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Selling Dreams: Endogenous Optimism in Lending Markets 出售梦想:借贷市场的内生乐观主义
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-28 DOI: 10.5282/UBM/EPUB.72571
Luc Bridet, Peter Schwardmann
{"title":"Selling Dreams: Endogenous Optimism in Lending Markets","authors":"Luc Bridet, Peter Schwardmann","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.72571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.72571","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, regardless of whether or not she ends up being optimistic in equilibrium. Our model thus helps explain why wishful thinking is not driven out of markets. Second, in line with empirical evidence, a low cost of lending and a booming economy lead to optimism and the widespread collateralization of loans. Third, equilibrium collateral requirements may be inefficiently high.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121871426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Time Pressure and Regret in Sequential Search 顺序搜索中的时间压力与后悔
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-28 DOI: 10.1257/rct.4065-1.0
F. Klimm, M. Kocher, Timm Opitz, S. Schudy
{"title":"Time Pressure and Regret in Sequential Search","authors":"F. Klimm, M. Kocher, Timm Opitz, S. Schudy","doi":"10.1257/rct.4065-1.0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4065-1.0","url":null,"abstract":"Perceived urgency and regret are common in many sequential search processes; for example, sellers often pressure buyers in search of the best offer, both time-wise and in terms of potential regret of forgoing unique purchasing opportunities. Theoretically, these strategies result in anticipated and experienced regret, which systematically affect search behavior and thereby distort optimal search. In addition, urgency may alter decision-making processes and thereby the salience of regret. To understand the empirical relevance of these aspects, we study the causal effects of regret, urgency, and their interaction on search behavior in a pre-registered, theory-based, and well-powered experiment. We find that urgency reduces decision times and perceived decision quality but does not alter search length. Only very inexperienced decision-makers buy earlier when pressured. Anticipated regret does not affect search length (neither with nor without time pressure), while experienced regret leads to systematic adjustments in search length. Thus, we recommend that consumer protection policies should particularly focus on markets with inexperienced first-time buyers.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130954099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance 道德无知的弹性
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000089263
Marta Serra-Garcia, Nora Szech
{"title":"The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance","authors":"Marta Serra-Garcia, Nora Szech","doi":"10.5445/IR/1000089263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5445/IR/1000089263","url":null,"abstract":"Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in policy circles, in which there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In this paper, we study how the demand for moral ignorance responds to monetary incentives and how the demand curve for ignorance reacts to social norm messages. We propose a simple behavioral model in which individuals suffer moral costs when behaving selfishly in the face of moral information. In several experiments, we find that moral ignorance decreases by more than 30 percentage points with small monetary incentives, but we find no significant change with social norm messages, and we document strong persistence of ignorance across moral contexts. Our findings indicate that rather simple messaging interventions may have limited effects on ignorance. In contrast, changes in incentives could be highly effective. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130017175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28
Foundations for Intertemporal Choice 跨期选择的基础
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-03-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3167146
Ali al-Nowaihi, S. Dhami
{"title":"Foundations for Intertemporal Choice","authors":"Ali al-Nowaihi, S. Dhami","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3167146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3167146","url":null,"abstract":"We consider discounted-utility models with a reference stream of outcomes. We provide a common framework for the main empirically supported discount functions in terms of three underlying functions: The delay, speedup and generating functions. Each of the delay and speedup functions can be uniquely elicited from behavior and, hence, can be fitted to the data. These two functions determine whether the discount function is subadditive, additive or superadditive; and whether the discount function exhibits declining, constant or increasing impatience. The third function, the generating function, links the speedup function to the discount function. Our framework nests several important attribute-based models that are typically considered to be in a separate class. We also show that apparent intransitivities of time preferences can be accounted for by framing effects.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127968245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Excessive Herding in the Laboratory: The Role of Intuitive Judgments 实验室中的过度羊群效应:直觉判断的作用
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3140365
C. March, A. Ziegelmeyer
{"title":"Excessive Herding in the Laboratory: The Role of Intuitive Judgments","authors":"C. March, A. Ziegelmeyer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3140365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3140365","url":null,"abstract":"We designed four observational learning experiments to identify the key channels that, along with Bayes-rational inferences, drive herd behavior. In Experiment 1, unobserved, whose actions remain private, learn from the public actions made in turn by subjects endowed with private signals of medium quality. We find that when unobserved face a handful of identical actions that contradict their high quality signals they herd more extensively than predicted by Bayes-rational herding. Deviations from the normative solution result in severe expected losses and unobserved would be better off without the chance to learn from others. When unobserved are endowed with medium quality signals they learn rather successfully from public actions, but they overweight their low quality signals relative to public information. Experiments 2-4 reveal that non-Bayesian updating and informational misinferences are the two channels that drive excessive herding, while the strong (resp. mild) overemphasis on low (resp. medium) quality signals is caused by wrong expectations about others’ strategy. A model of intuitive observational learning accounts for the phenomenon of excessive herding, it captures well herd behavior with medium quality signals, but it fails to predict that the reluctance to contradict private signals is stronger for low than for medium quality.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129368462","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Physical Distance and Cooperativeness Towards Strangers 身体距离和对陌生人的合作
