R Minus G

R. Barro
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引用次数: 22

Abstract

Long-term data show that the dynamic efficiency condition r>g holds when g is represented by the average growth rate of real GDP if r is the average real rate of return on equity, E(r e ) , but not if r is the risk-free rate, r f . This pattern accords with a simple disaster-risk model calibrated to fit observed equity premia. If Ponzi (chain-letter) finance by private agents and the government are precluded, the equilibrium can feature r f ≤E(g) , a result that does not signal dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, E(r e )>E(g) is required for dynamic efficiency, implied by the model, and consistent with the data. The model satisfies Ricardian Equivalence because, without Ponzi finance by the government, a rise in safe assets from increased public debt is matched by an increase in the safe (that is, certain) present value of liabilities associated with net taxes.
R - G
长期数据表明,当g用实际GDP的平均增长率表示时,r为平均实际净资产收益率E(r E),动态效率条件r b> g成立,但当r为无风险利率r f时,动态效率条件r b> g成立。这种模式符合一个简单的灾害风险模型,该模型经过校准以拟合观察到的股权溢价。如果排除私人代理人和政府的庞氏(连锁)融资,则均衡可以具有r f≤E(g)的特征,这一结果并不表明动态无效率。相比之下,动态效率需要E(r E)>E(g),这是模型隐含的,与数据一致。该模型满足李嘉图等价,因为在没有政府的庞氏融资的情况下,公共债务增加带来的安全资产增加,与净税收相关的负债的安全(即确定)现值增加相匹配。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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