{"title":"异质竞争者之间的竞争设计:全付费拍卖中平局和出价上限的实验研究","authors":"Nora Szech","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2766732","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We revisit the two bidder complete information all-pay auction with bid-caps introduced by Che and Gale (1998), dropping their assumption that tie-breaking must be symmetric. Any choice of tie-breaking rule leads to a different set of Nash equilibria. Compared to the optimal bid-cap of Che and Gale we obtain that in order to maximize the sum of bids, the designer prefers to set a less restrictive bid-cap combined with a tie-breaking rule which slightly favors the weaker bidder. Moreover, the designer is better off breaking ties deterministically in favor of the weak bidder than symmetrically.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"56","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions\",\"authors\":\"Nora Szech\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2766732\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We revisit the two bidder complete information all-pay auction with bid-caps introduced by Che and Gale (1998), dropping their assumption that tie-breaking must be symmetric. Any choice of tie-breaking rule leads to a different set of Nash equilibria. Compared to the optimal bid-cap of Che and Gale we obtain that in order to maximize the sum of bids, the designer prefers to set a less restrictive bid-cap combined with a tie-breaking rule which slightly favors the weaker bidder. Moreover, the designer is better off breaking ties deterministically in favor of the weak bidder than symmetrically.\",\"PeriodicalId\":410550,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"56\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2766732\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2766732","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Designing Contests between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions
We revisit the two bidder complete information all-pay auction with bid-caps introduced by Che and Gale (1998), dropping their assumption that tie-breaking must be symmetric. Any choice of tie-breaking rule leads to a different set of Nash equilibria. Compared to the optimal bid-cap of Che and Gale we obtain that in order to maximize the sum of bids, the designer prefers to set a less restrictive bid-cap combined with a tie-breaking rule which slightly favors the weaker bidder. Moreover, the designer is better off breaking ties deterministically in favor of the weak bidder than symmetrically.
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