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Between Fear Mongers and Samaritans: Does Information Provision Affect Attitudes Towards the Right of Asylum in Germany? 在恐惧贩子和撒玛利亚人之间:信息提供是否影响人们对德国庇护权的态度?
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2023-06-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3644301
B. Hayo, Florian Neumeier
{"title":"Between Fear Mongers and Samaritans: Does Information Provision Affect Attitudes Towards the Right of Asylum in Germany?","authors":"B. Hayo, Florian Neumeier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3644301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644301","url":null,"abstract":"We utilise information experiments embedded in a representative population survey to elicit the German public’s attitude towards the right of asylum. We randomly assign the interviewees to different groups and ‘treat’ each group with different information about the asylum-seekers that came to Germany in 2015 and 2016. The treatments involve information about (i) the total number of asylum-seekers, (ii) the fiscal costs as well as (iii) the potential long-term economic benefits associated with accepting refugees, (iv) the share of Muslim asylum-seekers, and (v) the share of war refugees. We find that providing information about the fiscal costs associated with accepting refugees, and about the share of Muslim refugees, significantly increases the likelihood of opposing the right of asylum by roughly 5 and 7 percentage points, respectively. These effects are more pronounced for middle-income earners and respondents with a low level of education. Deviations of people’s beliefs from the actual numbers provided by the treatments can affect their attitudes: respondents who underestimated the share of Muslim refugees are 18 percentage points more likely to call for abolishing the right of asylum when informed about the actual share.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128960489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks 比赛对非常规性团队任务的有效性
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2023-04-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3887253
Florian Englmaier, Stefan Grimm, Dominik Grothe, David Schindler, S. Schudy
{"title":"The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks","authors":"Florian Englmaier, Stefan Grimm, Dominik Grothe, David Schindler, S. Schudy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3887253","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3887253","url":null,"abstract":"Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams’ identity and social-image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a natural field experiment (n>1,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social-image motivates mainly the top-performing teams. Additional monetary incentives improve all teams’ outcomes without crowding out teams’ willingness to explore or perform similar tasks again.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122947803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Trust, Happiness, and Pro-Social Behavior 信任、快乐和亲社会行为
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2023-03-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3699242
S. Carattini, Matthias Roesti
{"title":"Trust, Happiness, and Pro-Social Behavior","authors":"S. Carattini, Matthias Roesti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3699242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3699242","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper combines several large-scale surveys and empirical strategies to shed new light on the determinants of cooperative behavior. We provide evidence indicating that the level of trust maximizing subjective well-being tends to be above the income maximizing level. Higher trust is also linked to more cooperative and pro-social behaviors, including the private provision of global public goods such as climate change mitigation. Consistent with “warm glow” theories of pro-social behavior, our results indicate that individuals may enjoy being more cooperative than what would lead them to maximize income, which can be reflected in higher levels of subjective well-being.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125534452","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Consumer Loss Aversion and Scale-Dependent Psychological Switching Costs 消费者损失厌恶与规模依赖心理转换成本
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3932021
H. Karle, Heiner Schumacher, Rune Vølund
{"title":"Consumer Loss Aversion and Scale-Dependent Psychological Switching Costs","authors":"H. Karle, Heiner Schumacher, Rune Vølund","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3932021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3932021","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the Salop (1979) model of product differentiation and assume that consumers are uncertain about the qualities and prices of firms’ products. They can inspect all products at zero cost. A share of consumers is expectation-based loss averse. For these consumers, a purchase plan, which involves buying products of varying quality and price with positive probability, creates disutility from gain-loss sensations. Even at modest degrees of loss aversion they may refrain from inspecting all products and choose an individual default that is strictly dominated in terms of surplus. Firms’ strategic behavior exacerbates the scope for this effect. The model generates “scale-dependent psychological switching costs” that increase in the value of the transaction. We find empirical evidence for the predicted association between switching behavior and loss aversion in new survey data.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129602807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory 信念依赖动机与心理博弈论
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3598771
Pierpaolo Battigalli, M. Dufwenberg
{"title":"Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory","authors":"Pierpaolo Battigalli, M. Dufwenberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3598771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3598771","url":null,"abstract":"The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on one’s own or others’ beliefs. It allows for incorporating, for example, emotions, reciprocity, image concerns, and self-esteem in economic analysis. We explain how and why, discussing basic theory, experiments, applied work, and methodology. (JEL C70, D83, D91)","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124175259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 40
Can Charitable Appeals Identify and Exploit Belief Heterogeneity? 慈善呼吁能否识别和利用信仰异质性?
