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The Impact of Defaults on Technology Adoption, and Its Underappreciation by Policymakers 违约对技术采用的影响，以及决策者对其的低估
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3098299
Peter Bergman, Todd Rogers
{"title":"The Impact of Defaults on Technology Adoption, and Its Underappreciation by Policymakers","authors":"Peter Bergman, Todd Rogers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3098299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3098299","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct an experiment to understand how enrollment defaults affect the take up and impact of an education technology. We show that a standard and simplified opt-in process induce low take up. Automatically enrolling parents increases adoption significantly and improves student achievement. Our surveys show automatic enrollment is uncommon because its impact is underestimated: District leaders overestimate take-up under the standard condition by 38 percentage points and underestimate take-up under automatic enrollment by 31 percentage points. After learning the actual take-up rates, there is a 140% increase in willingness to pay for the technology when shifting implementation to automatic enrollment.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126388933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Academic Publication Uncertainty and Publishing Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Perspective 学术出版不确定性与出版行为:一个博弈论的视角
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-11-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2885836
J. Faria, R. Goel
{"title":"Academic Publication Uncertainty and Publishing Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Perspective","authors":"J. Faria, R. Goel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2885836","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2885836","url":null,"abstract":"This paper incorporates publication uncertainty in a game between researchers and journal editors and examines its effects on quantity and quality of published research. A stylized differential Stackelberg game between journal editors and academic authors is considered, where authors seek to maximize satisfaction from publications, while journal editors try to enhance reputations of their journals. Publication probability depends on the number of academic journals. Results show that greater journal competition, generally leading to reduced publication uncertainty, would increase author payoffs by increasing citations and publications. However, it is not clear whether the quality of published research is enhanced. Thus, changes in competition in publishing markets have the potential to exacerbate the quantity-quantity trade offs in research markets.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121279939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Lab in the Field: Measuring Preferences in the Wild 野外实验室:野外偏好测量
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-22 DOI: 10.1016/BS.HEFE.2016.08.003
U. Gneezy, A. Imas
{"title":"Lab in the Field: Measuring Preferences in the Wild","authors":"U. Gneezy, A. Imas","doi":"10.1016/BS.HEFE.2016.08.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/BS.HEFE.2016.08.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125861911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 83
Unleashing Animal Spirits - Self-Control and Overpricing in Experimental Asset Markets 释放动物精神——实验性资产市场的自我控制与过高定价
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-03-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3140254
M. Kocher, Konstantin E. Lucks, David Schindler
{"title":"Unleashing Animal Spirits - Self-Control and Overpricing in Experimental Asset Markets","authors":"M. Kocher, Konstantin E. Lucks, David Schindler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3140254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3140254","url":null,"abstract":"One possible determinant of overpricing on asset markets is a lack of self-control abilities of traders. Self-control is the individual capacity to override or inhibit undesired behavioral tendencies such as impulses and to refrain from acting on them. We implement the first experiment that is able to address a potential causal relationship between self-control abilities and systematic overpricing on financial markets by introducing an exogenous variation of self-control abilities. Our experimental conditions seek to detect some of the channels through which individual self-control problems could transmit into irrational exuberance on the aggregate level. We observe a strong effect of inhibited self-control abilities on market overpricing. Our findings are furthermore robust to reducing self-control abilities only for a moderate share of traders in a market. Low self-control traders engage in more speculative behavior early on, but because others imitate their trading patterns, they do not end up earning less and are not driven out of the market.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"72 5 Pt 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123264149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions 异质竞争者之间的竞争设计:全付费拍卖中平局和出价上限的实验研究
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2766732
Nora Szech
{"title":"Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions","authors":"Nora Szech","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2766732","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2766732","url":null,"abstract":"We revisit the two bidder complete information all-pay auction with bid-caps introduced by Che and Gale (1998), dropping their assumption that tie-breaking must be symmetric. Any choice of tie-breaking rule leads to a different set of Nash equilibria. Compared to the optimal bid-cap of Che and Gale we obtain that in order to maximize the sum of bids, the designer prefers to set a less restrictive bid-cap combined with a tie-breaking rule which slightly favors the weaker bidder. Moreover, the designer is better off breaking ties deterministically in favor of the weak bidder than symmetrically.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114161329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 56
Generosity Across Contexts 跨背景的慷慨
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1969403
