CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)最新文献

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How Altruistic is Indirect Reciprocity? - Evidence from Gift-Exchange Games in the Lab 间接互惠有多利他?-来自实验室礼物交换游戏的证据

CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3653947

J. Becker, D. Hopp, Karolin Süß

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引用次数: 0

Polarization in Parliamentary Speach 议会演讲中的两极分化

CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3767690

Jon H. Fiva, O. Nedregård, Henning Øien

引用次数: 1

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