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2022-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3774662
Michalis Drouvelis, Benjamin M. Marx
{"title":"Can Charitable Appeals Identify and Exploit Belief Heterogeneity?","authors":"Michalis Drouvelis, Benjamin M. Marx","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3774662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3774662","url":null,"abstract":"Charitable fundraisers frequently announce giving by others, and research shows that this can increase donations. However, this mechanism may not put information about peers to the most efficient use if it is costly to inform individuals who are indifferent to peer actions or causes some individuals to give less. We investigate whether a simple mechanism without incentives can predict heterogeneity in charitable responses to peer decisions. We elicit beliefs about donations in a baseline solicitation, and in subsequent solicitations we randomly assign information about others’ donations. We find that elicited beliefs are often logically inconsistent and that many subjects fail to update beliefs when treated. However, elicited beliefs can predict heterogeneous treatment effects if individuals are engaged and the information is salient.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131134673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
R Minus G R - G
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.3386/w28002
R. Barro
{"title":"R Minus G","authors":"R. Barro","doi":"10.3386/w28002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w28002","url":null,"abstract":"Long-term data show that the dynamic efficiency condition r>g holds when g is represented by the average growth rate of real GDP if r is the average real rate of return on equity, E(r e ) , but not if r is the risk-free rate, r f . This pattern accords with a simple disaster-risk model calibrated to fit observed equity premia. If Ponzi (chain-letter) finance by private agents and the government are precluded, the equilibrium can feature r f ≤E(g) , a result that does not signal dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, E(r e )>E(g) is required for dynamic efficiency, implied by the model, and consistent with the data. The model satisfies Ricardian Equivalence because, without Ponzi finance by the government, a rise in safe assets from increased public debt is matched by an increase in the safe (that is, certain) present value of liabilities associated with net taxes.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115840191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22
Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: A Gender Experiment 领导选择与领导者不诚实行为:一项性别实验
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3682014
Kerstin Grosch, S. Müller, Holger A. Rau, Lilia Zhurakhovska
{"title":"Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: A Gender Experiment","authors":"Kerstin Grosch, S. Müller, Holger A. Rau, Lilia Zhurakhovska","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3682014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3682014","url":null,"abstract":"Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. Such situations may evoke psychological costs from being dishonest and dismissing higher monetary benefits for others. In a within-subjects experiment, we analyze such a dilemma. We first measure individual dishonest behavior when subjects report the outcome of a die roll, which determines their payoffs. Subsequently, they act as leaders and report payoffs for a group including themselves. In our main treatment, subjects can apply for leadership, whereas in the control treatment, we assign leadership randomly. Results reveal that women behave more dishonestly as leaders while men behave similarly in both the individual and the group decision. For female leaders, we find that sorting into leadership is not related to individual honesty preferences. In the control we find that female leaders do not increase dishonesty. A follow-up study reveals that female leaders become more dishonest after assuming leadership, as they align dishonest behavior with their belief on group members’ honesty preferences.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132967875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On the Causes and Consequences of Deviations from Rational Behavior 论偏离理性行为的前因后果
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-05-26 DOI: 10.5282/UBM/EPUB.73290
Dainis Zegners, U. Sunde, Anthony Strittmatter
{"title":"On the Causes and Consequences of Deviations from Rational Behavior","authors":"Dainis Zegners, U. Sunde, Anthony Strittmatter","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.73290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.73290","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents novel evidence for the prevalence of deviations from rational behavior in human decision making - and for the corresponding causes and consequences. The analysis is based on move-by-move data from chess tournaments and an identification strategy that compares behavior of professional chess players to a rational behavioral benchmark that is constructed using modern chess engines. The evidence documents the existence of several distinct dimensions in which human players deviate from a rational benchmark. In particular, the results show deviations related to loss aversion, time pressure, fatigue, and cognitive limitations. The results also demonstrate that deviations do not necessarily lead to worse performance. Consistent with an important influence of intuition and experience, faster decisions are associated with more frequent deviations from the rational benchmark, yet they are also associated with better performance.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127535170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Flexible Microcredit: Effects on Loan Repayment and Social Pressure 灵活小额信贷:对贷款偿还和社会压力的影响
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3618847
Kristina Czura, Anett John, Lisa Spantig
{"title":"Flexible Microcredit: Effects on Loan Repayment and Social Pressure","authors":"Kristina Czura, Anett John, Lisa Spantig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3618847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3618847","url":null,"abstract":"Flexible repayment schedules allow borrowers to invest in profitable yet risky projects, but practitioners fear they erode repayment morale. We study repayment choices in rigid and flexible loan contracts that allow discretion in repayment timing. To separate strategic repayment choices from repayment capacity given income shocks, we conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with microcredit borrowers in the Philippines. Our design allows us to observe social pressure, which is considered both central to group lending, and excessive in practice. In our rigid benchmark contract, repayment is much higher than predicted under simple payoff maximization. Flexibility reduces high social pressure, but comes at the cost of reduced loan repayment. We present theoretical and empirical evidence consistent with a strong social norm for repayment, which is weakened by the introduction of flexibility. Our results imply that cooperative behavior determined by social norms may erode if the applicability of these norms is not straightforward.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123941546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
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