R - G

R. Barro
{"title":"R - G","authors":"R. Barro","doi":"10.3386/w28002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Long-term data show that the dynamic efficiency condition r>g holds when g is represented by the average growth rate of real GDP if r is the average real rate of return on equity, E(r e ) , but not if r is the risk-free rate, r f . This pattern accords with a simple disaster-risk model calibrated to fit observed equity premia. If Ponzi (chain-letter) finance by private agents and the government are precluded, the equilibrium can feature r f ≤E(g) , a result that does not signal dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, E(r e )>E(g) is required for dynamic efficiency, implied by the model, and consistent with the data. The model satisfies Ricardian Equivalence because, without Ponzi finance by the government, a rise in safe assets from increased public debt is matched by an increase in the safe (that is, certain) present value of liabilities associated with net taxes.","PeriodicalId":410550,"journal":{"name":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"22","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"R Minus G\",\"authors\":\"R. Barro\",\"doi\":\"10.3386/w28002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Long-term data show that the dynamic efficiency condition r>g holds when g is represented by the average growth rate of real GDP if r is the average real rate of return on equity, E(r e ) , but not if r is the risk-free rate, r f . This pattern accords with a simple disaster-risk model calibrated to fit observed equity premia. If Ponzi (chain-letter) finance by private agents and the government are precluded, the equilibrium can feature r f ≤E(g) , a result that does not signal dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, E(r e )>E(g) is required for dynamic efficiency, implied by the model, and consistent with the data. The model satisfies Ricardian Equivalence because, without Ponzi finance by the government, a rise in safe assets from increased public debt is matched by an increase in the safe (that is, certain) present value of liabilities associated with net taxes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":410550,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"22\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3386/w28002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CESifo: Behavioural Economics (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w28002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 22

摘要

长期数据表明,当g用实际GDP的平均增长率表示时,r为平均实际净资产收益率E(r E),动态效率条件r b> g成立,但当r为无风险利率r f时,动态效率条件r b> g成立。这种模式符合一个简单的灾害风险模型,该模型经过校准以拟合观察到的股权溢价。如果排除私人代理人和政府的庞氏(连锁)融资,则均衡可以具有r f≤E(g)的特征,这一结果并不表明动态无效率。相比之下,动态效率需要E(r E)>E(g),这是模型隐含的,与数据一致。该模型满足李嘉图等价,因为在没有政府的庞氏融资的情况下,公共债务增加带来的安全资产增加,与净税收相关的负债的安全(即确定)现值增加相匹配。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
R Minus G
Long-term data show that the dynamic efficiency condition r>g holds when g is represented by the average growth rate of real GDP if r is the average real rate of return on equity, E(r e ) , but not if r is the risk-free rate, r f . This pattern accords with a simple disaster-risk model calibrated to fit observed equity premia. If Ponzi (chain-letter) finance by private agents and the government are precluded, the equilibrium can feature r f ≤E(g) , a result that does not signal dynamic inefficiency. In contrast, E(r e )>E(g) is required for dynamic efficiency, implied by the model, and consistent with the data. The model satisfies Ricardian Equivalence because, without Ponzi finance by the government, a rise in safe assets from increased public debt is matched by an increase in the safe (that is, certain) present value of liabilities associated with net taxes.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信