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-01-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3127363
L. Kühl, Nora Szech
{"title":"Physical Distance and Cooperativeness Towards Strangers","authors":"L. Kühl, Nora Szech","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3127363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3127363","url":null,"abstract":"Cooperativeness among genetically unrelated humans remains a major puzzle in the social sciences. We explore the causal impact of physical distance on willingness to help. In a field setting, participants decide about supporting local refugees at the dispense of money to themselves. We vary physical distance only, and keep other factors such as cultural distance fixed. The data shows that an increase in local physical distance decreases willingness to donate. A laboratory experiment confirms this finding. We further explore the causal roles of exposure (in the field) and of larger distances (in the lab) with a total of 475 participants.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128477787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Salience and Online Sales: The Role of Brand Image Concerns 显著性与在线销售:品牌形象关注的作用
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-12-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3119567
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. Köster
{"title":"Salience and Online Sales: The Role of Brand Image Concerns","authors":"Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. Köster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3119567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3119567","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a novel intuition for the observation that many brand manufacturers have restricted their retailers’ ability to resell brand products online. Our approach builds on models of salience according to which price disparities across distribution channels guide a consumer’s attention toward prices and lower her appreciation for quality. Thus, absent vertical restraints, one out of two distortions - a quality or a participation distortion - can arise in equilibrium. The quality distortion occurs if the manufacturer provides either an inefficiently low quality under price salience or an inefficiently high quality in order to prevent price salience. The participation distortion arises as offline sales might be entirely abandoned in order to prevent prices from becoming salient. Both distortions are ruled out if vertical restraints are imposed. As opposed to the current EU legislation that considers a range of vertical restraints as being hardcore restrictions of competition per se, we show that these constraints can be socially desirable if salience effects are taken into account.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115817532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Socio-Economic Gaps in University Enrollment: The Role of Perceived Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Returns 大学招生中的社会经济差距:感知金钱回报和非金钱回报的作用
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-12-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3106691
Teodora Boneva, Christian Rauh
{"title":"Socio-Economic Gaps in University Enrollment: The Role of Perceived Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Returns","authors":"Teodora Boneva, Christian Rauh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3106691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3106691","url":null,"abstract":"To understand the socio-economic enrollment gap in university attendance, we elicit students’ beliefs about the benefits of university education in a sample of 2,540 secondary school students. Our choice model estimates reveal that perceived non-pecuniary benefits explain a large share of the variation in intentions to enroll. Expected job satisfaction, parental approval, and perceptions about social life during the 3-4 years after finishing secondary school are most important. Students with low socio-economic status perceive pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns to be lower. Beliefs explain 48% of the socio-economic gap in intentions to enroll, while perceived non-pecuniary returns alone account for 37%.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125358134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 57
The Limits to Moral Erosion in Markets: Social Norms and the Replacement Excuse 市场道德侵蚀的极限:社会规范与替代借口
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-09-27 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3043728
Björn Bartling, Yagiz Özdemir
{"title":"The Limits to Moral Erosion in Markets: Social Norms and the Replacement Excuse","authors":"Björn Bartling, Yagiz Özdemir","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3043728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3043728","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument \"if I don’t do it, someone else will\" to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the \"replacement excuse\" if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132986287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard 考虑道德风险的机制设计
CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-08-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3036323
Suehyun Kwon
{"title":"Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard","authors":"Suehyun Kwon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3036323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3036323","url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes when the one-stage deviation IC constraints in the usual sense of dynamic mechanism design are sufficient. One can easily construct examples of when they are not sufficient. If the current state or the belief is not a sufficient summary statics of the agent’s private history, the one-stage deviation IC constraints are not sufficient in general. The paper provides sufficient conditions for when they are sufficient in the usual sense; it also provides a necessary and sufficient condition for all IC constraints if the one-stage deviation IC constraints in the usual sense are not sufficient.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131528406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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