The Efficacy of Tournaments for Non-Routine Team Tasks

Florian Englmaier, Stefan Grimm, Dominik Grothe, David Schindler, S. Schudy
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Abstract

Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams’ identity and social-image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a natural field experiment (n>1,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social-image motivates mainly the top-performing teams. Additional monetary incentives improve all teams’ outcomes without crowding out teams’ willingness to explore or perform similar tasks again.
比赛对非常规性团队任务的有效性
比赛通常用于提高创新环境中的表现。锦标赛提供了金钱奖励,但也突出了球队的身份和社会形象。我们研究了比赛对团队在非常规任务中的表现的影响,并确定了这些行为方面的重要性。在一个自然现场实验中(n> 1700名参与者),我们改变了团队身份、社会形象关注的显著性,以及团队是否面临金钱激励。提高团队认同感并不能提高绩效。社会形象主要激励表现最好的团队。额外的金钱激励可以改善所有团队的成果,而不会挤出团队再次探索或执行类似任务的意愿。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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