Alexander L. Davis, Nadja Jehli, John H. Miller, Roberto A. Weber
{"title":"Generosity Across Contexts","authors":"Alexander L. Davis, Nadja Jehli, John H. Miller, Roberto A. Weber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1969403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1969403","url":null,"abstract":"Extensive research in economics explores generosity in monetary allocations. However, generosity often involves the allocation of non-monetary goods or experiences. Existing evidence suggests that generosity may be higher in such contexts, though no direct comparison exists. Here, we compare generosity in decisions that vary whether allocations are monetary or non-monetary. In two experiments, generosity is significantly higher in non-monetary contexts. Thus, the typical monetary laboratory dictator game may underestimate generosity in many non-laboratory contexts where allocations are non-monetary. We find weaker relationships between individuals’ allocation decisions across monetary and non-monetary contexts than for allocations that hold constant the monetary nature of the context.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115231805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Moral Self-Licensing and the Direct Touch Effect 道德自我许可与直接接触效应
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-01-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2559713
M. Sass, Joachim Weimann
{"title":"Moral Self-Licensing and the Direct Touch Effect","authors":"M. Sass, Joachim Weimann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2559713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2559713","url":null,"abstract":"Repeated experiments with a time span of one week between repetitions are used in order to test two related hypotheses. The first is the moral self-licensing effect, which describes peo-ple’s tendency to allow themselves to act more selfishly on the back of previous prosocial or selfless behavior. The second is the direct touch effect, which describes the difference be-tween experiences perceived directly by the senses and those perceived in a more hypothetical or abstract way. As games in which both effects can be detected we use the standard trust game and the mutual gift-giving game. Preferences were elicited by the strategy method and both games were played with and without feedback information between the waves. In both games, the moral self-licensing effect as well as the direct touch effect could be observed. Fi-nally, we use a solidarity game to check whether these effects also determine behavior in situ-ations with a different social norm. We find that this is not the case.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117195251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Does Instrumental Reciprocity Crowd Out Prosocial Behavior? 工具互惠会排挤亲社会行为吗?
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-11-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2532920
Åshild A. Johnsen, Ola Kvaløy
{"title":"Does Instrumental Reciprocity Crowd Out Prosocial Behavior?","authors":"Åshild A. Johnsen, Ola Kvaløy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2532920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2532920","url":null,"abstract":"In repeated games, it is hard to distinguish true prosocial behavior from strategic instrumental behavior. In particular, a player does not know whether a reciprocal action is intrinsically or instrumentally motivated. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the relationship between intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity by running a two-period repeated trust game. In the ‘strategic treatment’ the subjects know that they will meet twice, while in the ‘non-strategic treatment’ they do not know and hence the second period comes as a surprise. We find that subjects anticipate instrumental reciprocity, and that intrinsic reciprocity is rewarded. In fact, the total level of cooperation, in which trust is reciprocated, is higher in the non-strategic treatment. This indicates that instrumental reciprocity crowds out intrinsic reciprocity: If one takes the repeated game incentives out of the repeated game, one sees more cooperation.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128399693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium 城市长期均衡中的低效择校
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-09-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2506528
U. Kamecke
{"title":"Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium","authors":"U. Kamecke","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2506528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2506528","url":null,"abstract":"We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This advantage vanishes if the participants get to know their priorities before they submit their preferences. Moreover, the mechanism creates artificial social segregation at the cost of the disadvantaged if the school priorities are based on ex ante known (social) differences of the applicants.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129539732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bargaining with Two-Person-Groups - On the Insignificance of the Patient Partner 二人小组议价——论耐心伙伴的无足轻重
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-03-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2232699
O. Kirchkamp, Ulrike Vollstädt
{"title":"Bargaining with Two-Person-Groups - On the Insignificance of the Patient Partner","authors":"O. Kirchkamp, Ulrike Vollstädt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2232699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2232699","url":null,"abstract":"Although many real bargaining situations involve more than two people, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on the two player situation. We study the simplest possible extension: four people (two two-person groups) of different patience bargain with each other. Theoretically, only the more patient member of each group should be relevant for the outcome. The less patient members would agree to any outcome and are, hence, irrelevant. We find, however, that the impact of the patient member can be quite small.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125403074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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