Curve is an Alternative to the Laffer curve 萨拉赫-穆罕默德三角分布曲线是拉弗曲线的另一种选择

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023021

Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian

{"title":"Salah-Mohammad triangular distribution Curve is an Alternative to the Laffer curve","authors":"Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian","doi":"10.3934/jdg.2023021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023021","url":null,"abstract":"Today, financing the government's expenses through taxes is the main and, at the same time, the most stable method, with the least negative economic consequences, stabilizing the economy by adopting optimal policies in recession and inflation conditions. The costs for the government have increased due to the extent of the government's obligations in the economic and social fields, requiring the implementation of ways to increase tax revenues and obtain resources to cover these costs. This paper deals with modeling the game between the taxpayers and the tax administration to achieve the factors affecting the optimal performance tax rate and determine the optimal performance tax rate. Assuming that the income of the tax affairs organization (government) is distributed triangularly in the interval [0, 1], and the quality of the investigating group is not known to the taxpayers, the proposed game is solved, and theorems are presented. The results showed that the income of the tax affairs organization had an inverse relationship with investigation costs and a direct relationship with the fines received from the taxpayers. Also, under certain conditions, the income of the tax affairs organization increases with the increase in the quality of the assessment groups. Finally, there was an inverse relationship between the optimal tax rate and the variables of investigating quality and diagnostic tax.","PeriodicalId":42722,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Dynamics and Games","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135263008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Can the indifferent population affect the spread of rumors? 冷漠的人群会影响谣言的传播吗?

IF 0.9

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023005

E. Accinelli, L. Quintas, H. Muñiz, Jorge Zazueta

引用次数: 0

Approximation of deterministic mean field games under polynomial growth conditions on the data 数据多项式增长条件下确定性平均场博弈的逼近

Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.3934/jdg.2023018

Justina Gianatti, Francisco J. Silva, Ahmad Zorkot

引用次数: 1